A eg 


AT VtO1e CRP 2 
Row. Cry Ai 1816-1896. 


Christian theism 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2022 with funding from 
Princeton Theological Seminary Library 


https://archive.org/details/christiantheismb00rowc 


I CHRISTIAN. THEISM. 


Re 


Cipla sdibaen = dlshotowe 


4 BRIEF AND POPULAR SURVEY OF THE EVIDENCE UPON 
WHICH TT RESTS "AND THE-OBJEGLIONS CRGED 
AGAINST IT CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 


Cc. A” ROW, M.A. Oxon., 


Honorary D.D. of the University of the South United States, Prebendary of 
St. Paul's Cathedral, and Bampton Lecturer jor 1877. 


NEW YORK: 


lo Ha@ 2 MeArs. -.W Heltle LAs ke ke Re 
2, BIBLE HOUSE. 


% 


se ee ee 


(Pant del Denyee@ dope 


Y reason for composing the present work is 

a special one. I have been frequently 

asked to recommend a book, level to the under- 
standings of that large number of persons, whose 
engagements in the active duties of life render it 
impossible for them to devote themselves to special 
studies, which sets forth in a popular form the 
chief reasons on which the belief in the Being of a 
God who possesses the attributes which the Chris- 
tian revelation attributes to Him, is founded, and 
points out the fallacy of the current and widespread 
anti-Theistic theories of the present day. This | 
have felt myself unable to do. Several admirable 
works dealing with those evidences, and answering 
the objections of anti-Theists, exist, which leave little 
to be desired; but as far as I am aware, they are, 
without exception, addressed to the higher orders 
of thought. On the other hand, smaller works, 
and works of less pretensions, for the most part 
deal with particular aspects of the question. [| 
have, therefore, composed the present work with a . 
view to the requirements of the class of readers 
above referred to, in the hope and trust that | may 
succeed in removing some of the difficulties and 
objections which, if they do not subvert their faith, 


vl PREFACE, 


form serious causes of disquietude. The reader, 
therefore, must not expect to find in it discussions 
of high points of philosophy or science. I have 
appealed throughout it to the principles of common 
sense. When I commenced writing it, it was my 
intention to have produced a book of the size of 
my Manual of Christian Evidences, with the design 
that it should form a companion volume to it; but 
this, owing to the extent of the matter which at 
the present day underlies the Theistic controversy, 
I found to be impossible. Still, for the benefit of 
those persons for whose special use this work is 
designed, I have done all I can to shorten it, by 
excluding from it all matter which is not absolutely 
necessary for the completeness of the argument. I 
have, therefore, abstained from all discussions which 
are purely philosophical or scientific, and I have 
endeavoured to exhibit the reasons for believing in 
Christian Theism in a form which will commend 
them to those to whom God has not given either 
the time or the talents for entering on the higher 
class of studies, or those which require a course 
of special training for their appreciation, under the 
firm conviction that He has not left these without 
adequate reasons for believing both that He exists, 


and is a Rewarder of those who diligently seek 
Him. 


CO NSPE ING Teo. 


CHAPTER I. 


THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK 


CHART he Lis 


THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH RESTS OUR 
BELIEF IN THE BEING OF A GOD 


CUAL PERG ITT: 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 


CHAP IE RELY: 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION 


ECE abs ar ves 


THE VALIDITY OF THE PROOF WHICH THE ADJUSTMENTS, 
ADAPTATIONS, AND CORRELATIONS OF THE UNIVERSE, 
AFFORD TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT 
CREATOR 


CITA PAE Roe Vib 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION CONSIDERED 
_ AND REFUTED 


CHAP TE ReV Le 


THE COURSE OF REASONING ADOPTED IN THE TWO 
PREVIOUS CHAPTERS ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLE 


PAGE 


it 


46 


65 


87 


IZ0 


viii CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER VIII. 


PAGE 
THE EXISTENCE OF THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN PROVES 
THAT A GOD EXISTS, WHO IS NOT A MERE IMPER- 
SONAL FORCE, BUT A MORAL BEING, : : . 166 
CHAPTER VIX: 
POPULAR OBJECTIONS AGAINST CHRISTIAN THEISM— 
THEIR VALUE ESTIMATED . ; 5 : ’ aie 


CHAPTER =X. 


THE OBJECTIONS WHICH ARE URGED AGAINST CHRISTIAN 
THEISM OWING TO THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL 
AND THE RESULTS WITH WHICH IT IS ATTENDED . 251 


GHAP LER SAT 
THE QUESTION WHETHER WE HAVE REASON FOR BE- 
LIEVING THAT WE SHALL SURVIVE THE DISSOLUTION 
OF OUR BODIES; AND ITS BEARING ON THE PREVIOUS 
ARGUMENTS : ; : ! ; . 290 


CHAP TERS: 


Pie SCOP NOM aL Her RESEND UZORL 


HE questions, Is there a God who has made 
this universe and all that it contains ? does 

He exert a moral government over the world which 
He has created ? will man survive the stroke of 
death ? will God call him to an account hereafter 
for his conduct here ? will his conduct here exert 
an influence on his condition in the world beyond 
the grave ?—are considerations which cannot help 
awakening a profound interest in the mind of every 
thoughtful man; and can be disregarded by those 
only who are regardless about the future. If an exist- 
ence awaits us in a future state of being, in which 
our condition will be affected by our conduct here, 
then it becomes a matter of unspeakable importance 
that that conduct should be so ordered as to secure 
our happiness hereafter. But if there is no God, 
or if that which is designated God is an impersonal 
force, destitute of intelligence, will, and a moral 
nature,—as is now loudly proclaimed by not a few 


I 


CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


to 


who justly hold a high rank in special departments: 
of scientific research,—then there is every reason 
for believing that our conscious personal existence 
will terminate at death. In that case, full well may 
each of us pursue that course of life, be it what 
it may, which he thinks best calculated to realize 
his own happiness ; and what that course is he must 
be the only judge, for an objective rule. of duty 
binding on us there can be none. Consequently, 
whether a man lives what men have agreed to call 
a virtuous or a vicious course of life becomes a 
matter of personal taste and temperament. One 
therefore, whose aspirations are naturally noble, 
will consider a life of corresponding elevation his 
Supreme good. Another, whose tastes are grovel- 
ling and sensual, will pursue that course of life 
which he thinks will afford him the greatest amount 
of immediate pleasure and enjoyment; for amidst 
the shortness of life, and the uncertainty of its 
duration one thing only is certain: that, after its 
brief day has passed, the elevated and the base, 
the saint and the sinner, will sleep a sleep of uncon- 
sciousness, from which there will be no awakening, 
and in which pleasure and pain, happiness and 
misery, will cease for evermore. 

The question of the existence of a God, such as 
Christian Theism affirms to exist, being thus. pro- 
foundly important, it is my intention to discuss it 
in the present work in a form level to the under- 


THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK. 3 


standings of those whose engagements in the active 
business of life give them neither time nor oppor- 
tunity for entering on a course of special study; 
for such persons it equally concerns as those who 
have the time and talents necessary for studies of 
this description. I shall, therefore, avoid everything 
in our modern Theistic controversies for the appreci- 
ation of which such studies are necessary before it 
is possible to form a judgment of the validity of the 
reasonings involved in them. Numerous works, 
dealing with the higher forms of this controversy 
already exist; works of profound interest to those 
whose intellectual powers, and whose freedom from 
the engagements of ordinary life, enable them to 
devote themselves to such investigations. But such 
is not the lot of the masses of mankind. They have 
neither the intellectual training, nor the leisure 
necessary for the investigation of such questions. 
The ordinary vocations of life, its struggles, its 
labours, and the intervals of refreshment necessary 
for enabling those engaged in them to enter afresh 
on their daily recurring duties, are sufficient to mo- 
nopolize almost the entire time at their command. 
For such investigations therefore, even if they pos- 
sessed the intellectual training necessary for their 
successful prosecution the requisite leisure is 
wanting. 
Are there, then, no reasons level to the capacity 
of such, which will afford them firm grounds for 


4 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


believing in the existence of a God, to whom 
they are responsible for realizing the purpose for 
which He has brought them into being? Or is 
the question of His existence—a question of the 
profoundest interest to every individual—one which 
that comparatively small body which constitutes the 
intellectual aristocracy of mankind is alone compe- 
tent to adjudicate upon, and determine ; and are the 
masses left dependent upon them for information 
and for guidance? That this last alternative is 
the true one, it is difficult to believe; for inasmuch 
as those who claim to constitute this intellectual 
aristocracy, differ widely in the conclusions at which 
they have arrived, the question at once confronts 
the inquirer: To which portion of them is he to look 
for guidance and direction? The determination of 
such a question would involve a rehearing of the 
entire case; because it is impossible to determine 
which of those who hold opposite opinions on this 
subject can be safely followed as an infallible guide 
to truth, without having previously formed a judgment 
on the validity of the reasons on which his opinions 
profess to be founded. This would constitute each 
individual the ultimate judge of the validity of the 
reasonings in question; and thus would leave the 
difficulty precisely where it found it. But surely 
if there is a God, who is not a “mere force, but a 
moral being who holds man responsible for his 
actions, it is incredible that He should have left 


Peo CORK Oli he Kola LOR kK, 5 


the masses of mankind dependent on specialists 
for a knowledge of His existence, or that He should 
not have given them reasons for believing in it 
amply sufficient to command the assent of that 
reason with which He has endowed them. St. Paul 
at least was of this opinion, for he affirms that God 
had not left Himself without witness (Acts xiv. 17), 
and that the ‘invisible things of Him since the 
creation of the world are clearly seen, being per- 
ceived through the things that are made, even His 
everlasting power and divinity’” (Rom. i. 20) ; and 
in His address to the philosophers at Athens this 
is assumed throughout. 

The following truth, obvious as it is, is too often 
overlooked in the theistic controversy :—It by no 
means follows, because certain proofs of the existence 
of a God are level to people of ordinary understand- 
ing, that they are not in the highest degree conclusive. 
Among not a few there is a strange tendency to 
value what is rare, and to esteem things in proportion 
as they can only be the exclusive possession of a 
few. But the careful observer of human life will 
arrive at the conclusion, that the best of our pleasures 
and enjoyments are those which are most widely 
diffused. In asimilar manner I shall endeavour to 
show that the reasons for believing in the existence 
of a God, which are capable of commending them- 
selves to the masses of mankind, are the strongest 
and most conclusive; and that the arguments which 


6 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


have been adduced to prove that they are wanting 
in validity will fail to commend themselves to men 
of ordinary understanding. 

Such being the object of the present work, I shall 
confine myself to those arguments which do not 
require a course of special study for their due 
appreciation. Ina word, I shall appeal to the prin- 
ciples of common sense; such for example, as 
influence our actions in the ordinary affairs of life. 
With respect to objections I shall only notice those 
which are likely to exert an influence on those whose 
engagements in active life render them incapable of 
forming a judgment on questions of high philosophy, 
such as the theories adverse to Theism, which are 
industriously propagated among the masses by a 
numerous class of philosophers and scientists. <A 
vast amount of highly abstract reasoning has been 
introduced into the theistic controversy by persons 
of this description respecting the validity of our 
primary intuitions. I shall not ask the reader to 
enter into such discussions; but I shall assume that 
our primary intuitions are true, whatever may be 
the mode in which they may be supposed to have 
originated; the latter being a question wholly indepen- 
dent of the former, though the opponents of Theism 
have done their utmost to confound their truth with 
the question of their origin. In a word, I shall 
appeal to such principles, and have recourse to such 
reasonings, as constitute our practical guides in life ; 


THe SCOPE, OF THE PRESEN I: WORK. ‘i 


and on which, even unbelievers, while they dispute 
their validity when adduced as proofs of the being 
of a God, or of the existence in man of a conscience, 
or moral sense, habitually act. I shall, therefore, 
assume, if they are sufficient guides to conduct us in 
the ordinary affairs of life, as they undoubtedly are, 
that reasonings based on similar principles must 
constitute sufficient evidence of the being of a God. 
In making these observations, let me guard against 
the idea that it is my intention to say one word in 
depreciation of those discoveries of modern science 
which have so vastly enlarged our views of the uni- 
verse ; on the contrary, I cordially welcome them as 
a kind of fresh revelation. They have disclosed 
to us the fact that it is not limited by the bounds of 
earth and sky, or of human vision as former ages 
thought ; but that it is vast beyond human com- 
prehension, embracing the infinitely great and the 
infinitely minute, extending from the universe of 
suns and planets, in numbers numberless, to the 
minutest particle, which no human eye, even by the 
aid of the most powerful instrument which man has 
invented for enlarging his sphere of vision, has seen 
or can see. All these testify alike of power, order, 
adaptation, purpose; and give us additional reasons 
for believing, not only that a God exists, but in the 
boundlessness of His power, His presence, and His 
wisdom. Nay, even the objections which unbelievers 
have urged against His being, or if not against His 


8 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


being, against the belief in a God who bears any 
relation to mankind, have helped to clear away 
numerous errors of the past, which have caused His 
infinitude, His character, and the mode of His working 
to be imperfectly apprehended. Let every one, there- 
fore, to whom God has given the endowments and 
the leisure necessary for the study of such subjects, 
prosecute it to the utmost, and he will be rewarded 
by ever-increasing disclosures of the Creator’s glory. 

There is one thing before I conclude this portion 
of the subject to which I must draw special attention, 
because it is far too frequently overlooked. I allude 
to the distinction between the facts which have been 
ascertained, by careful scientific investigation in 
conformity with accepted scientific methods, as un- 
questionably true, and the theories which have been 
propounded as accounting for their origin. The 
facts thus verified are worthy of all acceptation ; 
and justly take the rank of accepted truths. The 
theories which have been propounded as explanations 
of these facts, stand on a wholly different basis. 
This is particularly the case when scientists have 
ventured to dogmatize, as they far too often have, 
on subjects which lie outside the sphere of their 
special studies. ‘In such cases their theories, affir- 
mations, and conjectures, have no more value than 
those of ordinary men of sound judgment ; and of 
far less value than those who have devoted themselves 
to the special studies on which, without any special 


THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK, 9 


qualification for doing so, the former have under- 
taken to dogmatize. This caution is especially 
necessary at the present day, because there is a 
widespread practice of attempting to bear down the 
ordinary believer in Christian Theism by some name 
deservedly eminent in some particular department of 
scientific research, who ventures to propound theories 
and make affirmations on points which have formed 
no portion of his special studies. Such persons 
have loudly charged theologians with dogmatizing, 
and not unjustly; but when they venture to make 
assertions outside the range of those scientific pur- 
suits, for their eminence in which they owe their 
celebrity, they commit the very fault which they 
condemn in others. Many men of great celebrity in 
the scientific world have strongly condemned all 
abstract studies, especially metaphysics ; but when 
they propound a theory of the origin of the facts 
which they investigate, ultimately resolving itself 
into a theory of the origin of the universe, they 
plunge into a number of metaphysical questions, the 
study of which they repudiate. Science can tell us 
much respecting the order and the secondary agencies 
by which the universe, and especially the world in 
which we live, has been brought into its present 
form ; but respecting its cause, it can tell us nothing. 
Science deals with facts, and facts only; the inquiry 
into their causes, and the origin of things, lies outside 


its limits, 


10 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Before I conclude this chapter, I would offer 
one additional caution: Be careful not to under- 
take the defence of positions which are not essential 
to the issue. This is a danger to which zealous 
controversialists are particularly liable, and one 
which I have endeavoured to guard against in the 
present work. Not a few of the defenders of 
Theism and Christianity would have done well if 
they had attended to this necessary caution. Both, - 
but the latter especially, have received nearly as 
much damage from the indiscretions of friends as 
from the attacks of foes. It is obvious that the 
wider the line of defence is extended the more 
difficult it will be to defend it. Let me illustrate 
my meaning by a metaphor derived from warfare. 
_As long as a firm hold can be kept on the key 
of a position, an unnecessary extension of the out- 
works becomes most dangerous, for a force adequate 
to defend the one may be utterly inadequate to 
defend the other. Thus, by unduly extending the 
line of your defence, you incur the danger of giving 
your opponent the prestige of apparent victory, by 
affording him the opportunity of capturing some 
outwork which is immaterial to the defence itself. 
In the present work it is my intention to occupy 
in force those positions which form the key of 
Christian Theism, under the firm persuasion that 
if I can maintain these, others may be safely left to 
take care of themselves, 


CHAPTER II. 


THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE ON WHICH RESTS 
OUR BELIEF IN THE BEING OF A GOD. 


EFORE entering on our immediate subject, it 
will be necessary to explain to the reader 
the nature of the evidence on which the being of 
a God rests, because misconceptions on this subject 
are very widespread. I observe, therefore, in the / 
first place, that it is not capable of being proved 
by that kind of evidence which is called demon- 
strative. 

Attempts, it is true, have been made to prove 
His existence by a course of reasoning of this 
description ; but it is now the all but universal 
opinion of competent judges, that the attempts to 
do so have proved failures. At any rate, it Is 
certain that the reasoning processes by which it 
has been attempted to give a demonstrative proof 
of His existence, are far above the comprehension 
of the overwhelming majority of mankind, and, 
therefore, as far as our present argument is con- 
cerned, are valueless. Our inability to prove His 


12 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 


existence by evidence of this description has 
frequently been urged against the validity of 
the proof; one class of unbelievers affirming that, 
if a God exists, we ought to be able to give a demon- 
strative proof of His existence ; and another, that 
that portion of the evidence on which, up to a very 
recent period, Theists have most strongly relied, has 
been proved by the discoveries of modern science 
to be valueless. To these objections I reply, 

That the kind of’ evidence which is called 
‘demonstration ”” is not the only kind of evidence 
which is calculated to convey to the human mind 
the conviction of absolute certainty. This convic- 
tion is equally produced by that kind of evidence 
which is called moral, or circumstantial. This being 
a point of the greatest importance, in relation to the 
Theistic controversy, I must endeavour to set before 
the reader, as briefly as I am able, the nature of 
these two kinds of evidence, and to estimate the 
power of each to produce on our minds the con- 
viction of absolute certainty. 

Demonstrative evidence consists of two kinds. 
The first is founded on two of our primary concep- 
tions, namely, quantity and extension. In connection 
with these arise a number of propositions, designated 
axioms, that is, propositions of which our minds, as 
they are at present constituted, not only affirm their 
absolute truth, but that their contradictory must be 
absolutely false. Of this kind of proposition the 


THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENGE. ie 


axioms on which the science of geometry is based 
form the best possible illustration. Thus, as soon 
as our minds are capable of forming the conception 
of “whole” and “ part,” they cannot help perceiving 
that the affirmation that the whole is greater than 
its part is, and must be, absolutely true; and that 
the contrary proposition, which affirms that the 
part is greater than, or equal to, the whole must be 
absolutely false. The same is equally true of the 
other axioms of Euclid, except the twelfth, which, 
although beyond all doubt true, cannot be said to 
be self-evident. So also with respect to our pri- 
mary conceptions of number. Thus, as soon as 
we are capable of understanding what one, two, 
three, four, and five mean, we know, with a cer- 
tainty which nothing can exceed, that two and two 
are equal to four; and that twice ‘two cannot by 
any possibility be equal to five. Truths of this 
kind are incapable of having any addition made to 
their certainty by any process of reasoning. From 
these as a basis, aided by a few simple definitions 
and a still smaller number of postulates, of which 
it is impossible to doubt the possibility—as, for 
example, “that it is possible to draw a straight 
line from one point to another’”’”—have been deduced 
a vast number of additional propositions, which are 
not in themselves self-evident, but the truth of 
which is established as indubitable by the most 
rigid deductions of our logical faculty from the 


14 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


axioms, definitions, and postulates above referred 
to. This is what, in mathematical language, is 
called ‘ demonstration,” that is, when a number of 
propositions follow, as a matter of necessity, from 
the truth of other propositions which our minds 
cannot help recognizing as true. This kind of 
evidence, however, is only possible when the con- 
ceptions on which we reason are simple. and 
uncompounded, such as our primary conceptions 
of space, quantity, and number. But when they 
are of a complicated character, as is the case in 
every other department of thought, various ele- 
ments of uncertainty enter into our conclusions, 
and our deductions from them cease to possess 
the character of demonstrations. Hence it is that 
it is impossible to prove the existence of a God by 
any course of reasoning which is in this sense 
demonstrative. It is equally impossible to prove 
the truth of any particular fact by a course of 
reasoning of this description. The truth of these 
and similar things can only be established by 
reasonings of an entirely different character. 

The second kind of evidence to which the term 
‘“‘demonstration”” is applied in scientific treatises 
admits of being described with greater brevity. A 
truth is said in scientific language to be demon- 
strated, when it is capable of being verified by its 
being subjected to certain well-known scientific tests, 
and thereby to its being brought under the ultimate 


LHEANALORE: OFTHE EVIDENCE. 15 


cognizance of the senses. Such verifications are 
only capable of being applied to material things, 
which alone constitute the proper subject-matter 
of the physical sciences, and are inapplicable to 
things mental, moral, and spiritual, for these latter 
belong to a wholly different sphere of thought. 
Consequently, it is impossible by any such process to 
demonstrate the existence of a God, or of the soul 
of man. When the existence of the latter is denied, 
as it has been denied, because its existence cannot 
be proved by the use of such tests, it proves either 
ignorance of the entire subject of mind and its 
phenomena on the part of him who makes such an 
assertion, or that he covertly assumes that nothing 
exists in the universe but matter and its forces, 
which is neither more or less than to beg the question 
at issue. No believer in the existence of spiritual 
beings is so foolish as to imagine that their existence 
is capable of being either proved or disproved by 
any test which is capable of being verified by the 
Senses ; for the conception which the human mind 
forms of spiritual existence precludes the possibility 
of applying to it tests of this description, because 
our primary conceptions of matter and mind are 
directly antithetic to one another. 

We now come to the consideration of that kind of 
evidence which is denoted by the term moral or 
circumstantial, cumulative, etc. On it our belief in 
everything which is not the result of our primary 


16 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


intuitions, or on strictly logical deductions from those 
intuitions, or on things which are not capable of 
being subjected to the test of our individual senses, 
rests. I use the word “individual,” because our 
belief in what other men affirm that they have seen 
and heard, or tested by their senses, rests on 
evidence of this description. It has been truly said 
that probable evidence is the guide of life, for it is 
an unquestionable fact, that if we refused to act upon 
it, and demanded that kind of evidence which is 
called demonstrative, before we engaged in action, 
all human activity would come to a standstill. Past 
experience must be set aside as worthless, our 
hopes for the future quashed, and all testimony as 
a proof of fact invalidated. As it is on evidence of 
this kind that our belief in Theism rests, we must 
give a careful consideration to its nature and value. 
Probable evidence varies in degree as to its power 
to produce conviction. Its extreme limits are, 
absolute certainty on the one hand, and what we 
call a bare probability on the other. Between these 
two limits le various degrees of assurance of the 
truth of a proposition, or of the occurrence of an 
event. A bare probability that an event may occur, 
or a proposition be true, conveys to the mind an 
assurance so weak, that to act upon it would be to 
trust simply to chance; but when a number of pro- 
babilities meet together, and concur at the same time 
and place, they produce a conviction approximating 


Pipe ALoRL. OF sfHi EVIDENGE. 17 


to certainty, exactly in proportion to the frequency 
of their occurrence ; and when this concurrence ex- 
tends over a large number of instances, a conviction 
of certainty which is absolute and complete. 

The power of this kind of evidence to produce con- 
viction will be better illustrated by an example than 
by any amount of mere abstract statement. Let us 
suppose four dice to be thrown once into the air. In 
this case it is within the limits of probability, though 
the probability is a very low one, that they may all 
fall with their aces upwards, and it would be unjust 
to charge the person who threw them with being 
guilty ofa fraud. But if the operation were performed 
thrice with the same result, a suspicion of unfairness 
would be justly aroused. Still even this would not 
be such conclusive evidence of fraud as would jus- 
tify a jury in returning a verdict of guilty. But if 
the same operation were repeated ten times, and each 
time the dice fell with their aces upward, we should 
feel absolutely certain that they were loaded; and a 
few repetitions of this process would produce in any 
one of ordinary mental endowments as firm a con- 
viction of certainty, as is produced on the mind of 
the mathematician of the truth of any proposition 
proved by the most rigid process of demonstration. 

Let me now take an illustration from ordinary 
life. It frequently happens that a murder has been 
committed, but no one has witnessed it. The mur- 
derer can only be convicted on what is designated 

2 


18 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


circumstantial evidence. In that case the posses- 
sion of some one thing, as, for example, a revolver 
from which two shots had been fired, the bullets in the 
remaining chambers exactly corresponding with the 
bullets extracted from the body of the murdered 
man, though sufficient to rouse a very strong sus- 
picion of guilt, would be evidence wholly inadequate 
to prove that the man in whose possession such 
a revolver was found, was the murderer. In such a 
case there would be the counter-probability that 
inasmuch as numbers of revolvers are manufactured 
with chambers of exactly the same size and with 
bullets fitted to them, the revolver in question may 
have been purchased for a purpose perfectly inno- 
cent, and that the possessor of it may have loaded 
it and discharged two of its chambers for his amuse- 
ment, leaving the remaining ones undischarged. 
But, if on the other hand, a revolver was found near 
the place of the murder; if the balls extracted from 
the murdered man corresponded exactly with balls 
found in the possession of the supposed murderer 5 
if it could be proved on reliable testimony that he 
had only a few days before purchased both the balls 
and the revolver ; ifin addition he was seen hastening 
from the place of the murder at the time when it 
must have been committed ; if stains of blood which 
the analysts pronounced to be human blood were 
found on his clothes; if it could be proved that he 
had pawned a watch which was indisputably the 


Mtl tl Ciccolo of dd eT DIINGE. 19 


watch of the murdered man; or, if he had in his 
possession trinkets or clothing which had been his 
property, or that he had disposed of them; if the 
marks of footsteps about the place of the murder 
corresponded exactly with the impression which 
would be made by his boots; and if it could be 
further proved that his circumstances were such as 
to have induced him to commit the murder,—no one 
possessed of ordinary acumen could entertain a doubt 
that the man in whom these circumstances met, 
though taken one by one they would only justify a 
strong suspicion of guilt, was the murderer. | 

This feeling of certainty, though produced by a 
wholly different process, would be quite as great and 
be as fully justified as that of a mathematician in a 
truth which he had arrived at by the most rigid 
process of mathematical demonstration. The reason 
of this is that the human mind is so constituted as 
to be incapable of believing that a number of cir- 
cumstances, such as I have presupposed, can by any 
possibility meet together by hap-hazard in the same 
person. So certain is such a concurrence of circum- 
stances as a guide to our practical judgments, that 
even an unbeliever, who theoretically rejects evidence 
of this description as proof of the being of a God, 
would, | think, not hesitate, if he were sitting on a 
jury, and a body of evidence of this description were 
adduced in proof that the man in whom it all met 
was guilty of murder, to return a verdict of guilty, 


20 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


though no eye had seen him commit the crime. 
This, however, as I shall show hereafter, is a very 
imperfect representation of the force of the evidence 
which the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
of the universe furnish to the existence of an 
intelligent Creator. 

It not unfrequently happens, however, when a 
jury return a verdict on evidence, equally or little 
less strong than that which I have presupposed, 
that a number of persons come forward and impugn 
the justice of the verdict, on the ground that the 
evidence is only circumstantial and not direct. This, 
I think, can only arise from prejudice on the part 
of the objector, or from his surveying the parts of 
the evidence one by one instead of estimating 
their conjoint force taken as a whole. I draw 
attention to this because objections on_ precisely 
similar grounds have been urged against the evi- 
dence of Theism. It should be observed that cir- 
cumstantial evidence, such as above described, is 
far more reliable than direct testimony. It is an 
old but true saying, that facts cannot he, whereas 
testimony not only may, but frequently does; and 
mistakes as to personal identity are not uncommon, 
even on the part of those who are sincerely desirous 
of speaking the truth. All this weakens the force of 
direct testimony, but leaves that of moral evidence 
untouched. 

The above observations have an intimate bearing 


THES NALURE- OF THE EVIDENCE. 21 


on those evidences of Theism which act with the 
greatest force on the masses of mankind. I allude 
to what is commonly, though perhaps somewhat 
inaccurately, called ‘“‘the argument from design.” 
I say ‘somewhat inaccurately” because it has been 
frequently objected that the word “‘ design” involves 
a petitio principu, though, after all, the objection is little 
better than a cavil. I shall, therefore, in the course 
of this argument, substitute for the word “design” 
some other term against which no exception can be 
raised, and use in its place the words “ adjustment” 
and “adaptation,” which merely state a fact which 
must be conceded alike by Theists and anti-Theists. 

As this argument is one which is more level to 
persons of ordinary understanding than any other 
which is adduced in proof of Theism, it need not 
surprise us that very numerous attempts have been 
made by anti-Theists during the present century to 
dispute its validity ; and to show that these adjust- 
ments and adaptations, the existence of which, let it 
be observed, is not disputed, do not prove that they 
must have originated in intelligence, but that they 
may have been brought about by the interaction 
and mutual struggle, during the ages of the past, 
of the unintelligent forces of the universe, acting 
in conformity with invariable law. I propose, 
therefore, to give to this portion of the evidence, 
and to the objections which have been urged 
against it, a careful consideration in the course 


22 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


of the following chapters, under the firm conviction 
that it is a proof which is calculated to convey to 
the masses of mankind an assurance that a God 
exists, who is not a mere force destitute of intelli- 
gence and volition, but who is an all-powerful, 
all-wise, and intelligent Creator. 

The nature of the argument founded on the 
analogy above referred to, which I shall endeavour 
to set before the reader, may be briefly stated thus. 
As in the case of the dice the inference would be 
inevitable that they were loaded, if twelve of them, 
when thrown at hap-hazard into the air, fell twenty 
times in succession with their aces upwards, although 
the observer had no means of ascertaining the fact, 
either by weighing them, or measuring them; so 
from the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
with which the universe everywhere abounds, the 
inference is no less certain that it must be loaded 
likewise ; and that that with which it is loaded is the 
presence, and the directing hand of a God, to whose 
power and intelligence it is impossible to assign 
limitations. This inference is no less certain, though 
we cannot make His presence visible to our bodily 
senses, or weigh it in our scales. The evidence 
is of the same kind as that on which, in the ab- 
sence of direct testimony, a jury does not hesitate 
to return a verdict of guilty against a criminal, 
even when the forfeiture of his life is the result ; 
and only differs from it by the overwhelming weight _ 


THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE. 23 


which is une to it ty the fact that the ad- 
justments and adaptations of the universe are not 
limited to some ten or twelve concurring facts, 
which, when taken in combination, lead to the same 
inevitable conclusion, but which exist in numbers 
past human comprehension, all concurring to prove 
the existence of intelligent volition. Innumerable 
complicated adjustments and orderly arrangements 
not only fitted to realize a particular result, but 
which actually do so, the effect of the hap-hazard 
meeting together of matter and forces devoid of 
intelligence and volition is unbelievable. 

Finally. As it is impossible to prove the existence 
of God by that kind of evidence which is called 
“ demonstrative,” it is equally impossible to do so by 
that which is called “direct.” The reason of this 
is obvious. Our only rational conception of Him 
is that of a being who is everywhere present at 
every point of space, and whom, therefore, it is 
impossible to see with mortal eye. This being so, 
the belief in His existence must be an inference of 
some kind. 1 am aware that it has been urged 
by some that it is an intuition of the human mind 
prior to all reasoning. I cannot think so, for then 
the intuition of His existence would be universal, 
which it certainly is not. I fully admit that the 
universality—or the all but universality—of religion 
proves that.there is something in the constitution 
of human nature which has suggested, even to the 


24 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


most uncultured races, the existence of a super- 
human being, although their conceptions of such 
a being are for the most part of a degraded 
character. But this differs widely from a direct 
intuition of His existence, which, if it were real, 
would be in all places everywhere alike. I trust, 
however, that I shall be able to prove from the 
authoritative declarations of conscience, when it 
affirms a law of duty binding on man, and makes 
him feel self-condemned for its violation, not only 
that a being exists to whom the duty is due; but 
that he is a being possessed of the attributes 
which Christian Theism ascribes to God. But even 
here, the only thing of which we have a direct in- 
tuitive knowledge, is the affirmation of conscience 
proclaiming a law of duty. The existence of a 
being in whom all duty and obligation centre is 
an inference, though an obvious one. - Similar 
remarks are applicable to the evidence on which 
we believe that our conscious existence will survive 
the dissolution of our bodies. 

It has often been urged, and will doubtless be 
urged again, if a God exists to whom we are re- 
sponsible for our conduct here, and if our conduct 
here will be attended with important consequences 
to ourselves in an existence beyond the grave, that 
He ought to have given us evidence of this far 
more cogent than that which we possess, either by 
making our belief in His existence, and of our 


THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE. 25 


survival one of our primary intuitions; or else 
that the evidence of it should be such that we can- 
not help believing in it. In reply to this objection, 
I observe, first, that we are very inadequate judges 
of what God ought to have done, as far as providing 
us with intuitive knowledge, or affording us on these 
points evidence which cannot be resisted, is con- 
cerned; and that He will hold men responsible only 
for the light which He has imparted to them, and not 
for that which He has withheld: and secondly, that 
His not having done so, by no means invalidates 
the proofs which He has given us of His existence, 
and of the duties due to Him by us as our Creator 
and Preserver. The only real questions for our con- 
sideration are: Is the evidence which we possess 
sufficient to afford us adequate reason for believing 
that a God exists to whom we are reponsible for our 
conduct here ; and has He not, as our Creator, a right 
to our devoted service? Does He care, or is He 
indifferent whether we realize the purpose for which 
He has created us? Will the characters which we 
have formed here follow us into the world beyond 
the grave? If these questions must be answered 
in the affirmative, the survival of our conscious 
existence after death is a certain consequence, 
although our reasons for believing in it are not 
demonstrative, but are indefinitely stronger than 
that moral evidence on which we act with the 
fullest assurance in the affairs of ordinary life. 


CEA PALE Regula 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 


Hi Re system known by the name of Agnosticism 

is widely diffused in the upper regions of 
thought, and is exerting no little influence in promot- 
ing unbelief in its lower strata. As it lays the axe 
to the root of all Theistic investigations by assuming 
that they are nugatory ; that the question whether 
there is a God suchas Theists presuppose transcends 
the limits of the human understanding, and that 
when we ascribe certain attributes to God we are 
guilty of what is called Anthropomorphism, that is, 
that we manufacture a God who exists nowhere but 
in our own imagination; it is necessary before pro- 
ceeding further that I should offer a few observations 
on its general principles. 

While it concedes that a belief in the existence 
of a First Cause of the Universe, which is itself 
uncaused,—which, if we please, we may call God— 
is a necessity of thought ; yet because it is infinite 
and man’s intellect is finite, it affirms that we 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 27 


neither know, nor can know, anything about its 
nature or its attributes. We must, therefore, beware 
of attributing to it either personality, wisdom, will, 
a moral character, the exercise of any providential 
care over the universe of which it is the Cause, or 
even any purpose or design in its formation. From 
these principles it follows that the existence of such 
a being need not exercise any influence on human 
conduct, and that the entire course of our lives may 
be safely, perhaps I ought to say wisely, regulated 
without any reference to it (I must not say “ Him,” 
for that would be to ascribe to it personality) ; 
and that the proper answer to every question which 
our curiosity may suggest respecting it, is that we 
neither know, nor can know, anything about it, and 
therefore that all inquiry is as much lost labour. 
From these principles the very portentous con- 
clusion follows, that the God in whom Christian 
Theists believe is neither more nor less than the 
projection of the highest attributes of man, magnified 
indefinitely, into some unknown substratum, and 
then designating this figment of our own imagin- 
ations God; or, as a very popular writer of this 
school of thought has most profanely put it, that the 
God of Christian Theists is a kind of magnified Lord 
Shaftesbury. It need hardly be said that a God 
of this kind is as much one of our own making as 
an idol is of him that fashions it. The propounders 
of these views object to be called Atheists. They 


28 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


say, ‘‘ No; we neither know, nor can know, anything 
about God. All that we affirm is that the entire 
subject transcends the limits of our understandings 
to say whether He exists or not ; and consequently 
that the God in whom you believe is a figment of 
the imagination.” Such a system, therefore, may be 
not incorrectly designated ‘“‘ Moral Atheism.” 

This entire system of thought is based on reason- 
ings of a very abstract character, so abstract that 
they require special endowments, and a special 
training, to enable a judgment to be formed as to 
their validity. Into these mazes, therefore, I shall 
not ask the reader to enter. But as the objections 
against Christian Theism which have been founded 
on their basis have been loudly trumpeted in popular 
lectures, and in works which are easily accessible, 
by certain individuals who hold a high reputation as 
philosophers and scientists; and there is, therefore, 
no small danger that they may impress those who 
are incapable of forming any judgment respecting 
the value of the reasonings adduced by the sheer 
weight of authority, it will be necessary that I 
should point out that the principles and reasonings 
in question lead to results which are repugnant to 
that common sense which constitutes the only guide 
in life of the overwhelming majority of mankind. 

In order that I may avoid involving the reader in 
a labyrinth of metaphysical puzzles, I must en- 
deavour to set before him the principles on which 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 29 


this system is based in the simplest form, and free 
from language which is difficult to translate into 
vernacular English.* I think that they may be 
reduced to the two following affirmations :— 

1. That it is impossible for the finite to compre- 
hend the infinite, or even to frame to itself any 
image of it which can enable us to constitute it a 
definite subject of thought. This being so, inas- 
much as the human intellect is finite, and the very 
conception of God involves the idea of His infinity ; 
it is impossible, even if there is a God, for finite 
man to attain any knowledge of His nature, or of 
His character, which is real. 

2. Inasmuch as the idea of God involves on His 
part the possession of the following attributes: 
namely, that He is Infinite, that He is the Absolute 
Being, and that He is the First Cause of the 
Universe ; and that these three conceptions, when 
viewed as united in the same being, involve a 


* To give the reader an idea of the unintelligible language in 
which the propounders of this system of philosophy express 
themselves, I quote the following words from Mr. H. Spencer’s 
explanation of the mode in which, according to the principles 
of the agnostic philosophy, the present universe has been evolved, 
namely, by “a change from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a 
definite coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations and 
integrations.” These words will enable the reader to understand 
what I mean when I speak of “language difficult to translate into 
vernacular English.” Commenting on them, Mr. Goldwin Smith 
writes: ‘This universe may well have heaved a sigh of relief 
when, through the cerebration of an eminent thinker, it had been 
delivered of this account of its origin,” 


30 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 


- ———— as — a . SS 


number of contradictions,—this renders all reason- 
ings on the subject nugatory and invalid, and con- 
sequently all knowledge of the realities which exist 
in Him impossible. Perhaps it is necessary that I 
should inform the reader who is unaccustomed to 
this kind of speculation, that by the words, ‘the 
Absolute Being,” is meant a being who - exists 
devoid of all relations to every other being, a thing 
which it is alleged must be true of God if He has 
existed throughout the eternity of the past, prior to 
that creative act by which He brought the universe 
into existence. 

Respecting these positions I observe that none 
are more ready than Christian Theists to admit that 
our knowledge of God, though real as far as it goes, 
is not perfect knowledge, and that there are realities 
in His being, which transcend the powers of our 
finite intellects to grasp. This, however, is a diffi- 
culty which is by no means peculiar to Theism, but 
is one which extends over the entire range of 
human knowledge, every department of which runs 
up into some ultimate, the real nature of which 
man’s finite intellect is unable to fathom. If, there- 
fore, the objection, that, because our knowledge of 
God is partial, or because it runs up into problems, 
the solution of which transcends the powers of our 
finite understandings, is valid against Christian 
Theism, it is equally so against every kind of know- 
ledge which we imagine that we possess, The 


Pa ts 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 31 


reasonings in question, therefore, if carried out to 
their legitimate consequences, would involve us in 
universal scepticism. But between perfect know- 
ledge, and total inability to know anything which is 
real, a great gulf lies; and I feel convinced that no 
amount of abstract reasoning will induce men of 
ordinary understanding to believe that because there 
are actualities in the Divine existence which tran- 
scend the power of our finite minds to penetrate, that 
therefore we can know nothing about Him which is 
real. It has been affirmed by a well-known popular 
writer that to a God who is unknowable we may 
render worship of a silent kind; but I think that 
my readers will be of opinion that a God, respecting 
whom we can know nothing, is incapable of pro- 
ducing in the human mind the feeling of either 
adoration, reverence, or love, or of exerting any 
influence on our conduct. 

The unsoundness of the basis on which this 
system of philosophy rests may be made clear to 
the ordinary reader by the aid of a very simple 
illustration derived from a subject with which he 
is well acquainted; I allude to our conception of 
space. It is impossible to conceive of space as 
limited ; for if in imagination we attempt to assign 
a boundary to it, the question at once presents it- 
self, What is the boundary of that boundary ? and 
so on for evermore. On the other hand, owing to 
the limitations of the human mind, it is impossible 


32 CHRIS TIAN.ITIEIOM, 


for it to picture to itself an image of a space which 
is destitute of limits. From this the conclusion has 
been drawn by certain metaphysical philosophers. 
that our conception of space is no representation of 
any reality which exists outside the human mind; 
and that if any reality exists, outside our subjective 
consciousness, we can know nothing about its nature 
which is real. Whatever effect such reasoning may 
have on those who delight in courses of abstract 
reasoning, I cannot but think that they will fail to 
commend themselves to people of ordinary under- 
standing, who, whenever they set themselves in 
motion find space to be a great reality. If such a 
person were to travel from London to Calcutta, is it 
credible that either he or even a metaphysical philo- 
sopher could be induced to believe that that through 
which he was persuaded that he had been travelling 
several thousand miles had no objective existence 
outside his own brain ? Our inability, therefore, to 
penetrate into all the secrets of the infinite, or to 
image it in our own minds in its infinity, does not 
hinder us from attaining a partial knowledge of it 
which is real. Such is our conception of space, and 
such is our knowledge of God, real as far as it goes, 
but imperfect. 

From the Agnostic position that because God is 
infinite and man finite all real knowledge of God is 
impossible, a number of conclusions have been 
deduced which directly contradict the positions on 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 33 


which its reasonings are based. Thus, the Agnostic 
argues because man’s conceptions are finite they 
cannot represent any reality which exists in the 
infinite ; and inasmuch as the conceptions of person- 
ality, will, intelligence, a moral nature, and various 
other attributes which Christian Theists habitually 
ascribe to God all involve finiteness, they can denote 
no realities which exist in the infinite. From this, 
as I have observed above, he adduces the additional 
conclusion that a wise man will do well to frame his 
conduct without any reference to a being who is thus 
unknown and unknowable. But if these positions are 
true, it is evident that our knowledge of God is not 
inconsiderable. The Agnostic will object that all this 
is merely negative knowledge. Granted; but the 
knowledge of what a thing is not is frequently a very 
important kind of knowledge, especially when, as 
in the case before us, may be deduced from it the 
positive conclusion that the whole course of human 
life may be regulated without any reference to that 
being which this system of philosophy allows us to 
designate God. 

The position that the phenomena of the universe 
are manifestations of its First Cause, respecting which 
we can know nothing but the bare fact of its exist- 
ence, is one which is in striking contradiction to our 
ordinary modes of reasoning which we find verified 
in our daily experience. It is admitted by Agnostics 
that we know not a little about phenomena; in fact, 


2 


34 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


they affirm that all our knowledge, both ordinary and 
scientific, is either a knowledge of phenomena or a 
deduction from it. How then, I ask, is it possible 
that we can know nothing about the Cause of the 
universe, of which all its phenomena are manifesta- 
tions ? In every other department of knowledge we 
invariably draw inferences from the phenomena 
which come under our observation, and we are of 
opinion that they enable us to attain some knowledge 
which is real respecting the Causes which have pro- 
duced them. We may not be able to know everything 
about them, but our experience proves, when pheno- 
mena are accurately observed, and when in drawing 
our conclusions due weight has been attached to 
them as a whole, that our knowledge, though it may 
be only partial, is yet real. Our habits of drawing 
inferences of this kind are so universal—they form 
the very guide of our practical life—that everyone 
can find abundance of instances of having done so in 
his own experience. To it, therefore, it will be 
better that I should refer the reader, rather than 
adduce a few striking instances, which at best can 
form only an imperfect representation of what is the 
habitual practice not only of those who are endowed 
with ordinary common sense, but even of agnostic 
philosophers themselves. On what principle, then, I 
ask, is it that the only exception against the validity of 
reasonings of this kind is, when we draw inferences 
from the phenomena of the universe respecting the 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 35 


character of its Cause, ¢.c. of God? The knowledge 
of Him which we are able to arrive at from this source 
may, | should rather say must, be imperfect know- 
ledge, because our knowledge of the phenomena of 
the universe is confined to that very small portion of 
it which comes under our observation ; but this does 
not hinder it, as far as it goes, from being real. 

I must now offer a few remarks on the objection, 
so constantly urged by Agnostics, that Christian 
Theism is neither more nor less than anthropo- 
morphism, or, in other words, that the God whom 
Christians worship is a man-made God. 

The word ‘“anthropomorphism” is compounded 
of two Greek words—avOpw7ros, man ; and popdy, 
which means, form, shape, or figure. The abstract 
term “anthropomorphism,” has no word which corre- 
sponds to it in Greek ; but out of these two words is 
compounded an adjective—dv@pwrouopdos, which 
means of human form ; and a verb avOpwropophow, 
the meaning of which is, to form a thing like a man, 
or to clothe it in human shape. As long, therefore, as 
this verb is used in its primary meaning, with the 
intention of denouncing as utterly inadequate and 
unreal, every term which has been applied to God, 
except by way of analogy, or metaphor, which repre- 
sents Him as possessing the form, shape, and figure 
of a man, it may be cordially adopted by every in- 
telligent Christian Theist, for none now believe that 
the Most High possesses body, parts, passions, or a 


4 


36 CHRISTIAN ‘THEISM. 


human shape. But the word as it is now employed 
by unbelievers has acquired a very extended mean- 
ing, and is used as a denunciation of every form of 
theistic belief which ascribes to God any attribute of 
man, even the highest and the noblest, such as per- 
sonality, volition, free agency, intelligence, holiness, 
justice, or benevolence ; because, as it is alleged, these 
conceptions being finite human ones, can denote no 
corresponding realities in a being who is infinite. 
For these and similar reasons, a numerous body of 
unbelievers seem to think that to denounce Christian 
Theism as anthropomorphism is a sufficient proof 
that the belief in it is founded on a delusion. . No 
weapon is more extensively used by its opponents 
than this kind of denunciation. 

With respect to this objection, I observe, 

First: It proves too much, for the following reason. 
All our conceptions, whether of things in heaven or of 
things on earth, cannot be other than human concep- 
tions, because as human beings, we possess no other. 
If, therefore, for this reason we can have no assurance 
that there is any objective reality corresponding to 
them, the whole of our knowledge of external things 
would be invalidated. Into the highly abstract dis- 
cussion of the relation between the perceiving subject 
and the perceived object I shall not enter, because it 
is one which is not only highly perplexing, but which 
can have no practical interest to the readers whom I 
am addressing. But if, as it is urged by the Agnostic, 


* 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 37 


that because our conceptions are finite human ones 
they can denote no corresponding realities as they 
exist in God, I observe that it by no means follows 
because our conception of a thing is finite that it is 
incapable of denoting a reality as it exists in the 
infinite. Thus, as I have observed above, our finite 
conception of space does not cease to denote an 
objective reality corresponding to it, because we 
cannot conceive of space otherwise than boundless. 
In a similar manner, when Theists affirm that God’s 
power, wisdom, and benevolence are devoid of limita- 
tions, and His holiness and justice perfect, itis absurd 
to affirm that our human conceptions of these attri- 
butes can denote no corresponding realities in Him, 
or, as some theologians have even taught, that be- 
nevolence, holiness, and justice, as conceived of by 
man, may denote one thing, and that when these 
attributes are ascribed to God they may denote some- 
thing widely different from our human conceptions 
of them. 

Second: The objection, viewed as one against 
Christian Theism, js valueless. Christian Theists 
believe that God has created man in His own image 
and likeness. If this is true, it follows as a necessary 
consequence that the highest attributes of man must 
have something which corresponds to them in the 
Divine nature. Unless, therefore, the Agnostic can 
prove (which he cannot) that God cannot have created 
man in His own image, the objection owes its entire 


38 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


plausibility to the fact that, somewhere in the course 
of the reasoning by which it has been attempted to 
be established, the point requiring to be proved has 
been covertly assumed. The question, therefore, 
resolves itself into the following alternative : Which 
is the more probable: That there is a God who has 
created man in His own image and likeness; or that 
man, with all his mighty powers of intellect, his free 
agency, and his moral nature, has been evolved out 
of we know not what by forces destitute of freedom, 
intelligence, and morality ? 

Let it be observed when Christian Theists affirm 
that there are realities in God, such as intelligence, 
freedom, a moral nature, holiness, justice, and 
benevolence, the same in character as the corre- 
sponding attributes in man, that they conceive 
of them as free from all the imperfections as they 
exist in ourselves. Thus, while intelligence in 
man is confined within limits which are relatively 
narrow, intelligence in God extends to all things 
actual and possible; while man’s free agency is 
limited by certain boundaries which it cannot 
transcend, the Divine free agency is free from 
all limitations; while holiness and benevolence in 
man are imperfect, holiness and benevolence in God 
are absolute and complete; while, owing to our 
inability to penetrate into motives, and to form a 
correct estimate of the circumstances which have 
influenced the formation of character, human justice, 


PGVNOS HCloM CONSIDERED ANDARERUTED, 2396 


even with the best intentions on the part of the 
judge, is only too frequently imperfect,—justice in 
God, being free of any limitation of knowledge, 
is absolute and perfect. But because this dis- 
tinction exists between the Divine and. the human, 
it is absurd to affirm that realities corresponding 
to our human conceptions cannot exist in God; 
or that those who believe in a God in whom 
such attributes exist, are guilty of the folly of 
worshipping what is neither more nor less than a 
magnified man freed from the imperfections of 
humanity. 

We have a striking example of what may be 
justly designated a man-made God in that system 
of much-vaunted lofty philosophic thought, known 
by the name of Positivism. I refer to it here for 
the purpose of showing the absurdities into which 
high philosophy can go, when it deserts the regions 
of common sense. Though closely allied to Agnos- 
ticism, its principle is essentially atheistic. Its 
founder, Comte, affirmed that human knowledge 
is exclusively confined to phenomena, that it is im- 
possible to penetrate to anything beyond them, and 
that we can know nothing about causes. Conse- 
quently it is impossible even to affirm that a First 
Cause of the Universe must exist. 1 need scarcely 
observe that a system of this kind differs little from 
Atheism pure and simple. Yet the instincts of 
human nature proved too strong for the gifted 


40 CHRISTIAN. THEISM. 


author of this system, and he felt himself forced to 
admit that a religion of some kind was a necessity 
for man. Having, as he believed, utterly destroyed 
the belief in Theism as a worn-out figment of 
the times of ignorance, he proceeded to propound, 
in place of all religions which rest on it as a basis, 
what he designated the Religion of Humanity, in 
which human nature itself—z.e. all the men and 
women who have existed in the past, who exist in 
the present, and who will exist in the future—is set 
forth as the object of worship; and for its due 
celebration, he instituted a Church provided with 
an elaborate system of rites, ceremonies, and sacra- 
ments, and with a body of philosophers as priests, 
who were to wield a power even more absolute 
than that which has been ever claimed for its priest- 
hood by the Roman Catholic Church. This strange 
deity still continues to be an object of worship to 
the orthodox portion of his philosophic followers ; 
while others, who accept the general principles of 
his system of philosophy reject it. I think that the 
reader will be of opinion that this system, though 
elaborated by one who was really a_ profound 
thinker, and accepted by others whose abilities it 
is impossible to deny, is simply grotesque. 

Before concluding this part of our subject, it will 
be desirable that I should offer a few observations 
on the language which is applied to God in the 
Scfiptures of the Old Testament, because the mis- 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REBUTED At 


understanding of its nature and import, gives to the 
objection we are considering the only appearance 
of plausibility as an objection against Christian 
Theism. Not a few of its readers fall into the 
error of imagining that the terminology which its 
writers have used respecting Him, instead of being 
metaphorical, and not unfrequently accommodated 
to the mental condition of those to whom it is 
addressed, is intended to denote realities as they 
exist in God. This error is also widely diffused 
among uneducated unbelievers, and forms perhaps 
the most dangerous weapon. which they direct 
against Christian Theism in the eyes of the igno- 
rant, and the unwary. This point is one of very 
considerable importance, as everyone whose duty 
‘t has been to deal with this class of unbelievers, 
is only too painfully aware. What, then, are the 
facts ? 

1. In numerous places in these Scriptures, the 
highest conceptions which the human mind is capable 
of forming are applied to God. Of these, Psalm 
exxxix. ascribes to God a universal presence in the 
universe, as far as it was known to the writer, 
and a perfect acquaintance with every thought of 
man; Isaiah xl. ascribes to Him greatness and 
creative power beyond human comprehension, and 
a constant presence and energy in providence ; 
Solomon’s dedication prayer affirms the inadequacy 
of every temple made with hands to contain Him, 


42 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain; and 
the revelation of His self-existence, and of His 
moral perfections made to Moses as recorded in 
Exod. iii, and xxxiv., may be referred to as examples 
out of a vast number of others equally decisive. 

2. On the other hand, He is frequently spoken 
of under various limitations, and even as possess- 
ing a human form, a bodily organism, and a local 
presence. Of this form of speech, Gen. xviii., 
which contains the account of Abraham’s inter- 
cession for the cities of the plain, may be referred 
to as a striking example. I therefore quote it: 
“Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is 
great, and because their sin is very grievous; I will 
go down now, and see whether they have done 
altogether according to the cry of it, which is 
come unto Me; and if not, I will know.” In the 
immediate context one who bears the Divine name 
is represented as appearing in human form, and 
even as partaking of a meal, and, after the colloquy, 
‘as going His way.” 

3. It not unfrequently happens that while in 
one set of passages self-existence, unchangeable- 
ness, universal presence, and the highest attributes 
of man, are ascribed to God, in numerous others 
are freely attributed to Him some of the lowest 
passions of human nature, such as rage, fury, 
jealousy, etc., and that, too, by the same writer. 
Not only is this so, but He is even described, 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 43 


es a EE Se 


when speaking of Himself, as animated by not a 
few of the passions of our frail humanity. Of this 
mode of speaking, the student of the prophets, 
especially of Jeremiah, cannot fail to find numerous 
examples. 

From these facts I draw the following conclusions: 

].—That it is incredible that the same writer 
should have ascribed to God the highest perfec- 
tions which are conceivable by man, and have 
attributed to Him many of the lowest passions of 
human nature, if He had intended to affirm that 
these latter denoted realities corresponding to them 
in the Divine Being. The only rational conclusion, 
therefore, is that He used them either as metaphors, 
or as part of the poetic imagery in which He 
wrote, or as accommodations to the low mental 
condition of those whom He was addressing. 

I].—A large number of the expressions which 
ascribe to God a bodily form, bodily organs, a local 
presence, and others of a similar character, are 
obviously metaphorical. 

IIIl.—Not a few of them are analogies, as for 
example when it is said that God’s eyes are in 
every place, that His ears are open to every prayer, 
that He smells the smell: of a sweet savour, and 
that, like a warrior, He takes up the spear and 
stops the way against them that persecute ; or that 
His sword is bathed in blood. 

1V.—Not unfrequently when human passions of a 


44 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


low type and a limited local presence are ascribed 
to God, they are accommodations to the mental 
condition of those to whom they are addressed, 
that condition being such as to render them inca- 
pable of receiving anything higher or better. The 
fact that several of the utterances recorded in the 
Scriptures are accommodations, is admitted even in 
these Scriptures themselves. 

V.—It is asserted again and again by the writers 
of the New Testament, that the Old Testament 
Scriptures were not intended to contain a revelation 
of absolute truth; but, on the contrary, that its 
revelations are fragmentary, relative, accommodated 
to the mental condition of those to whom they 
were addressed ; and intended, when they had ful- 
filled their temporary purpose, to be superseded 
by a higher and a better. They are best described 
as containing the history of the gradual education 
of the Jewish people from low to higher conceptions 
of the Divine nature and character, until they 
became capable of receiving the revelation of the 
Divine character and perfections made in the 
Person, work, and teaching of Jesus Christ. 

Finally: The objection because there are depths 
in the mode of the Divine subsistence, and in God’s 
providential government of the universe, which are 
unfathomable by man’s finite understanding, that 
therefore we cannot attain to any knowledge of 
Flim that is real, is utterly futile. How can it be 


AGNOSTICISM CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 45 


otherwise than that such depths should exist in Him? 
If there are such profundities in the existence even 
of an atom, which philosophers and scientists have 
failed to sound, much more must there be still pro- 
founder ones in Him by the energy of whose will 
all things are upheld in being, and were at first 
created. Surely a philosophy and science which, 
while it admits that the ultimate reality about atoms 
and molecules is shrouded in mysteries which it 
cannot penetrate, yet affirms that its knowledge of 
their activities is not inconsiderable, is in flagrant 
contradiction to our common sense, when it teaches 
that because we cannot know everything about 
God, we can know nothing about Him that is real; 
and that all inquiries respecting His character, His 
attributes, and His relations to ourselves, must be 
a mere useless expenditure of labour; and from 
such premisses boldly to draw the conclusion that 
it will not only. be safe, but even wise to frame 
our course of life without any reference to Him. 


ChAT LE ReVe 
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 


| AM now in a position to address myself to the 

immediate subject of this work, which is to 
set forth in as brief a space as possible the evi- 
dence, which ought to be sufficient to convince 
men of ordinary understanding, that a God exists 
who is a moral being, and to whom they will be 
responsible hereafter for their conduct here. [I 
shall first attempt to deal with the argument from 
causation; and as this will constitute the most 
difficult part of my subject, I must ask the reader’s 
deepest attention to the following reasonings. I 
observe, therefore, 

That the human mind is so constituted, that 
whenever it witnesses an event, or what is called 
in the language of philosophy a phenomenon, it 
cannot help inferring that its existence is due 
either to a single cause, or to several causes 
acting in combination, ze. to a force or a com- 
bination of forces, adequate to its production. 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 47 


This is no theory, but a matter of our daily 
individual experience. An occurrence happens. 
We instantly say to ourselves, ‘‘Whence came it ? 
What caused it ?”? . We discover that the immediate 
causes are phenomena. The conclusion is inevi- 
table, that they must have owed their existence to 
other causes, and so on in an ascending series, 
until we are forced to arrive at the conception of 
a Cause, itself uncaused, which possessed in itself 
sufficient potency to have brought into existence 
all the phenomena of the past and of the present. 

Against this conclusion, there are only two 
possible alternatives :— 

First : That these successions of finite causes have 
gone on operating during the eternity of the past, 
1.é. that they have never had a beginning. 

Second: That the first of the series having been 
at some period, however remote, non-existent, 
sprung into existence spontaneously, ze. was self- 
caused. 

With respect to the first of these alternatives, 
it will be sufficient to observe that our minds are 
so constituted that it is inconceivable that while 
each set of a succession of finite causes has had 
a beginning, that the whole succession can have 
had none. 

To the second a similar remark applies. Our 
minds are so constituted that we are incapable of 
believing that an occurrence, or phenomenon, is a 


48 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


chance production which, having been once non- 
existent, has sprung into existence spontaneously, 
te. without a cause. 

It would be foreign to my purpose to enter on 
this work with an inquiry respecting the origin of 
these beliefs, or of the primary intuitions of the 
human mind, or to attempt to vindicate their va- 
lidity. To do so would involve my readers in a 
number of highly abstract metaphysical discussions. 
I shall only observe that, be their origin what it 
may, they are either truths to which as we are at 
present constituted we cannot help giving assent, 
or they are direct perceptions of our consciousness, 
which form to us the highest of certitudes. The 
fact that it is so, is sufficient for my argument, 
without entering into the question of how it has 
become so. Volumes have been written on the 
latter question, without arriving at any conclusion 
respecting it which commands anything approach- 
ing general assent. If any of my readers should 
entertain a doubt that the beliefs above referred 
to are necessities of thought, let him try if he 
can conceive of the possibility of the occurrence of 
an event without a cause adequate to produce it; 
or of a succession of causes which have been 
operating without a beginning during the eternity 
of the past; or of a succession the first of which 
sprang into existence spontaneously, and then ask 
himself whether he has not habitually acted on the 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 49 


conviction that such things are impossible, and 
found this conviction verified by the facts of actual 
experience. The contrary assumption contradicts the 
beliefs of everyone, except that very small portion of 
mankind who have endeavoured to reason themselves 
out of them, or who, owing to their low intellectual 
condition, are unable to form a distinct conception of 
what is meant by such terms as events and causes. 

To make the following reasoning clear, it will be 
necessary to state distinctly what is the meaning 
which the common sense of mankind attaches to the 
word Cause. Unless we are under the bias of some 
particular theory, we invariably associate the idea 
of efficiency with that of cause. By efficiency, I 
mean a power residing in the cause, which is adequate 
to produce the effect, and which actually produces it. 
Further, it is an essential part of the conception of 
a cause, that it exists prior to the event of which it 
is the cause. 

The following definition, therefore, will be suffi- 
ciently accurate for all practical purposes. A cause 
is a thing previously existing, which has not only 
the power to bring into existence something not pre- 
viously existing, but which has actually produced it. 
The first of these is, in philosophic language, called 
the antecedent ; and the second, the consequent. 

From the above positions, the following important 
conclusions follow— 

1. Whatever exists in the effect, exists either 


4 


50 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


actively or in potency, in the cause. Otherwise it 
must either have produced itself, which is absurd ; 
or some other cause must be invoked to account for 
the existence of such things in the effect which 
did not exist either actively or potentially in the 
cause. 

2. The cause of an event may be the result of the 
action of a number of previously existing causes, 
and for the most part it is so; and so through a 
series indefinitely long; and each number of the 
series must possess in itself a potency to bring into 
existence the effect, which prior to the action of its 
cause was non-existent. But the idea that a suc- 
cession of finite causes can have been operating 
throughout the eternity of the past without any 
beginning to their activity involves a contradiction. 
Hence we are compelled, as a necessity of thought, 
to assume the existence of a cause, which is itself 
uncaused, but which possessed in itself a potency 
adequate to produce the universe and all that it 
contains. 

3. An event or phenomenon is, perhaps, never the 
production of a single cause, but of a multitude of 
causes acting in combination; and these of a long 
succession of other causes, which become more 
numerous the higher we ascend in the series of 
events, and therefore more and more difficult to set 
before the mind in their completeness. 

4. Care must be taken to discriminate between 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 5 


causes and necessary conditions of the existence of 
things, otherwise confusion of thought will be the 
certain result. Let me illustrate my meaning by an 
example. Space is the necessary condition of the 
existence of everything material ; but to speak of 
it as the cause of their existence would be absurd. 
Necessary conditions limit the action of causes, and 
are capable of diverting their activity into this or 
that particular channel; but to speak of them as 
causes contradicts the idea which is inherent in the 
term itself, namely, the possession of a power in 
something previously existing, adequate to bring 
into existence something which did not previously 
exist ; or to mould previously existing elements into 
anew form; or to modify the action of previously 
existing forces. 

5. It is most important to observe that law is not 
a cause, though it is frequently spoken ofas if it were 
one, alike by philosophers, scientists, theologians, 
and even in common conversation. Attention cannot 
be too strongly directed to this fact, because it is 
frequently used by all these classes of persons as if 
it were equivalent to force; nay, it is frequently 
personified even by those who deny that the First 
Cause of the Universe is a personal being. Thus 
philosophers and scientific men are frequently in the 
habit of affirming that the laws of Nature effect this 
or that ; that feeble man is unable to resist their over- 
whelming power ; and that they remorselessly crush 


52 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


him, when he comes across their path; but the truth 
is, that whereas the forces of Nature effect much, the 
aws of Nature can effect nothing. 

What, then, are the laws of Nature? They are 
nothing but generalized expressions, which denote the 
invariable order of the occurrence of phenomena, and 
the invariability of the action of its forces. Thus 
what is called the law of gravitation, is merely an 
expression, which denotes the order in which material 
things fall under the influence of the force of 
gravitation, the force being the efficient agency, 
while the law neither does nor can effect anything ; 
the forces of Nature crush ; its laws are powerless ; 
they can neither do good nor do evil. A_ similar 
inaccuracy frequently occurs in speaking of the laws 
of a state. What are they? They are simple rules 
which command or forbid particular classes of actions, 
and in which certain penalties are denounced against 
the disobedient. Metaphorically, we are in the habit 
of speaking of the laws as doing this or that; and 
even as pronouncing sentence ona criminal ; but if 
we use accurate language—and the use of inaccurate 
language has introduced endless confusion into the 
theistic controversy, and into that about miracles— 
its laws effect nothing; it is the forces which are 
behind them, such as the judge, the jury, the police, 
the prison warder, and the executioner, which are 
the only things which operate efficiently. Let it, 
therefore, be kept steadily in mind that the laws of 


3 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 53 


Nature merely denote the invariable order in which 
certain consequents follow certain antecedents, and 
are therefore devoid of all causal power. 

A very simple illustration will make it evident 
that the idea of efficient agency is inseparably united 
with that of cause in the minds of all, except a few 
speculative philosophers. Let us suppose that an 
extensive warehouse has been burnt to the ground, 
with no inconsiderable loss of life and property, and 
that a jury is impannelled to inquire into the cause 
of the calamity which after careful investigation 
returns the following verdict: A man who was em- 
ployed to perambulate the building at night care- 
lessly threw an imperfectly extinguished match into 
amass of combustible matter, which had been im- 
properly allowed to accumulate in a dangerous place. 
This took fire, and from thence the conflagration 
spread over the entire building. 

Who, or what, then, was the cause, and what were 
the necessary conditions of the fire, and of the 
mischief that followed ? , 

The primary and direct cause of the fire was the 
act of the man who threw the match, which had 
inherent in it a potency sufficient to kindle a flame, 
in amass of combustible matter. The match, there- 
fore, with the properties inherent in it, was its 
secondary cause. The existence of the combustible 
matter in the place where it was, the character of 
the building and of its contents, was the necessary 


$4 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


condition. Apart from the presence of the combustible 
matter in the place where it was, the man and the 
match would have effected nothing. The cause, then, 
of the destruction of the lives and property was 
the action of the man and of the match, exerted on a 
set of conditions suited to produce combustion meet- 
ing together at the right time and place, their 
existence and concurrence being the result of an 
indefinite number of causes and conditions. 

Having settled these preliminary points, I will now 
set before the reader the evidence which the principle 
of causation furnishes in proof of the existence of a 
God. All thatis essential in it admits of being stated 
in a brief space. 

The universe, and all which we behold in it, con- 
sists of a mass of very complicated phenomena. 
Compelled by that belief in the principle of causation 
which each of us intuitively feels—it matters not, as 
far as this argument is concerned, what may have 
been the origin of this belief—we arrive at the 
conclusion that none of these phenomena are self- 
caused ; and we are no less absolutely certain that 
there was a time when they first came into existence. 
Hence we infer that they must have been produced 
by a cause, or by a combination of causes, possessing 
a potency adequate to their production. On further 
investigation we arrive at the conclusion that these 
must have owed their existence to successions of 
previously existing causes. But as our minds are so 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 55 


constituted that we are incapable of believing ina 
succession of causes, while each member of the series 
has been brought into existence by something pre- 
viously existing—that the series itself never had a 
commencement, we are compelled to assume the ex- 
istence of a First Cause which, being itself uncaused, 
i.e. self-existent, is the cause to which the entire suc- 
cession of causes, to which the existing phenomena of 
the universe, owe their existence, and of which they 
are manifestations. 

It matters not, as far as this argument is concerned, 
how remote this First Cause may be from existing 
phenomena, or how complicated may be the succes- 
sion of intervening causes, which interpose between 
them and it. However long the chain, the consti- 
tution of our minds compels us to believe that it is 
finite ; and as a succession of finite causes which never 
had a beginning is inconceivable, we are driven to 
the conclusion that a First Cause, itself uncaused, 
must exist, for it is unbelievable that existing things 
could have sprung spontaneously into being out of 
absolute nothingness; or, to put it in the form 
of the well-known proverb, Lx nthilo nihil fit. I 
cannot better express this truth than in the words 
of Mr. H. Spencer, the Coryphzeus of Agnosticism : 
‘‘The assumption of the existence of a First Cause of 
the Universe is a necessity of thought.” This First 
Cause we Theists designate God. 


I have heard it urged by a certain class of 


56 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


unbelievers that it is necessary to give an account of 
the origin of this First Cause. To this I answer, that 
if it had an origin it would cease‘to be a First Cause, 
and so we should be asked to give an account of that 
which caused it, and so on for evermore. Far 
more plausible is the objection, that a Cause, which is 
itself uncaused, presents equal difficulties to formu- 
late in thought, as a succession of finite causes, which 
never had a beginning. One of these alternatives, 
however, must be true, notwithstanding any difficul- 
ties with which the conception may be attended. | 
shall only observe that the difficulties are not equal, 
The conception of a First Cause, itself uncaused, con- 
tains in it nothing contradictory ; for as Mr. Spencer 
affirms, it is a necessity of thought ; whereas a succes- 
sion of finite causes which never had a beginning, 
each member of which was non-existent prior to its 
being caused, involves a direct contradiction in terms. 

I will now set this argument before the reader in a 
less abstract form. Modern science has rendered an 
eminent service to Theism by showing that the present 
universe cannot have existed from eternity; and 
although the time may be indefinitely remote, that it 
will certainly come to an end. The nebular theory 
which has found acceptance by an overwhelming 
majority of scientists teaches us that the present 
universe was once a fiery vapour cloud, which, under 
the influence of forces inherent in it, has in the course 
of ages gradually condensed into suns and planets, 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 57 


one of which, our earth, has become a fit habitation 
for living beings, while it is highly probable that this 
is the case with others also. A time, therefore, once 
was when this earth, and every form of vegetable and 
animal life, existed not. No less certain is it that the 
universe in its present form is gradually wearing out. 
Suns, as sources of heat and motion, are parting with 
their energies. The time, therefore, will come when 
the earth will become too cold to be a fit habitation 
for animal life. It will then become a desolation like 
the moon. Owing tothe loss of energy, it, and every 
one of the planetary bodies, will ultimately be ab- 
sorbed into the sun, The sun, too, notwithstanding 
the fresh supplies of heat which will be imparted to 
it by these catastrophes will, in the lapse of ages, 
get cooler and cooler, thus gradually losing its ener- 
gies, until it is absorbed by some mightier body. 
This body is ultimately destined to a similar fate, and 
so the entire universe of suns and planets, until, all 
its energies being equalized, it becomes a homo- 
- geneous~mass, destitute of motion and of life, and 
destined to be the region of everlasting silence, un- 
less some mightier power, external to itself, exists, 
which is capable of again imparting to it motion, 
and thus of enabling it to enter on a fresh series of 
evolutions. 3 : 

The earliest state of things, therefore, to which 
science professes to have penetrated is this fiery va- 
pour-cloud, which according to anti-theistic theories 


58 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


must have contained within itself, either actively or 
potentially, the germs and possibilities of all future 
existence. But even this could not have been the 
primeval state of things; one must have preceded it 
and caused it, and so on for evermore, unless we 
assume the existence of a Cause, itself uncaused, 
which gave it being. The existence of such a power 
is rendered certain by the consideration that, if this 
fiery mist was the original state of things, or any- 
thing composed of similar materials, it would in the 
course of the eternal ages have completed all its 
possible developments, and have passed into that 
state .of homogeneity, silence, and desolation to 
which, as this philosophy teaches, this present 
universe is doomed ; and from which, having no 
power of its own to rescue it, it must continue for 
evermore, unless there be some power external to it, 
to intervene, and impart to it fresh motion and life. 
It follows, therefore, that such a power must exist, 
because, during the ages of the past, successions of 
such catastrophes must have occurred, bringing 
about a state of things motionless and lifeless. From 
one of these the existence of the present universe, 
with all its energies and motions, proves that there 
must have been a resurrection. Further: if this 
hypothesis be correct, the existence and active energy 
of such a power is the only thing which can rescue 
the ages of the future after the energies of the 
existing universe have passed into quiescence and 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 59 


its materials into a state of motionless homogeneity 
from everlasting silence and desolation. It follows, 
therefore, that this universe, with all its numberless 
adjustments, adaptations, and correlations, must have 
owed its origin to a Cause, Itself Uncaused, adequate 
to its production. That Cause is God. 

The course of reasoning from the principle of 
causation is so conclusive that we need not be sur- 
prised that a determined attempt has been made to 
invalidate it. It has been objected, that our knowledge 
is confined exclusively to phenomena, and that we 
neither know, nor can know, anything about causes, 
Thus, it is alleged that what we call causes are no- 
thing more than invariable sequences of phenomena, 
and that all that we really know is that one event 
or occurrence invariably precedes another, and that 
the latter never occurs without being preceded by 
the former. From this the inference which has been 
drawn, that the one is caused or brought into existence 
by the other, is a mere figment of our ignorance. 

Perhaps the reader will be of opinion that the best 
refutation of this objection is its simple statement, 
for it is in flagrant contradiction to the whole 
of our convictions as they are verified in practical 
life. The objector himself habitually acts on the 
assumption that the position in question is practically 
false. To take an obvious example; if he is 
suffering from some severe pain and sends for a 
medical man to afford him relief, his object is to get 


60 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


him to remove not what he considers to be a mere 
antecedent of the pain but its actual cause. Thus, 
if he is suffering from toothache, he believes that a 
decayed tooth by its action on the nerve is the cause, 
and not the mere antecedent, of the pain and actually 
produces it; and that its removal will afford him 
relief. The tooth is extracted, and the relief follows. 
Similarly, if a person carelessly throws a stone and 
thereby inflicts an injury on another, no one in his 
senses would consider the person who threw the 
stone a mere antecedent, but the direct cause of the 
injury, and would hold him responsible for it. To 
speak of holding a mere antecedent or a necessary 
condition responsible is to talk nonsense. ‘There is 
nothing like bringing theories of this kind to the test 
of facts. 

But the assertion that we neither know, or can 
know, anything about causes directly contradicts one 
of the greatest of our certitudes. If our observations 
are exclusively concentrated on things external to 
ourselves, then it is correct enough to affirm that 
all that we discern with our senses is a succession 
of phenomena following one another in an invariable 
order. But things external to ourselves are far from 
constituting our only sources of knowledge. Besides 
these there is the information furnished by our self- 
consciousness. From its testimony we know, with 
a certainty which nothing can exceed, that we our- 
selves are causes and that we possess a power to 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 61 


originate action ; that we are not mere forces acting 
in conformity with an iron law of necessity, but 
voluntary agents, having it in our power to act or to 
forbear acting. Thus, when we turn the action of our 
minds on ourselves, and observe the results which 
follow from our mental activity, we feel, with the 
fullest assurance of certainty, that we are capable of 
acting on the external world; and that apart from man’s 
resolve to act on it, and this resolve being carried 
into effect, the course of things would be entirely 
different from that which it actually is; and that the 
centre of this power is our will. ‘The act of our wills 
in exciting to action, whether it be on things internal 
or external to ourselves, constitutes our primary idea 
of force or efficient agency. The mode in which 
this power is exerted is as follows. We first will or 
form a resolution to do this or that. Our under- 
standings then plan the means whereby this purpose 
can be carried into execution. When this has been 
determined on, the will, through the nervous system, 
conveys its orders to the hands, the feet, or to some 
other part of the body. These execute its injunctions ; 
and various results, some of which are of the highest 
importance, follow. Of all this we are as certain as 
we are of our own existence. Thus, I am absolutely 
certain that I am the cause of the written characters 
now before me. How came they there? Once 
there was nothing but a blank sheet of paper. Now 
it is covered with written characters. Their existence 


62 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


is due to my resolve to write on a given subject. 
Having thus resolved, I made what I have written the 
subject of careful deliberation, and thereupon formed 
the plan of the present work. Having done this, my 
will—that is, I, myself—communicated its orders to 
the fingers by means of the nervous system, and 
thus set them in motion. These laid hold on the 
pen, dipped it in ink, and the paper which was 
previously a blank, became covered with characters. 
Of all this and the various other processes connected 
with the composition of this work, I am as certain as 
I am of my own existence. In other words, I am 
not the mere antecedent of the existence of the work, 
but its cause. 

The only thing, therefore, of which we have direct 
and immediate knowledge as possessing causal or 
efficient power is ourselves, the originating force 
being what we designate ‘an act of volition.” 
Hence we draw the inference, when we see similar 
results produced by beings not ourselves, that they 
must have originated inasimilar manner. But when 
we speak of things which are necessary agents as 
causes, we do so by analogy; they produce results 
only, but are destitute of the power of originating 
action. The only thing of which we have experience 
as possessing this power is will. From this we 
draw the inference that all force originates in will, 
and is a manifestation of it. 

But inasmuch as the conception of a rational 


THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION. 63 


will involves that of a permanently existing con- 
scious personality, which not only now exists, but 
which has existed the same conscious personality, 
say, during forty, fifty, or sixty years of the past; 
a bold attempt has been made to invalidate the 
argument from causation by affirming that we have 
no knowledge that we are persons, in the sense 
which we ordinarily attach to the word person. 
The objection assumes, that what we mistake for 
our personality is neither more nor less than 
a succession of states of consciousness, which are 
never for two moments together permanently the 
same. I fully admit that if this strange position 
could be proved to be true, it would invalidate 
the argument from causation. But the paradox 
involved in it is so absolute, and the contradiction 
to universal experience so complete, that I may 
safely leave it to be dealt with by the common 
sense of my readers. Strange is it that those 
who have propounded the theory in question did 
not see that the idea of states of consciousness 
involves a permanent something which perceives, 
and a something which it perceives. The argument, 
therefore, proves the very thing which it is intended 
to disprove. I shall, therefore, only observe that the 
consciousness which each of us possesses, that we 
not only exist, but that we have existed the same 
persons during considerable intervals of time, during 
which every particle which has composed our bodies 


64 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


has changed several times over, makes short work 
with philosophic, scientific, and popular material- 
ism, and proves that there is something within us 
which is capable of originating action, of which 
the blind forces of Nature are incapable. The First 
Cause of the Universe, therefore, must be possessed 
of intelligent volition. 

In conclusion, I will briefly set before the reader 
some of the most important conclusions which follow 
from the position laid down by Mr. H. Spencer, 
that the phenomena of the universe are manifesta- 
tions of its First Cause, the existence of which is a 
necessity of thought. One of its phenomena is 
intelligence : intelligence, therefore, must exist in its 
First Cause. Another is the moral nature of man: 
a God, therefore, must exist who is a moral being. 
Another is free agency, rational will, personality, 
and a power of self-determination—for all these exist 
jin man—these, therefore, must be manifestations 
of Him from whom man derives his being. Another 
of its phenomena is that its irrational forces act in 
conformity with invariable law, from which mode of 
action its order springs: invariable law, therefore, 
must be an expression of the Divine will, and the 
love of order must exist in God. Similar illustra- 
tions may be adduced to much greater length; but 
these will be sufficient to illustrate the nature and 
character of the argument from causation. 


CHAPTER, 


THE VALIDITY OF THE PROOF WHICH THE <AD- 
MEN Sa a DALPTATIONSA SAND © CORRELA: 
ITONS MOI LHE UNIVERSE, “AFFORD. TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN INTELLIGENT CREATOR. 


alee evidence furnished by the order, adaptations, 

and correlations of the universe has always 
been considered to be one of the strongest reasons 
for believing in the existence of a God. This being 
so, anti-Theists at all times, but especially during 
the present century, even while they admit their 
existence in numbers passing human comprehension, 
have strained their utmost efforts to prove that they 
have originated in the interaction of a number of 
unintelligent forces ; and, therefore, that they furnish 
no proof of the existence of an intelligent Creator. 
Such being the case, it will be necessary to prove 
that this argument, which is commonly called “ the 
argument from design,” is indubitably valid; and that 
the reasonings which have been adduced, and the 
theories which have been propounded in Opposition 
to it, are destitute of any rational foundation. 


66 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Before entering on the argument itself, it will be 
desirable that I should define the meaning which I 
attach to the words “adaptation” and “ correlation,” 
in this and in the following chapters. 

By an adaptation | mean an instrumentality 
composed of a number of parts acting in com- 
bination, which is fitted to produce a certain result, 
which actually produces that result, and which, if 
one or more of the parts were either misplaced or ab- 
sent, would produce no result at all, or one wholly 
different. 

I have used the word “adaptation ' 
“design,” because it has been objected that the 


) 


rather than 


expression “the argument from design ” involves 
a petitio principi. TVhis objection, however, cannot 
be urged against the word ‘adaptation ;” because, 
whatever diversity of view may be entertained re- 
specting the origin of an adaptation, it cannot be 
denied that it exists as a matter of fact. The only 
question open for discussion is: Does the existence 
of an instrumentality, consisting of a number of 
parts fitted to produce a particular result, prove that 
its originating cause must have been a being pos- 
sessed of a power and intelligence adequate to 
produce the adaptation; or is it conceivable that it 
can have been produced by a number of forces des- 
titute of intelligence and volition, meeting together 
at the fitting time and place. Besides this, a further 
and all-important question arises, which demands 


ih be 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 67 


solution, to which the anti-Theist is bound to 
return an answer which will be satisfactory to our 
reason: What do those adaptations, which he 
himself admits to exist in the universe in numbers 
past human comprehension, prove when contem- 
plated in their totality? Is it believable that they 
have resulted from the interaction of a number of 
blind forces destitute of intelligence and volition ? 

By a “correlation” I mean a number of mutually 
related adaptations, so adjusted to one another as 
to form a complicated whole, which act in mutual 
harmony, and which, apart from this harmonious 
action, would either damage or render nugatory the 
action of the whole. Of this correlation of parts and 
functions to one another, the bodies of animals may 
be referred to as a striking illustration. We our- 
selves are only too sensible of the results which 
follow from the derangement of one or more of these 
adaptations, for when one member suffers, the result 
is that the whole body suffers with it. The question, 
therefore, for our consideration is:—What do these 
adaptations, thus adjusted to one another so as to 
form a complicated whole, prove? Is it conceiv- 
able that they can have been the result of the inter- 
action of a number of forces destitute of volition 
and intelligence. 

Before proceeding further, I must ask the reader’s 
attention to the actual position of the argument. It 
cannot be denied that the action of an intelligent 


68 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Creator gives an adequate and rational account of the 
origin of the order, the adaptations, and the corre- 
lations with which the universe abounds. How, then, 
stands the case between the Theist and the anti- 
Theist ? If, for the sake of argument, we assume 
that the theory which is propounded by the latter, 
affords an adequate and a rational account of their 
origin, it by no means disproves the existence of an 
intelligent Creator. All that it does is to leave us 
in the presence of an alternative. The question then 
arises: Which is the more probable; that the order, 
adaptations, and correlations of the universe have 
owed their origin to a being possessed of a power 
and intelligence adequate to produce them ; or that 
they have originated in an eternal struggle between a 
multitude of unintelligent forces, acting under an 
iron law of necessary agency, from which it was 
impossible that they could deviate? When the 
position of the controversy is stated thus, there can 
be no doubt which alternative will command the 
assent of an overwhelming majority of those who 
are endowed with ordinary intelligence. 

It is important that the reader’s attention should 
be drawn to this, because it is far too generally 
imagined that the anti-theistic theory of the origin 
of the universe, disproves the existence of an in- 
telligent Creator, whereas all it does is to propound 
an alternative theory which is beset with difficulties 
in every direction, leaving the question open which 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 69 


is most rational to believe, that the order, the 
adaptations, and correlations with which the uni- 
verse abounds, have owed their origin to the inter- 
action of a number of blind forces during the 
eternity of the past, or to the energy of a being 
possessed of a power and intelligence adequate to 
produce them. But it is not my intention to let 
the argument for the being of a Gcd rest on a choice 
between these alternatives, however much the evi- 
dence in favour of the one may outweigh that in 
favour of the other; but it will be my duty to show 
that the anti-theistic position is utterly untenable, 
and that the theistic one alone rests on a rational 
foundation. 

First, then, let us inquire with respect to orderly 
arrangements, What do they prove? I answer, this 
is what universal experience affirms. We have 
hever seen a complicated orderly arrangement pro- 
duced by the action of a number of blind forces. I 
use the word “complicated” because it is possible 
that an orderly arrangement on a small scale may 
be the result of that which we designate “chance.” 
Thus, as I have observed above, it is within the 
limits of possibility that twelve dice thrown into the 
air hap-hazard may fall with their aces upwards ; 
but although such an occurrence is abstractedly 
possible, it is very doubtful whether it has happened 
once in ten million times. But if this operation were 
repeated a hundred times, and each time the dice fell 


70 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


with their aces upwards, no rational man, no, not 
even the greatest sceptic, would entertain a doubt that 
‘they were loaded. But these hundred repetitions 
of the fall of the dice with their aces upwards is but 
a faint representation of the force of this argument 
when applied to the structure of the universe, where 
orderly arrangements, and these very complicated 
ones, abound in numbers past human comprehen- 
sion. From this the inference is irresistible to all, 
except a few speculators who are committed to the 
maintenance of a particular theory, that the universe 
must have owed its origin to the action of an 
intelligent being, who must have directed the forces 
of the universe so as to have enabled them to pro- 
duce its innumerable adjustments, adaptations, and 
correlations. 

Persons of ordinary intelligence will think this 
view of the case conclusive, but as the principle on 
which it rests is of the greatest importance in its 
bearing on the theistic argument, it will be desirable 
to exhibit its force by a few illustrations. 

Let us suppose that we enter a large library, in 
which the books are arranged on shelves. On one 
set of shelves are the theological works, on another 
the historical, on another the philosophical, on 
another the scientific, on another the poetical, and 
on another the novels and works of fiction. On 
further observation we find that each of these classes 
of writings is arranged under a number of distinct 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. va 


heads ; and that the different books are placed in 
order according to the dates of their publication. 
What, I ask, is the inference which common sense 
cannot help drawing from the phenomena in ques- 
tion? I answer that such arrangements afford 
incontestable proof of the presence of intelligence. 
If it were suggested, that the books had been thrown 
together at hap-hazard, and that some one had 
picked them up just as he found them, and placed 
them on the shelves in the order in question, the 
person who made the suggestion would be consi- 
dered to be attempting to impose on our credulity. 
One more illustration will suffice. Let us sup- 
pose that a manuscript of eight hundred pages is 
lying on a table immediately before a window, that 
the wind is blowing a gale against it, that the 
window is inadvertently opened; and that the wind 
scatters the manuscript in every direction. Let us 
further assume that after this disaster we leave 
the room, and that after a considerable interval 
we enter it again. To our surprise we find every 
page in its proper place, page I being at the 
top, and page 800 at the bottom, of the pile of 
papers. On inquiring who has been meddling with 
the MS. during our absence, we are informed by 
a servant that no human being except herself has 
entered the room; that she has not touched the 
papers, but that the wind after scattering the pages 
in every direction finally deposited them in the 


42 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


order in which we find them. What, I ask, is the 
opinion which every sane man would form respecting 


this story ? Doubtless that the servant who gave 
this account of the matter made an affirmation 
which she knew to be untrue. 

What, then, is the conclusion which we instinc- 
tively arrive at? That all complicated orderly 
arrangements and adjustments must have been 
the result of the action of an intelligent agent, 
although we have not seen him at work in their 
production. Although the grounds on which our 
conviction is formed are different, we are no less 
firmly convinced of its truth, than we are that 
two and two make four and cannot make five. 
No sceptic doubts the validity of this argument in 
the affairs of common life. Objection is only made 
to its adequacy when it is adduced as affording 
unquestionable evidence that the universe is the 
work of an intelligent Creator. 

Let us now consider the argument from the 
innumerable adaptations with which the universe 
abounds. What do they prove? I answer, that 
the common sense of mankind, with the exception 
of a small number of philosophers and _ scientists, 
and it may be also of those savage races who 
are in the lowest state of mental degradation, 
affirms that intelligence must have presided over 
their production; and that the more complicated 
is the adaptation the stronger is this conviction. 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 73 


The chances against a combination of materials 
at hap-hazard, such as is necessary to form a 
very simple adaptation, are very numerous; but 
when adaptations are complicated, the conviction 
which they produce that they cannot have origi- 
nated in the casual meeting of a number of forces 
destitute of intelligence and volition, is equal in 
force to that produced by a mathematical demon- 
stration. But the adaptations with which the 
universe abounds are not only extremely numerous 
—so numerous that they meet us at every point, 
turn where we will—but highly complicated. No 
array of millions of millions is capable of presenting 
to our minds even a faint idea of their number. The 
chances, therefore, against the concurrence of the 
materials and the forces necessary to form these 
combinations are practically infinite. We are, there- 
fore, incapable of believing that they can have 
originated in the chance meeting together of a 
number of molecules and forces destitute of purpose, 
volition, and intelligence, or in any combination of 
them. 

The importance of this argument as affording 
proof of the existence of an intelligent Creator, 
arises from the fact that it not only commends itself 
in the strongest manner to our reason, but also from 
its being level to men of ordinary understanding. 
It requires no exercise of abstract thought for its 
appreciation, and the evidences on which it rests 


"4 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


are all close at hand; and there is no occasion to 
enter on a minute research to find instances of 
these adaptations, for they meet us at every turn. 
Wherever we cast our eyes, whether to the heavens 
above, or to the earth beneath, or when we direct 
our attention to the structure of the vegetable and 
animal kingdoms, we observe they are full of in- 
numerable instances of them. Nay, we may find 
them nearer home in the structure of our own 
bodies, where they exist in numbers numberless, 
It is true that while we are in health, and the 
parts of which our bodies are composed act har- 
moniously, we are too apt to forget how fearfully 
and wonderfully we are made; but let only some 
minute portion of their organism get deranged, and 
we are painfully reminded of the necessity that 
these wondrous adaptations of part to part should 
work together in harmonious combination. ‘Their 
doing so means health; their failure to do so, 
disease and death. 

A few more very simple illustrations will do 
more to impress the reader with a sense of the 
importance of this argument, as affording proof of 
the existence of an intelligent Creator, than any 
mere general description of it. Anti-Theists them- 
selves, when it suits their convenience to do so, 
readily avail themselves of it. We have all heard 
of what is called the ‘Stone Age.” Men of 
science, whether they believe or disbelieve in the 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 75 


existence of a God, are all but unanimously of 
opinion that its remains prove that man has existed 
on the globe at a period indefinitely more remote 
than the 4,004 years which has been placed in the 
margin of our Bibles as the time of his first 
creation. What, then, are the media of proof? 

The answer is, a number of flints which have 
been found in a great variety of places at different 
depths, and in company with various remains, which 
prove the high antiquity of the period when they 
were deposited in the localities where they have 
been discovered. These flints are alleged, and 
alleged truly, to bear unmistakable marks of 
adaptation, so as to have fitted them for certain 
purposes of savage life. From these facts the 
inference has been drawn that they were fashioned 
at a period long prior—it is impossible to say how 
long—-to the commonly accepted date of the creation 
of man. 

On the other hand, it has been urged by those 
who have endeavoured to maintain the commonly 
accepted system of chronology, that these flints owe 
their peculiar shape to the action of natural causes ; 
and, therefore, form no proof of the existence 
of man in a state of savagery. To this it has 
been replied, that although it is within the limits 
of possibility that one or even a few flints may 
have acquired their peculiar shape from the ac- 
tion of such causes, yet their numbers render it 


76 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


impossible that this can be a true account of their 
origin. In a word, they are alleged to bear unmis- 
takable marks of having been manufactured articles, 
and of having been adapted to certain purposes 
of savage life; and, further, although the shape 
of one or even a few may have been given to 
them by some accident, that there is no known 
natural force which is capable of imparting to 
flints in large numbers these peculiar forms. 
What, then, is the inference which has been 
deduced from these facts? That they are not 
natural productions, but that intelligence of some 
kind must have presided over their manufacture ; 
and consequently that intelligent beings of a low 
order must have existed on this globe at a period 
indefinitely remote. These beings, although they 
have left behind them no other record of their 
existence, are assumed to have been men; and 
because these implements are extremely rude, men 
in a very low state of intellectual development. 
The bearing of this course of reasoning, the 
validity of which is fully admitted by anti-Theists, 
and which has been urged again and again as 
invalidating the Biblical account of the origin of 
nan, on our present argument is obvious. If the 
existence of these rude flint instruments proves 
that an intelligence of some kind presided over 
their formation at a period indefinitely remote, how 
is it possible to affirm that the same line of reasoning 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 7 


is not equally valid to prove that an intelligence 
adequate to their production must have presided 
over the formation of these innumerable adaptations 
—adaptations not rude like these flint implements, 
but highly complicated, and exquisitely finished— 
which meet us at every turn, and with which the 
universe everywhere abounds? Surely, if rude 
implements prove that intellect, though in a low 
stage of development, must have existed at a period 
long prior to the birth of history, the innumerable 
adaptations of the universe must prove that a being 
possessed of power and intelligence adequate to 
their production must have presided over their 
formation, and existed prior to it. To affirm that 
unintelligent forces could not have shaped the 
flints, but that they have shaped the adaptations, 
contradicts every principle of sound reasoning. 
Let us now pursue this course of reasoning as 
it has been applied to a later period. After an 
interval of indefinite duration—it is impossible to 
say how long—comes what is called the Neolithic, 
or more recent, stone age. Here, again, we have 
no direct evidence of the existence of man; that 
he did exist is an inference from its remains. 
The implements of this age exhibit more perfect 
adaptations, a higher finish, and a more artistic 
skill, than those of the previous one. Hence the 
inference has been drawn—and justly drawn—that 
it is impossible that they have owed their shape to 


78 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


the action of a number of blind forces, but that they 
must have been the work of a higher order of 
intelligence than that possessed by the men of the 
first stone age; and that during the interval between 
these two ages, mankind had made a considerable 
advance in civilization. The same inference follows 
from the inspection of the remains of the lake dwell- 
ings which exist in different parts of Europe, and so 
on as we ascend higher and higher, until we arrive 
at our present advanced state of civilization. Surely 
if arguments such as these are valid to prove the 
existence of men possessed of different degrees of 
intelligence at these early periods, though they have 
left no other memorials of their existence, the adapt- 
ations and correlations with which the universe 
abounds, afford a proof of the existence of an 
intelligent Creator which is indefinitely stronger. 
Let us now assume for the purpose of furthel 
illustrating the strength of this argument, that all 
historical evidence of the existence of man during 
the ages of the past has perished at some distant 
period of the future, while not a few of his works 
are preserved. These would afford marks of very 
complicated adaptations, from which the men then 
existing would justly infer that mankind had existed 
throughout these earlier periods, and that they had 
passed through a succession of developments, gradu- 
ally advancing from lower to higher degrees of 
civilization. How, I ask, is it possible that the 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 79 


above arguments can be valid to prove the exist- 
ence of man in a very low stage of intellectual 
development, but gradually higher and higher at 
periods indefinitely remote; yet that the innumer- 
able, complicated, and perfect adjustments of the 
universe should not be valid to prove the existence 
of a being possessed of a power and intelligence 
adequate to their production? If unintelligent forces 
cannot have produced the one, surely it is incredible 
that they have produced the other. 

Once more: let us assume that a traveller pene- 
trates into some uninhabited region of the globe, 
and there finds in a building a piece of machinery 
equally complicated as those which exist in our 
great manufactories. The question will at once 
present itself to him, How got it there? Let us also 
suppose that some one suggested to him that its 
existence had resulted from the action and inter- 
action of the blind forces of Nature during the ages 
of the past; and that the idea that a high form of 
intelligence must have presided over its formation 
is a delusion. Surely the most determined sceptic 
would reject such a suggestion wirh scorn. This 
assumption is not wholly an imaginary one. Certain 
monuments exist in America, which are known not 
to have been the work of the races existing there at 
the time of its discovery by Europeans. ‘These are 
inferred, and inferred justly, to have been the work 
of some prior race of men in a certain stage of 


80 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


civilization. Yet the only evidence of their existence 
is the monuments in question, the race itself having 
utterly perished, without leaving any other trace 
of its existence behind. Why, then, is the argument 
from adaptation only invalid, when it is urged by 
Theists as affording proof of the existence of a 
God ? 

On the nature of the evidence afforded by the 
correlations with which the universe abounds, only 
a few brief remarks will be necessary, for what has 
been said above respecting the inference which the 
contemplation of a number of adaptations suggests 
to people of ordinary intelligence, applies with an 
intensified force to a number of correlations. The 
correlations with which the universe abounds consist 
of two kinds. 

First: Those which arise from the meeting together, 
at the right time and place, of a number of forces 
wholly independent of one another, by the concur- 
rence of which a particular result is produced ; and 
apart from which concurrence this result would 
never have come into existence. 

Second: When a number of adaptations are so 
mutually related to one another, that they form a 
complicated whole; and, by their combined action, 
produce a result which could only be effected by 
their combined acton in harmonious unison each 
with the other and with the whole. 

Respecting the nature and the force of the proof 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. SI 


which is furnished by these correlations to the 
existence of an intelligent Creator, I shall have 
more to say in a subsequent chapter. 

When we consider the importance of this line 
of reasoning in its bearing on the Theistic con- 
troversy, especially on that very numerous class 
who have neither time nor opportunity to devote 
themselves to special studies, we need not wonder 
that anti-Theists have done their utmost to prove 
that it is destitute of validity. I must, therefore, 
offer a few brief observations on the alternative 
theories which have been propounded by them- 
Before doing so, however, let me ask the reader 
carefully to bear in mind, that one point is incon- 
testable, namely, either that the order, adapta- 
tions, and correlations of the universe must have 
owed their origin to a being possessed of a power 
and intelligence adequate to have produced them ; 
or else to a number of forces destitute of volition 
and intelligence. Other alternative there is none. 

I am aware that for the purpose of avoiding the 
difficulty of building the universe by forces of this 
description, it has been suggested that the ultimate 
particles of matter may possess in themselves some 
principle of intelligence, say, one side intelligent, and 
the other not.* But of this there is not only not one 
atom of proof, but it involves those who propound 


* This theory has been actually propounded. 


6 


$2 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


it in a number of hopeless contradictions. It will, 
therefore, be unnecessary to discuss it. Who, I ask, 
will believe, that an intelligence is latent in the 
particles of matter which compose the table on 
which I am writing, or that intelligence could be pro- 
duced out of it, by a different arrangement of its 
particles ? 

An objection has been urged against the validity 
of the argument from adaptation on the ground 
that it is founded on a mere analogy derived from 
the action of human intelligence ; and that however 
just the reasoning may be when applied to the latter, 
it is totally inapplicable when applied to a being of 
infinite power and wisdom, who not only fashions 
the materials with which he acts, but also creates 
them. This means that he might have so created 
them, as to have avoided the necessity of employing 
adjustments, adaptations, and correlations to effect 
his purposes ; or in other words that he has created 
difficulties for the purpose of overcoming them. 
Into the discussion of subtleties of this kind I shall 
not enter, but I shall content myself with observing 
that even if the objection were never so true it by no 
means disposes of the fact, that these adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations actually exist, and that 
their existence is a proof that a being must have 
existed who possessed a power and _ intelligence 
adequate to their formation. 

Another objection is, that the argument from 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 83 


adaptation represents God as acting from without, 
fashioning a set of materials after the manner of a 
human artificer. Those who have urged this objec- 
tion have not scrupled to apply to this argument 
the coarse term of “The Carpenter Theory of the 
Universe.” 

To this objection, I reply, that as far as an 
adaptation is concerned, it is a matter of indif- 
ference in what manner the Creator has acted in its 
production. It is no business of the Theist to 
define the mode of His activity. In fashioning the 
universe, for anything we know to the contrary, He 
may have acted as a force imminent in it, directing 
all its movements from within, or external to it, or 
both; whichever of these alternatives we adopt—let 
it never be forgotten that we are totally ignorant of 
the mode of the Divine activity in creation—the 
adaptations of the universe in their countless numbers 
remain as facts, the existence of which is beyond the 
power of dispute ; and it is upon them as facts, and 
not on the manner in which they have been produced, 
that the argument is founded ; and from them, despite 
of this objection, those who are not bound by the 
exigences of a particular theory, will continue to 
infer that they afford unquestionable evidence of the 
existence of an intelligent Creator; and that the 
theory which affirms that they have resulted from 
the interaction of a number of blind forces during 
the ages of the past is simply incredible. Another 


34 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


objection which has been urged, that the employment 
of adjustments and adaptations to effectuate particular 
results, instead of bringing them into existence by 
the energy of His will, implies a limitation of the 
Creator’s power, may safely be left to the judgment 
of the reader. 

As I have said above, the only alternative to the 
theistic argument that these adaptations and correla- 
tions afford unquestionable proof of the existence of 
an intelligent Creator, is the theory which affirms 
that they have resulted from the interaction during 
the ages of the past of a multitude of forces desti- 
tute of intelligence and voluntary agency. This 
theory assumes the eternal existence of particles of 
matter, which have inherent in them certain poten- 
tialities, infinite in number, indefinitely minute, self- 
existent, and which have been in a state of perpetual 
motion, in obedience to certain necessary forces, 
during the eternity of the past. It is further assumed 
that these atoms during this past eternity must have 
passed through every possible form of combination, 
the last of which has produced this universe with all 
its innumerable adaptations and correlations ; or in 
other words, that it has been built up by the com- 
bined action of matter, force, and motion, ali alike 
destitute of intelligence. This is the anti-theistic 
theory of its origin stated in all its nakedness, for 
into it every theory, except that which traces its origin 
to the power and wisdom of an intelligent Creator 


THE ARGUMENT FROM ADAPTATION. 85 
must ultimately resolve itself. The simple statement 
of such a theory is perhaps its best refutation. 

A few questions, however, may be put with 
advantage to those who think this account of the 
origin of the universe a possible one. Is the eternal 
existence of an infinite number of atoms indefinitely 
minute one whit more conceivable than that of the 
eternal existence of an intelligent Creator ? Whence 
came their inherent potentialities ? Whence their 
motion ? Why were they not always at a standstill ? 
How do we know that during the past eternity they 
must have passed through every possible form of 
combination? May they not have repeated the same 
combinations over again times without number ? 
These and a number of similar questions may be 
asked, to which the anti-Theist can make no rational 
reply. Whatever difficulties he may consider to 
exist in the conception of a self-existent Creator, he 
will find that those which are inherent in his own 
system are out of all proportion greater. 

In concluding this portion of my subject, I must 
ask the reader to refer to, and carefully to ponder 
over, the observations made in a previous chapter 
respecting what science tells us is the ultimate destiny 
of the present universe ; and which must have been 
the destiny during the ages of the past of any 
previously existing one, unless a being had existed 
external to the motionless mass of matter into which 
they had become resolved, who was capable of 


86 CHRISTIAN .THEISM. 


imparting to it fresh energy and life ; for unless such 
a being had existed, instead of our present universe, 
full of its varied activities, unbroken silence and 
lifelessness must have been the result for evermore. 

The favourite theory behind which anti-Theism 
entrenches itself is the theory of evolution. This 
theory has obtained during recent years an acceptance 
among no small number of scientists of great repu- 
tation as affording a rational account of the origin 
of the universe with all its innumerable adjustments 
without the intervention of an intelligent Creator. 
Many of these have loudly proclaimed their belief — 
that the investigations of modern science have sapped 
the foundation of what has long been regarded as 
the stronghold of the belief in Christian Theism ; 
and no small number of others, who have never 
troubled themselves to test the validity of the 
reasonings on which this theory is based, have 
been induced to accept it by the sheer weight of 
authority. This being so, its importance renders it 
necessary that I should consider its claims to our 


acceptance in a separate chapter. 


CHAPTER VI. 


ite aNd Liei STI CeerheOnY Oh EVOLUTION 
CONSIDERED AND REFUTED. 


T is not every theory of evolution which is anti- 
theistic. Theories of evolution assume three 
forms— 

1. One which is consistent with a belief in Chris- 
tian Theism. 

2. One which is consistent with a belief in a 
philosophic Theism ; but which affords little satisfac- 
tion to the requirements of our spiritual and moral 
nature. 

3. One which is incompatible with the belief in the 
existence of an intelligent Creator; which affirms 
that the universe with all its innumerable adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations has been produced by 
the action of blind forces, without the intervention 
of any being who has an existence independent of it: 
It is the last of these theories to which I wish to 
direct the reader’s special attention in this chapter. 

The popularly accepted theistic theory of the past 
laid down that each separate species of vegetables 


88 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


and animals was brought into existence by a special 
and separate act of creative power. The discoveries 
of modern science have shown that the number of 
existing species is so inconceivably vast as to render 
itimprobable that this can have been the mode in 
which the Creator has acted in His creative work. 
That it involves a difficulty is certain, which is 
obviated by the Christian theory of evolution. This 
theory is fully consistent with the discoveries of 
modern science; and lays down that the Creator, 
by His unceasing energy In a manner unknown 
to us, has evolved all existing species out of pre- 
viously existing ones in a gradually ascending scale, 
beginning from lower to higher forms of being. 
Both theories alike ascribe the creation and the 
upholding of all things to His energetic working 
and the operation of His will. They differ from 
one another as to the mode in which the Creator has 
acted in His creative work. The one assumes that 
His energy has been exerted from without and the 
other from within matter and its forces, guiding 
and directing them; and at times introducing into 
the universe some new element of life. 

It is to be regretted that a few eager controver- 
sialists have denounced the belief in the principle of 
evolution, in every one of its forms, as inconsistent 
with a belief in Christian Theism, because, in their 
opinion, it is inconsistent with certain statements of 
the Old Testament. In doing so, they have adopted 


Poe tN eS ice ToLOn ew Ol EV OLULION, .89 


a course which is pre-eminently unwise, because it is 
obvious, that it is not the object of the Bible to teach 
the modus operandi of the Creator; and it is certain 
that the mode in which men are brought into exist- 
ence is not by the direct creation of each individual, 
but by a process of evolution. It is also beyond 
dispute that science has proved that the order in 
which things have come into existence has been a 
gradual advancement from lower to higher forms of 
being. As it is foreign to the purpose of the present 
work to enter on this controversy, I shall only observe 
that one thing is certain: that we have no means 
of knowing on a priori grounds, what is the mode in 
which the Creator has acted in His creative work, 
and in His present action in providence. These are 
secrets into which it transcends the powers of our 
finite intellects to penetrate. It is, therefore, quite as 
probable that He has produced one species out of a pre- 
existing one, and so on in an ever ascending series, 
by a constant and gradual exertion of His power 
acting from within, as by a number of what are called 
special and separate acts of creation. This being so, 
and our ignorance of how creation has been effected 
being profound, it is absurd to dogmatize on the mode 
in which the Creator must have acted. All that 
Christian Theism requires us to believe is, that the 
universe is the work of a Being who is all-powerful, 
all-wise, holy, just, merciful, and good ; and that He is 
ever present in His creative work, upholding it in 


go CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


existence by His ceaseless energy, and guiding it by 
His Providence. But the mode in which He energizes 
can be known only to Himself ; yet our ignorance of 
it is no disproof of the reality of the fact. 

The second form of this theory assumes the exist- 
ence of an intelligent Creator, who, at some period of 
the past, brought into existence one or more cells 
possessed of life, endowed them with the power of in- 
corporating various substances into themselves, and 
then of evolving out of themselves all the varieties 
of animal life which have existed in the past or 
which exist in the present, without any further 
intervention onhis part. ‘This theory, be it observed, 
makes no attempt to account for the origin of things, 
or how the world was brought into existence amply 
provided with everything needful for the support of 
the innumerable orders of beings which were destined 
to inhabit it. All these things it is content to leave 
unsolved. As I have said, it takes up the work of 
evolution with the first introduction of life, and 
having provided itself with one or more living cells, 
endowed with certain properties, the formation of 
which it ascribes to an all-powerful and all-wise 
Creator, it proceeds to evolve all the living beings 
which have existed in the past, or which exist 
in the present, by a kind of self-acting machinery, 
which goes on working out his purposes without 
any further intervention on his part. To effect 
this marvellous result, it is alleged that he endowed 


THE ern felis tiG) LEORY (OF EVOLUTION, oI 


these cells with a power of producing beings simi- 
lar to themselves; but inasmuch as, if this had been 
their only power, universal sameness must have 
been the result, he bestowed on them the additional 
power of imparting to their progeny a number 
of variations from their parental form, indefinitely 
small, and so on in perpetual succession. Having 
effected thus much he retired from his creative work, 
and left it to the blind forces of the universe to grind 
out his ultimate purposes without any further in- 
tervention or providential guidance. In this way, 
according to this theory, through the instrumentality 
of innumerable variations, struggles for existence, 
survivals of the fittest (that is, the strongest), the 
power of transmitting improvements to successive 
generations, etc., have emerged the present vegetable 
and animal kingdoms, with all their innumerable 
adjustments, adaptations, and correlations. 

Let it be observed that throughout all these latter 
stages this theory of evolution adopts the same 
machinery as the anti-theistic one. I shall, therefore, 
discuss the difficulties which are involved in it when 
Weconeider gtuewlatter, sl teiseriohtwnowever, -thatel 
should observe, that not a few of those who hold this 
theory in its main outlines, admit that there are 
certain gaps in this long succession which it is 
impossible to bridge over; and which involve the 
necessity of special interventions of the Creator at 
certain stages of the evolution process. Of these the 


92 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


principal are: the introduction of intelligence, free 
agency, a moral nature, and those various powers 
which distinguish man from the animal races; and 
lastly, on the part of those who believe in Christianity 
as a Divine revelation, that special interposition of 
God, which introduced it into the world. 

I by no means wish to deny that this theory is 
consistent with a belief in Theism, and that it satisfies 

demand of our intellects which anti-Theism does 
not. Thus, it starts with the assumption that the 
introduction of the original germs of life into a 
universe previously destitute of life, must have been 
the work of an all-powerful and intelligent Creator. 
It affirms, and affirms truly, that the creation of the 
original cells, endowed with the potency of evolving 
out of themselves every form of living being which 
has existed in the past, and which exists in the 
present, with all their innumerable adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations, is a proof that the 
being who could effect this must have been possessed 
of inconceivable power and intelligence. This is 
indubitable ; but, however much a theory of this kind 
may satisfy some of the requirements of philosophic 
thought, a God who, after creating these cells and 
endowing them with their various properties, has 
retired from all interference with them except on a 
few special occasions ; and has left them by the aid 
of the unintelligent forces of the universe to grind 
out a number of foreseen results, just as a machine 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 9 


when once set in motion, grinds out the results for 
the production of which it was constructed, and then 
stands by calmly contemplating its action, unmoved 
by any consequences with which it may be attended, 
can satisfy neither the spiritual nor the moral 
requirements of man. The intellect may be satis- 
fied with a. God who is very far off; but man’s 
spiritual and moral nature sighs after one who is 
also very near at hand, for one with whom he can 
hold communion, who reveals Himself, and who can 
hear and answer prayer. It is difficult to com- 
prehend how the God of this system of philosophy 
can become the subject of either love, trust, or hope. 
Epicurus, himself, did not deny the existence of gods ; 
but he took care to relegate them to a region of 
peaceful enjoyment, undisturbed by the cares and 
troubles of the providential government of the world. 
The god of this system of philosophy bears a far 
closer resemblance to one of the gods of Epicurus 
than to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the 
Father of mercies and the God of all consolation. 
Its God may satisfy an intellectual need, which anti- 
Theism cannot, but he is too remote to satisfy the 
aspirations of the heart. 

Let us now consider that form of the theory of 
evolution which is inconsistent with a belief in the 
existence of an intelligent Creator. Although it has 
been propounded by several men of eminence, with a 


considerable variety in its details, yet inasmuch as 


94 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


these details are based on principles which are 
substantially the same, it will be unnecessary to 
discuss them separately. I shall, therefore, simply 
address myself to the consideration of the principles 
themselves. : 

All anti-theistic theories are obliged to assume an 
existence of some kind.as a foundation on which it is 
possible to commence the operation of world-build- 
ing, because there is one certitude which is accepted 
alike by Theists and anti-Theists, namely, that 
out of nothing nothing can originate. From this it 
follows that if something now exists, something 
must have existed always; otherwise nothingness 
must have produced existence—which is absurd. 
The propounders of these theories are, therefore, 
compelled to assume the existence of space; of 
an innumerable multitude of atoms inconceivably 
minute, possessed of an inherent power of motion, 
and an existence designated force,* which enabled 
these atoms to congregate into masses, and gave rise 
to the principle of gravitation. These assumptions 
are rendered necessary, because, without atoms it 
would be impossible to build a universe; without 
space motion would be inconceivable; without 
motion the atoms would have been eternally 


* The opinion which is now widely accepted respecting force 
is that it is unalterable in amount, neither increasing nor diminish- 
ing; and that the only change which it undergoes is the trans- 
formation of one kind of force into another, its equivalent in 
amount, 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 95 


quiescent ; and without some kind of force operat- 
ing either upon them or within them, they would 
have been incapable of congregating in masses, and 
thereby of forming worlds. It is also necessary to 
assume that these things were self-existent, ze. that 
they existed without a beginning during the eternity 
of the past; for otherwise they must have been 
brought into existence by a self-existent Creator 
whose existence it is the object of this theory to 
disprove. All these are very convenient assumptions, 
for without them the anti-theistic theory could not 
advance a step; but to attribute to a succession of 
atoms, to motion, and to force an existence which 
never had a beginning involves difficulties out of all 
proportion greater than the assumption of the 
existence of a self-existing being, who possessed a 
power and intelligence adequate to create this 
universe with all its innumerable adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations. The assumption that 
these atoms must have passed through every possi- 
ble form of combination during the eternity of the 
past, of which the hap-hazard production of this 
ordered universe is the last, may be safely left to 
the judgment of the reader. 

The anti-theistic theory having thus provided 
itself with the materials necessary for commencing 
operations, let us now consider the mode in which, 
according to it, the present universe has been built 
up out of these atoms without the intervention 


96 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


of intelligence. The process briefly stated is as 
follows— 

After various interactions of matter, force, and 
motion during ages of indeterminate duration, these 
atoms got resolved into a fiery vapour-cloud, in- 
tensely hot, filling the space now occupied by the 
solar system. I say ‘the solar system” because, 
with a view to our present argument, it is unneces- 
sary to go beyond it and inquire how the millions 
of suns, which astronomers tell us are scattered 
throughout space, came into existence. It will be 
sufficient to inquire how this theory gives a rational 
account of the origin of the world in which we live, 
and of all which it contains. 

If it be asked : ‘‘ Whence came the heat of this fiery 
vapour-cloud?” the anti-Theist will reply, ‘‘ Heat and 
motion are only two forms of the same force; and 
when motion is arrested heat is generated.” It is 
only necessary, therefore, to assume that the motion 
of these atoms should get diminished (how, we are not 
told), and heat will be generated in sufficient quantities, 
What, then, is the next step? <A cooling process in 
course of time is assumed to have set in, and the 
heat of the vapour-cloud to have been gradually dissi- 
pated into space. Hereupon it contracted, and when 
it had sufficiently cooled, a portion of the atoms met 
together in masses, forming a nucleus; and the prim- 
eval force inherent in them, which, as we have said, 
admits of various transformations, assumed the form 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 97 


of what we call the force of gravitation, and the mass 
of congregated atoms assumed a circular motion. 
Then the remaining portions of the vapour-cloud 
got gradually thrown off from the original mass, and 
by several other processes after the lapse of ages 
got consolidated into worlds of which our earth is 
one. All this, and much more, we are asked to 
believe has taken place during the ages of the past, 
from the interaction and hap-hazard meeting of 
forces destitute of intelligence. If it be objected that 
these processes require intervals of time inconceiv- 
ably vast for their accomplishment, the anti-Theist 
will reply, ‘I never need trouble myself about time ; 
I have eternity to fall back on, which is inex- 
haustible. What cannot be accomplished in a million 
years can be accomplished in a hundred million ; 
and that admits of being multiplied to any conceiv- 
able extent. So the necessary time will be always 
forthcoming. Time, therefore, forms no difficulty 
with me.” 

Still the work is very incomplete, for the world 
thus formed was a simple desolation; and until it 
had passed through a further process of cooling, its 
heat was so intense that no form of vegetable or 
animal life was capable of existing in it, though it 
was well stored with everything which enters into 
the composition of its solid nucleus, necessary for 


their support. 
Yet these unintelligent forces, unprescient of the 


7 


98 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


future, proceeded with their work, and after long 
intervals of time, succeeded in so framing and fashion- 
ing the world as to have made it a place fit for the 
habitation of beings possessed of life, and furnished 
with all the materials requisite for their development 
and growth ; nay, even in making it a fit habitation 
for beings endowed with a high order of intelli- 
gence; in a word, without the smallest foresight 
they succeeded in forming a world, which, in the 
course of distant ages, would be not only a suitable 
habitation for man, but one capable of supplying 
his various wants, as he advanced from one stage 
of civilization to another. If it is asked what is 
involved in these operations, the answer must be 
that forces devoid of intelligence are capable of pro- 
ducing results, which beings possessed of the highest 
order of intelligence might full well envy. 

But all that has been thus far effected is to have 
produced a world devoid of life, yet fitted to be 
the habitation of life and intelligence. Here, then, 
we have arrived at a gap in the anti-theistic theory 
of evolution so wide that none of its advocates have 
been able to throw a bridge over it except by the 
aid of their imagination. Let it be observed that 
the only materials, which they have to work with, are 
lifeless matter, force, and motion. But life exists. 
Whence, then, came it? No experiment known to 
science has been able to evolve matter which is 
living out of matter which is not living. Pressed by 


LHE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 99 


this difficulty, some anti-Theists have affirmed that 
life is a mode of motion, combined with a suitable 
arrangement of the particles of matter. But the 
difference between things possessed of life, and 
things not possessed of life, is one which is palpable 
to the most ordinary understanding. Nothing will 
persuade such a person, that a change in the posi- 
tion of the atoms which compose the table on which 
Iam writing, or any motion imparted to them, will 
enable it to present the phenomena of life. Pressed 
by this difficulty of producing life by such means, 
most anti-Theists have adopted a theory called 
“spontaneous generation,” 7c. that life has in 
some unknown way during the ages of the past, 
emerged out of non-life. But here they are pressed 
by the evidence of facts. Once it was supposed 
that this was a thing of not unfrequent occurrence ; 
but certain experiments have proved the contrary. 
Even eminent Scientists, who disbelieve in Christian 
Theism, are compelled to admit that as far as our 
present knowledge goes, no instance can be pro- 
duced of the production of life out of matter which 
is certainly devoid of life, Here, as far as present 
facts are concerned, the anti-theistic theory hope- 
lessly breaks down. What, then, is to be done? 
Is the theory to be abandoned ? No; recourse is 
to be had to the principle of faith. They take 
refuge in the expression of a confident expectation 
that, although in the present state of our knowledge 


100 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


not a tittle of evidence can be adduced in support 
of this theory of spontaneous generation, yet that 
this evidence will be forthcoming at some period 
of the future; or that the state of things might 
have been different in the distant past from what 
they are in the present. In other words they 
abandon reason, and fall back on that faith which 
they denounce in others as credulity. 

Let us now suppose, for the sake of argument, 
that a few living cells have been evolved in the 
manner which this theory pre-supposes. Let us 
hear Sir John Lubbock’s description of a cell, and 
then judge whether the theory is believable— 


“Every cell in the animal body is a standing 
miracle. It must grow, it must assimilate nourish- 
ment, it must secrete, it must produce other cells 
like itself, and this after ‘and in addition to its own 
proper and distinctive function. The lowest animal 
consists only of a single cell. Yet they feed and 
digest, they grow and multiply, they move and feel. 
Their perceptions are no doubt confused, and un- 
differentiated, and perhaps devoid of consciousness. 
The soft protoplasm of which they consist is dimly 
affected by external stimuli, as for instance, by the 
waves of light and sound. Their forms are all 
minute, almost invisible to the naked eye” (The 
Senses of Animals, p. 3). 


The writer might have full well added one more 


either have created themselves, or have been evolved 
out of matter destitute of life and intelligence by a 
process which differs only in name from self- 
creation, if they are not the work of an intelligent 
Creator. 

But let the anti-Theist proceed in his work 
of world-building ; and to enable him to do so, 
let us assume that a cell has been produced 
by an act of spontaneous generation. A _ very 
serious task awaits him, to fill the world, then a 
desolation, with these innumerable forms of vege- 
table and animal life, which have existed during the 
past, and which exist in the present; for the cell 
produced by spontaneous generation cannot be 
assumed to be endowed with the marvellous quali- 
ties above described, but to be only a simple cell 
possessed of life. 

Before it is possible to make the smallest progress 
in the production of additional forms of life, the anti- 
Theist is compelled to make a very serious demand 
on our faith. These cells, unless they had been 
endowed with the power of producing other cells, 
and that too in considerable numbers, must have 
utterly failed to people the globe with living forms. 
Further, if their powers were limited to the pro- 
duction of cells precisely similar to themselves, 
universal sameness must have been the result, and 
the endless varieties of life would have failed to 


102 | CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


come into existence. It was, therefore, necessary 
that these primeval cells should have been en- 
dowed with the power of generating their like 
with the addition of a number of small variations 
from their primitive forms. Unless this had been 
so, the whole process of anti-theistic evolution would 
have come to a standstill. Cells endowed with these 
properties are very convenient for the purposes of 
this theory; but the questions, how came they into 
existence, through what process did they become 
possessed of the power of generating their like, 
and of doing this with numerous small variations, 
demand an answer. To these questions the anti- 
Theist has no answer to give except that they have 
been worked out through ages of evolution during 
the eternity of the past. With theorizers of this 
kind, with eternity at their back, all things are 
possible, except the existence of a Creator possessed 
of boundless power and intelligence. 

Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, 
however incredible it justly seems to men of ordi- 
nary understanding, that beings such as those above 
referred to, have been evolved by the action and 
interaction of a number of forces devoid of life 
and intelligence, during the ages of the past; that 
their descendants have evolved a-vast variety of 
small variations, some suited, and some unsuited 
to their environment; that the latter have perished, 
while the former have survived; that the survivors 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 103 


have evolved fresh variations of an improved type, 
and more capable of adjusting themselves to their 
surroundings; and that this process has gone on 
through ages of indefinite duration. These have 
at last become so numerous, as to have encroached 
on the means of subsistence. Hence has arisen 
what, in the language cf this theory, has been called 
“a struggle for life.” In this the weaker perished, 
while the stronger survived, and threw out fresh 
improvements gradually evolving more and more 
perfect forms. All this gradual advancement, the 
position taken by the anti-Theist compels him to 
assume, has been produced through the action (let 
this never be forgotten) of forces destitute of in- 
telligence. What, then, must have occurred? One 
answer only is possible: A countless number of 
hap-hazard meetings together of these forces af 
the right time and place, must have produced the 
adjustments capable of producing the results in 
question. I have already drawn attention to the 
number of chances against the fall of twelve dice 
with their aces upwards, when thrown into the air, 
and the immense multiplication of the improbability, 
if the operation were repeated twelve times in suc- 
cession with the same result, an improbability so 
great, that we arrive at the full conviction that 
intelligence must have intervened somewhere. But 
this is a mere shadow compared with the chance 
production of the adjustments, adaptations, and 


104 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


correlations which exist in numbers past human com- 
prehension. Their occurrence, therefore, is incredible. 

Let us, however, for the sake of argument, assume 
that all these difficulties have been surmounted ; that 
the blind forces of Nature have prepared a world 
supplied with everything requisite for the support 
of vegetable life; and that a few of the lowest 
forms of organization. have been actually evolved. 
A mighty work yet remains to be accomplished, 
namely, to fill the world with the various forms of 
vegetable existence in all their inconceivable variety, 
and to fit them to the various conditions of soil 
and climate; for it is an obvious fact that this has 
been effected somehow. How, then, has this been 
accomplished? The anti-theistic evolutionist will 
answer: ‘By a very gradual evolution of lower forms 
into higher ones by the aid of a number of small 
variations, through periods of vast duration, which 
by repeated struggles for existence, adaptations to 
their environment, and survival of the fittest, have 
evolved the present vegetable kingdom, with its 
endless varieties of form, qualities, adaptations, and 
correlations.” Let the reader glance at it, and ask 
himself whether it is credible that blind forces, in- 
capable of purpose or foresight, can have produced 
results, such as the highest form of intelligence, short 
of the infinite, might full well envy. No conceivable 
array of figures can convey an adequate idea of the 
number of the requisite hap-hazard interactions of 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 105 


forces necessary to produce such results. What, then, 
must have been the numbers in their totality which 
were requisite for evolving the present vegetable 
kingdom, with its innumerable varieties? The 
anti-Theist will doubtless again reply: ‘I have 
the bank of eternity at my command; and with 
sufficient time all the necessary interactions of 
unintelligent forces at the right time and place are 
possible.” To this it will be a sufficient reply, that 
many abstract possibilities, of which this is one, 
are not credible as actual occurrences. Further, 

astronomy tells us that the time which has elapsed 
since the world has been capable of sustaining life, 
is far too short to satisfy the demands of the anti- 
theistic evolutionist. 

Let us again assume, for his benefit, that these 
difficulties have been overcome; and ask him to 
address himself to the evolution of the varieties 
of the animal kingdom, the different species of 
which, as modern science teaches us, amount to 
hundreds of thousands, if not of miilions. Here, 
however, before he can take one step in advance 
he is met by a difficulty which is sufficient to make 
the most determined evolutionist look grave. In 
the animal kingdom, which includes man, a number 
of phenomena make their appearance, of which the 
preceding forms of existence are destitute, namely, 
sensation, intelligence, free agency, and a moral 
nature. Unless these can be generated somehow, 


to6 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


the theory of anti-theistic evolution inevitably breaks 
down. Let us briefly consider how the evolution- 
ist proceeds to evolve them out of materials which 
contain no trace of them. 

With respect to sensation, he affirms that it is 
the result of motions in the nervous system, which 
are conveyed to the brain, and of the arrangement 
of the particles of matter, of which that organ is 
composed, which when set in motion by the action 
of the nerves, produce the phenomenon which we 
designate “sensation.” But of this no evidence has 
been adduced. What, then, are the facts? 

Sensations are invariably preceded by motions in 
the nervous system, produced by either external or 
internal forces, which are conveyed to the brain, and 
terminate in it; but between these motions, and the 
sensations which invariably follow them, a wide 
gulf lies, which no amount of scientific observation 
has been able to bridge over. We have eminent 
authority for affirming that known science can sug- 
gest no means, by which a motion can be translated 
into a sensation ; and that in fact the translation of 
the one into the other is in the present state of 
our knowledge inconceivable. This being so, the 
only resource of the anti-theistic evolutionist is to 
express his belief that what is not possible now 
may have been possible in the ages of the past. 

But, assuming that this difficulty has been 
surmounted, he has immediately to encounter a 


THIN TI-THEISTICATAHEORY (OF EVOLUTION.“107 


fresh one—the necessity of evolving intelligence 
out of materials previously destitute of it. I 
SayveeetlemilecesslLymOlmevOlvingmit, sionwit. 1S.an 
obvious fact that it exists, and therefore that it 
must have come into existence somehow. Equally 
certain is it that intelligence, and the want of it, 
are not separated from one another by a few small 
variations, such as this theory presupposes, but by 
a great gulf; for even sensation and intelligence 
differ widely. How, then, is this interval to be 
bridged over, when the only materials at the com- 
mand of the evolutionist are matter, force, and 
motion? Must we once more invoke the theory 
of spontaneous generation ? 

This difficulty has been attempted to be sur- 
mounted, by the affirmation that thought and in- 
telligence are neither more nor less than a function 
of the brain; that where there is no intelligence, 
there is no brain ; and that wherever there is brain, 
however small, there is intelligence however low; 
and consequently that thought and intelligence are 
a mere question of organization. I have pointed 
out in a previous chapter the inadequacy of this 
theory to account for the facts, and therefore I 
need not repeat what I have said on that subject 
here. 

Let us now once more assume, for the sake 
of argument, that these difficulties have been 
surmounted, and that the lowest form of animal 


108 CHRISTIAN, THEISM. 


existence has been brought into being, with all 
its marvellous endowments as above described. 
What, then, is the work which the anti-theistic 
evolutionist has yet to accomplish? This, and 
nothing less: to prove that all the forms of animal 
existence now inhabiting the globe, from the 
smallest animalcule to the whale, the lion, and the 
elephant, and even to man with his moral nature 
have been evolved by a succession of small and 
gradual improvements out of one of the lowest 
forms of life by the action of forces destitute of 
intelligence and volition. This is the problem which 
he has to solve. How, I ask, is it to be effected ? 
Here again the answer will be returned, “ By the 
process called ‘natural selection,’ or the ‘survival 
of the fittest.’ As this theory is a very widespread 
and popular one, it will be desirable that I should 
give it a brief consideration. According to it, the 
small variations above referred to, when of a favour- 
able character, gave to their possessors an advantage 
in the struggle for life, when the means of sub- 
sistence became scarce; whereas those which were 
destitute of them perished. These advantages became 
fixed, and were transmitted to their descendants ; 
and thus they produced an improved breed, while 
the inferior ones became gradually extinct. This 
process has gone on from generation to genera- 
tion, until at last has emerged the present animal 
kingdom with all its countless varieties, adaptations, 


Tie ANE THE oo tl HEORY: OF EVOLUTION. 109 


and adjustments, including man and his moral nature. 
Such in very brief outline is the anti-theistic form of 
this theory. A few comments on it will be necessary. 

I observe, first, that the terms used in it are 
‘ambiguous, and therefore misleading. The word 
“ selection” in the ordinary use of language, 
means ‘‘choice,” and choice implies the presence 
of intelligence, because without it in the ordinary 
acceptation of the term, choice is impossible. But 
in the process designated “natural selection,’ the 
forces operating in it are destitute of all power of 
choosing, and the object of the theory is to construct 
the various forms of animal and vegetable life with- 
out the intervention of intelligence, or of any being 
who is capable of exercising choice. Again: accord- 
ing to this theory, “ the survival of the fittest” 
really means “ the survival of the strongest,” for the 
struggle in question is one for the necessary supply 
of food, and for space in which to exist, of which 
the strongest are certain to get the largest share. 
But it by no means follows that the strongest are 
‘n all cases the fittest to survive. Which, I ask, is 
the fittest to survive: the persecutor or the perse- 
cuted, the strong villain or the weak saint, the 
man devoured by the shark or the shark which 
devours him? Fitness to survive involves other 
considerations than that of mere strength. This 
theory also takes for granted that, in a struggle for 
existence, the victor always emerges out of it with 


110 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


undiminished powers. On the contrary, it frequently 
happens that the victor in a contest for a supply of 
food, instead of emerging out of it in his full strength, 
issues from it considerably weakened, especially 
when the struggle has been a severe one. In such 
a case he would transmit weakened instead of 
improved powers to his posterity. Further, the 
term evolution, as intended to be descriptive of the 
process by which a simple cell gradually produces 
the present animal kingdom, is misleading ; the fact 
being that before any of these primeval germs of 
life, which this theory assumes the existence of, can 
produce anything out of themselves, no small amount 
of involution and assimilation must take place, and 
so throughout the entire process. Exactness of 
thought requires that the anti-theistic theory of evo- 
lution should be designated a theory to account for 
the existence of the various forms of animal and 
vegetable life through a process of involution and evo- 
lution, by means of forces destitute of intelligence 
and volition. 

The reader will have observed that in the course 
of this argument I have repeatedly referred to the 
necessity of the meeting together of a number of 
distinct and independent forces at the right time and 
place, in order that they may bring about a par- 
ticular result. The importance of such a con- 
currence in its bearing on the anti-theistic theory 
of evolution will be made clear by a very simple 


Paes) eis Gal ROR YO EVOLUTION sql tt 


illustration. Let us assume that the Hew 
forces of Nature, through the principle of natural 
selection, have succeeded in producing a male animal 
—for example, a horse. It is evident that if they 
had stopped here, no race of horses could have come 
into existence. What, then, was the necessary con- 
dition of the production of the species? Evidently 
that the blind forces of Nature, at the time that they 
produced a male, or shortly afterwards, should have 
produced a female. But this is not all; for if the 
male had been evolved in America, and the female 
in Europe, the species would never have come into 
existence. To produce a race of horses, it would 
have been necessary that the male and the female 
should have been evolved not only at the same 
time, but in the immediate neighbourhood of one 
another. Against sucha concurrence of unintelligent 
forces at the right time and place, the chances are 
so overwhelming as to render it unbelievable. But 
according to this theory a similar concurrence of 
forces must have taken place in the case of every 
existing species of animals now existing on the globe 
to have rendered their existence possible. Is such 
a concurrence, I ask, within the limits of rational 
belief? Yet this is only a single instance out of 
innumerable others which must have taken place 
during the ages of the past, without which the anti- 
theistic theory of evolution must have come to a 
standstill in its operations, 


112 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Further: Three thousand years have now elapsed 
since the birth of authentic history, and a vastly 
longer period since that which may be desig- 
nated by the term “ monumental” history. What 
indications are there of even a tendency on the part 
of a lower order of beings to evolve out of them- 
selves a higher one during this interval of time? 
Surely, during a period so long, some signs of 
movement in a higher direction ought to be visible. 
But there are none. The bee is just as wise as, and 
no wiser than, it was three thousand years ago ; nor 
has it learned to regard the annual slaughter of its 
parent drones a sin. The dog has been man’s 
companion for long centuries, yet he has failed to 
invent, a language, nor is there a trace of his vocal 
organs undergoing a gradual improvement in the 
production of articulate speech. The ape, not to 
speak of numerous other animals, is capable of 
appreciating the comfort of a fire; but he has 
never yet learned the art of kindling one, simple 
as it is. The cat has long been not only the com- 
panion, but a favourite, of mankind ; yet it has not 
made the smallest progress in the way of developing 
even the semblance of a conscience or a moral 
sense. It is needless to multiply examples, for we 
all know that the various races of animals, whatever 
may be their endowments, if left to themselves, 
are unprogressive ; although a few instances exist 
where they are capable of making a slight advance- 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 113 


ment under the direct teaching of man. Full well, 
then, it may be asked, how it has come to pass, 
if they have been progressive, as according to 
this theory they must have been to a wonderful 
extent during the ages of the past, that during 
the historic period they have come to a stand- 
still, and have done nothing. But if it be urged, 
as it has been urged, that the period of time 
which is covered by authentic and monumental 
history is too short to produce any visible ad- 
vancement in a direction upwards, then this 
period, compared with the vast intervals of time 
which must have been requisite for effecting the 
innumerable evolutions which must have taken 
place in the animal kingdom, not to speak of 
those in the vegetable kingdom, can be no larger 
than a single grain of sand compared with the 
masses which lie on the ocean’s shore. But other 
sciences teach us that far, very far, within this 
stupendous interval of time, the globe in which we 
live must have been in such a state of heat as to 
have rendered it impossible for any living thing, 
such as an animal or a vegetable, to have existed 
iicit. 

In conclusion, I think that it will-put in a 
striking light the difficulties which the anti-theistic 
evolutionist has to encounter, if I put before the 
reader, in a succinct form, those which must be 
overcome in the production of a being such as 


8 


114 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


man, through agents which are alike devoid of 
life, intelligence, and a moral nature 

First, he has to provide himself with a cell 
possessed of life; but how one can be produced 
out of materials devoid of life he fails to explain, 
except by drafting on his imagination. This cell, 
when brought into being, as Sir J. Lubbock tells us, 
must grow, assimilate, and secrete; and, he should 
have added, be capable of producing other cells 
similar to itself; for if it did not possess these 
powers, the entire evolution process would have 
_been stillborn. But it by no means follows that a 
living cell, evolved out of the only materials which 
the evolutionist has at his command, should be 
either capable of growth, of assimilating nourish- 
ment, or of generating other cells similar to itself. 
Here, again, to explain how they became possessed 
of these powers, the evolutionist has to make a 
large draft on our imagination—may I not rather 
say, on our credulity? If a cell must grow, it 
must be capable of assimilating nourishment from 
some source external to itself; and if it must assi- 
milate nourishment, nourishment must have been 
all ready at its hand suitable for it to assimilate. 
How, then, by whom, or by what, has this suitable 
nourishment been provided? Again, it by no 
means follows that a living cell should be possessed 
of a power of generating numerous other cells 
similar to itself. That cells should have been 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. 115 


possessed of this power, is very convenient for the 
evolutionist ; but the only way in which he can 
account for the production of a thing which Sir 
J. Lubbock designates “a standing miracle,” is by 
making a further draft on our imagination. But 
here a very serious obstacle blocks the way. If these 
cells only possessed the power of generating others 
precisely similar to themselves, universal sameness 
must have been the result. To prevent this, it is 
necessary to assume that they possessed this power 
united with that of producing a number of small 
variations from their primeval type. How they 
succeeded in acquiring this singular power, we are 
not informed, but it is absolutely necessary to 
assume its existence, if the evolution theory we 
are considering is to get into working order. An 
eminent professor, however, has attempted to get 
rid of all difficulties at once by informing us 
that his power of vision enables him to see in 
matter the potency of all living things. Still, it is 
not unreasonable to demand that each difficulty 
should be met by itself, because it is evident that 
if this and the other above-mentioned difficulties 
cannot be overcome, it is impossible to evolve out 
of one or more living cells, even if you have suc- 
ceeded in getting life out of non-life, the innumerable 
varieties of the animal kingdom. 

But we cannot stop here. Assuming that the 
anti-Theist has provided himself with the necessary 


116 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


cells wherewith to commence operations, how is 
he to produce the endless variety of organized 
beings which at present fill the earth ? His answer 
will doubtless be, by, these cells throwing out a 
number of variations which were improvements on 
their original forms, which gave them the advantage 
in their struggle for existence ; that those improve- 
ments became fixed, and were transmitted to their 
descendants; and so on, from generation to genera- 
tion, until at last they succeeded in evolving the 
lowest form of organized life. Here, however, he 
has to encounter a serious difficulty. It is very con- 
venient for his theory that these cells should have 
been possessed of the power of transmitting such 
variations as were improvements to their descend~ 
ants, and so on for ever in perpetual succession ; 
and that the varieties which were not improvements 
should have become extinct; but in this long course 
of improvement, the hap-hazard concurrences of 
the various things necessary for carrying the entire 
process into effect at the right time and _ place, 
without which it would have been impossible that 
these advances in an upward direction could have 
been effected, must have been so inconceivably 
numerous as to make the theory utterly incredible. 

But his difficulties increase in proportion as the 
evolutionist advances. Out of such materials He 
has now to fill the world with every form of 
organized being which now exists in it. His only 


lire Vila bee ol Gal Oly Ore VOLG LION. 117 


machinery for doing so is that which | have re- 
peatedly referred to in the course of this chapter. 
The numbers of such beings are inconceivably vast, 
and in them exist a number of adjustments, adapta- 
tions, and correlations, whereby each organ is fitted 
to its function; part to part, and each part to the 
whole. The number of these which exist in animal 
bodies exceeds the power of human calculation. How, 
then, have they been formed, according to the anti- 
theistic theory of evolution ? Here again, the answer 
must be by the action and the interaction on matter 
of a number of unintelligent forces meeting together 
at the right time and place. But against such a 
concurrence the chances are enormous even in the 
case of a single organ. But animal bodies contain 
a multitude of organs, not a few of which are of a 
highly complicated character. To express the chances 
against such a concurrence, the number of organisms 
which exist in the animal kingdom will have to be 
multiplied by the number of the adjustments, adapta- 
tions, and correlations which they contain; and the 
result by the number of the parts of which they are 
composed. The array of figures thus produced would 
be incapable of being embraced by the human mind. 
This would denote the impossibility of the results, 
which the anti-theistic evolutionist endeavours to per- 
suade us can be produced by the hap-hazard concur- 
rence of atoms and forces destitute of intelligence 


and volition, 


115 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 


But I must hasten onwards to man. How is He 
to be evolved in conformity with the anti-theistic 
theory of evolution? Here the difficulties thicken 
so as to make not a few of the holders of this theory 
look grave. I will briefly enumerate the chief of 
them. Sensation has to be evolved out of materials 
which were utterly incapable in their original form 
of experiencing a sensation; intelligence out of that 
which was destitute of intelligence ; the free agency 
which each of us is conscious of possessing out of 
that which is incapable of exercising an act of choice; 
conscience, the sense of right and wrong, the feeling 
that it is our duty to choose the one and to avoid 
the other, and the sense of approbation and dis- 
approbation, out of things which neither do nor can 
understand either of these distinctions: and mercy, 
holiness, compassion, justice, and benevolence, out 
of blind forces, which remorselessly crush everything 
which crosses their path. 

It would be easy to adduce numerous other 
difficulties, but these will suffice. I will not aggravate 
the position of the anti-theistic evolutionist, or waste 
the reader’s time by dwelling on them in detail. I 
shall, therefore, only observe that it is certain that 
before one thing can be evolved out of another it 
must first exist in some form or shape in that thing 
out of which it is evolved; but in blind matter and 
force, these things exist not. How, then, was it 
possible that they should have evolved out of them- 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION, 119 


selves that which was never in them? We can 
persuade a man; we can terrify an animal; but a 
steam engine we can neither persuade nor terrify. 
We may entreat it, but it cannot hear; we may 
command it, but it will not obey. Wide, therefore, 
is the gulf which separates the world of free agency 
from the world of necessary agency. A body of 
alchymists, wholly different from any which has 
existed during the past, must arise before the one 
can be transmuted into the other. 

One observation more before I conclude this 
chapter: The difficulties of Theism sink into com- 
parative nothingness compared with those with which 
the theory of anti-theistic evolution is attended. 
Those who accept this theory in order that they 
may avoid those with which a belief in Christian 
Theism is attended, bear a close resemblance to 
those who of old strained out a gnat, and swallowed 


a camel. 


CHAPTER VET: 


THE COURSE OF REASONING ADOPTED IN THE 
TWO PREVIOUS CHAPTERS ILLUSTRATED BY 
EXAMPLES. 


i Be do this in a satisfactory manner is a work 

of no little difficulty. This arises not from the 
paucity, but from the richness, of the materials at our 
command; for adjustments, adaptations, and correla- 
tions abound everywhere in the vegetable and animal 
kingdoms, and meet us at every turn. Of these 
some are simple, others extremely complicated. The 
reader's attention cannot be too strongly called to the 
fact that it is not single instances of such adapta- 
tions, but their existence in numbers numberless, 
which imparts to the argument its overwhelming force. 
To exhibit its full force in a brief work like the 
present 1s obviously impossible, for it would involve 
a description of the most important adjustments and 
adaptations in the animal and vegetable kingdoms— 
and of the manner in which they are correlated to 
one another, and to the external universe. On the 
other hand, by adducing only a few examples, there 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 121 


is no little danger of failing to impress the reader. 
with a sense of the force of the argument taken as a 
whole. Happily, however, their existence is not 
denied even by the most determined unbelievers. 
The reader will, therefore, only have to multiply the 
examples which I shall adduce by hundreds of thou- 
sands of millions to enable him for all practical 
purposes to estimate the force of the argument 
which they furnish in proof of the existence of an 
intelligent Creator. | 

In considering this subject, it cannot be too con- 
stantly kept in mind that the only question in the 
present state of the Theistic controversy is, not the 
existence of these adjustments, adaptations, and cor- 
relations, but whether they have owed their origin 
to the interaction during the ages of the past of a 
number of blind forces destitute of volition and in- 
telligence ; or do they prove as the Theist contends, 
with a force equal to that of a demonstration, that 
their existence must be due to the energy of a being 
possessed of a power and intelligence adequate to 
have brought them into existence ? It will be, 
therefore, desirable that I should not only exhibit 
the argument in the general form in which it is 
set forth in the two previous chapters, but also to 
enable the reader better to appreciate its force, 
that I should adduce a few illustrations of it, 
asking him at the same time to keep steadily in 
mind what, as I have observed above, unbelievers 


i122 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


in the being of a God do not deny ; that these adap- 
tations and correlations exist in the universe in 
numbers passing human comprehension. In doing 
this I shall draw my illustrations from things 
with which most of us are in some degree ac- 
quainted. Some of them may seem well worn, but 
they are clear and obvious, and quite as convincing 
as the most elaborate discoveries of modern science. 
The truth is, that God has not left Himself without 
witness, even to those who know no more of the 
structure of the universe, than the uncultivated men 
whom St. Paul addressed at Lystra. All that modern 
discoveries have done is greatly to enlarge our 
knowledge, and thereby to furnish a vast mass of 
additional evidence from every quarter, indefinitely 
strengthening an argument which in its most 
simple form commends itself to persons of ordinary 
understanding. 

I shall draw my illustrations from our bodily 
framework, for not only is it full of adjustments 
and adaptations, some of which are extremely com- 
plicated, by means of which the various results 
which are necessary for our health, and even for 
our life, are effectuated, but these adaptations are 
so correlated together, that they form a compli- 
cated whole, each part being adjusted to every other 
part, and to the body as a whole. 

The idea which I desire to convey, cannot be 
better expressed than in the language of St. Paul 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 122 


slightly accommodated to the present argument, in 
which form even an anti-Theist cannot object to it, 
as a true statement of facts, whatever theory he may 
propound respecting their origin. 

The parts of the body are so tempered together, 
“that there should be no schism in the body; but that 
the members should have the same care one for 
another. And whether one member suffers, all the 
members suffer with it ; or one member is honoured y 
(that is, adequate to perform its function) all the 
members rejoice with it. The well-known fable of 
the envy of the members against the belly, their 
conspiracy to starve it, and the results which followed 
the attempt also forms another admirable illustration 
of this important truth. 

This correlation of the different parts of the 
body to one another, and to the body as a whole, 
is a thing which comes under our daily Experience. 
Let sickness intervene, and we immediately become 
sensible that if one member suffer, the whole body 
suffers with it; and as soon as the mischief wrought 
by the diseased member ceases, and it is enabled to 
perform its proper function all the other members 
obtain relief. The following illustrations, will be 
amply sufficient to prove that the innumerable adap- 
tations in our bodily framework, and its correlations 
by which its parts are so adjusted together as to 
form a complicated whole, cannot have been the 
result of the interaction of forces destitute of 


124 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


intelligence, and nano of ene a purpose; but 
on the contrary they prove with irresistible force that 
their existence must be due to the action of a being, 
to whose power and wisdom it is impossible to assign 
limitations. I will consider 

The instrumentalities by which sound, articulate, 
speech, language, and hearing are produced. 


1.—The Ear. 


I will quote Sir J. Lubbock’s description of it in 
his recently published work, entitled, The Senses 
of Animals (p.77). Anti-Theists will scarcely object 
that I am adducing the testimony of a partial 
witness. 


“We have first the internal ear, which is much 
less important in man than in many of the other 
animals, like the horse, where it may be seen 
moving continually, and almost automatically, as- 
suming a form most suitable for carrying the waves 
of sound down the outer passage to the tympanum 
or drum. This is a membrane stretched between 
the outer ear on the one hand and the drum on the 
other, which also contains air transmitted through 
the mouth by means of the Eustachian tube. The 
drum is separated from the brain by a hard bony 
partition, in which are two orifices, the one oval and 
the other round. Across the drum stretches a chain 
of little bones—first the hammer, secondly the anvil, 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 125 


and | thirdly the stirrup. The flat plate of the stirrup 
lies against the orifice (or, as it is technically called, 
fenestra ovalis) of the drum. Thus the sounds are 
intensified by being conveyed from the tympanic 
membrane to one which is twenty times smaller. 
Behind the fenestra ovalis is the labyrinth, which is 
filled with fluid, and on which the final filaments of 
the auditory nerve are distributed. This fluid is 
thrown into vibrations by those of the stirrup; but 
as it is enclosed in a bony case the vibrations would 
be greatly curtailed if it were not for the second mem- 
brane, or fenestra rotunda. This second membrane, 
therefore, acts aS a counter-opening, for if the fluid 
is compressed in one place, it must claim more room 
in another. The labyrinth also consists of two parts ; 
the cochlea, and the semicircular canals. The semi- 
circular canals are three in number, and stand at | 
right angles to one another. No satisfactory ex- 
planation of their function has yet been given ; but 
there ig some evidence that, in addition to and 
apart from hearing, they are affected by the position 
of the head, and thus serve as organs for maintain- 
ing the equilibrium of the body. Each of the canals 
commences with an oval dilatation, or ampulla. In 
the ampulla is a projecting ridge, on which are 
strong, stiff, delicate, hairlike processes, the vibra- 
tions of which probably gives certain sound sen- 
sations. In the canals certain parts have shorter 
hairs, over which are minute ear-stones, or otoliths, 


126 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


a $$$ $s 


consisting of carbonate of lime, embedded in a 
gelatinous substance. The cochlea contains, more- 
over, a complicated and wonderful organ discovered 
by Count Corte. This appears to be, in facGed 
microscopic musical instrument, composed of some 
four thousand complex arches, increasing regularly 
in length and diminishing in height, from the base 
to the summit of the cochlea. The waves of sound 
have been supposed to play on this instrument 
almost like the fingers of a performer on the strings 
of a musical instrument. The fibres of Corte, ac- 
cording to Helmholtz, may be distributed among the 
Seven octaves which are in general use, so that 
there will be thirty-three and a third fibres to every 
semitone, and four hundred to each octave. Weber 
has estimated that a skilful ear can perceive a 
difference even of one sixty-fourth of a tone, or 
nearly four thousand seconds, and this would agree 
fairly well with the number of fibres.” 


Thus complicated is this organ. If the reader 
will count, he will find that it consists of at least 
thirty different parts besides the four thousand 
complex arches, so correlated to each other that, by 
their conjoint action, they produce a definite result, 
which result would fail of being produced if any 
one of the parts were wanting. They are even 
more numerous, but as their numbers are not given 
by the author, it is impossible to count them. Some 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 127 


of them are very elaborate, as the drum, the ham- 
mer, anvil, stirrup, the labyrinth, and the Eusta- 
chian tube, which connects the ear with the mouth, 
thereby furnishing the drum with the needful air, 
and above all, the four thousand complex arches, 
forming a microscopic musical instrument. 

Yet, notwithstanding all this elaborate machinery, 
every part of which is adjusted and correlated to 
every other part, no sound has yet been produced, no, 
not even a motion; only an organ possessed of life, 
one portion of which is capable of receiving and 
being affected by a number of motions, which are 
not only extremely numerous, but of the most 
varied character ; and the other, endowed with the 
capacity of transmitting those motions to the auric 
nerve. 

Here let it be carefully observed, before the 
organism of the ear can produce a single sound 
that three other conditions are necessary— 

(i) An instrumentality capable of originating 
motions. 
(ii) A medium capable of transmitting the motions 

thus produced to the ear. 

(iii) A power which, when the motions thus 
produced are transmitted to the brain, is capable of 
translating them into sensations, and thus producing 
what we designate sounds; and in the case of man, 
with whom alone we are at present concerned, 
articulate speech. 


128 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


How, then, is all this accomplished? To effect 
it, the vocal organs and the ear require not only to 
be exactly correlated to each other, but both to a 
substance quite independent of the human body and 
its organism, namely, the atmosphere. Apart from 
this correlation, no communication between the vocal 
organs and the ear would be possible, and the ex- 
istence of both would be without result. Yet even 
when this communication has been established, we 
get nothing but a mass of complicated motions 
transmitted to the brain. To produce hearing, 
speech, and language, something capable of trans- 
lating these motions into sensations and thoughts 
is necessary. How this last Operation is effected, 
science is compelled to confess its ignorance. One 
thing, however, is certain. Motions are neither 
sounds, sensations, nor thoughts; but only the 
media through which they are produced. An intel-- 
ligent mind is the only thing which is capable of 
affecting this translation; but how it does SO, we 
know not. 

The adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
involved in these latter processes, are not only 
extremely numerous, but of a highly complicated 
character. To make this clear it will be necessary 
that I should give to the vocal organs which pro- 
duce the requisite motions, and to the medium 
through which they are transmitted to the ear, a 
brief consideration. 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 129 


2.—The Vocal Organs. 


It will be unnecessary that I should give an 
equally minute description of the vocal organs as 
that which has been given in Sir J. Lubbock’s 
description of the ear. They are, however, of a very 
complex character. The degree of their complexity 
may be appreciated from the fact that, for the pro- 
duction of that endless variety of motions which are 
necessary for the production of sounds, a corre- 
sponding change must take place in the action of 
the innumerable muscles connected with the lungs, 
where these motions are originated, the vocal 
chords, the larynx, the tongue, and the mouth, by 
means of which they are modified in such ‘a manner 
as to produce the endless variety of sound, rhythm, 
tune, pitch, and harmony as is produced in a con- 
cert. Let it be carefully observed, that not a single 
change takes place in the human voice, not even in 
the production of a consonant or a vowel sound, 
without a corresponding motion taking place in some 
part of the vocal organs—which changes are produced 
by the action of muscles specially adapted for that 
purpose; thereby producing corresponding motions 
in the air, which forms the only medium of commu- 
nication between the mouth and the ear. Conse- 
quently it was necessary that the vast number of 
parts which constitute these two organs should be 
mutually adjusted to one another, before those 


9 


130 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


motions which cause all the variations of the human 
voice could be produced, conveyed to the brain, and 
there translated by the mind into sensations and 
thoughts. We all know from experience how 
necessary is their healthy action, when we find that 
some inconsiderable disorder in the throat is capable 
of producing hoarseness, and a more considerable 
one, a total loss of voice. From this we learn the 
complication of the apparatus, its delicacy and 
minuteness, and the necessity of the correct action of 
the various parts of which it is composed; yet this 
complicated action is continued, with slight inter- 
ruptions, during the entire period of our lives. 

But the vocal organs are so framed that they are 
not only capable of causing that variety of motions 
which are necessary for producing the endless varia- 
tions of the human voice, but portions of them also 
subserve some of the most important functions of 
our bodies. Thus, the teeth aided by the tongue, 
both of which are most important agents in the 
formation of voice, act as a mill for grinding our 
food, preparatory to swallowing it. Then the com- 
bined action of the tongue and throat conveys it to 
the only place where it is useful, namely, the 
stomach. While the tongue is performing these 
functions, its nerves are acting as the medium of 
taste. Next, the passage between the mouth and the 
stomach presents us with a most marvellous adapta- 
tion, Part of the road is common to the breath and 


TELUSTRATIONS OF LHE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 131 


the food; but a short distance down, this road divides 
into two branches, one leads to the lungs for the 
purpose of supplying them with air, without which 
supply life would speedily become extinct, and voice 
impossible ; and the other, to the stomach, which 
conveys to it the food necessary for our support, to 
be there digested. If the food happens by accident 
to take the road leading to the lungs, the conse- 
quences would be fatal. How then is this prevented? 
There is a trap-door provided, over which the food 
passes, which is so constituted that without any 
thought or care of ours, it shuts every time we 
swallow, and opens every time we inhale or exhale 
breath. Nothing is more striking than the fre- 
quency, and at the same time the safety, with which 
this operation apparently so dangerous is performed ; 
for, during a dinner party, where there is much con- 
versation, this trap-door must open every time the 
guests breathe, and must shut every time they 
swallow ; yet the accident, commonly called “ going 
the wrong way,’ is of the rarest occurrence. Let 
the reader judge whether it is believable that this 
mass of complicated adjustments, adaptations, and 
correlations can have resulted frem the interaction 
of atoms and forces destitute alike of volition and 
intelligence. 

The anti-Theist will reply that these adjustments 
and adaptations bear no analogy to those formed by 
man, who fashions those which he originates out of 


132 GCORISTIAN THIS, 


materials previously existing, and who is compelled 
to adopt a number of ingenious contrivances for the 
purpose of overcoming the obstacles which they 
interpose in the way of his realizing his purposes; 
whereas the adjustments and adaptations in question 
are gradual growths, the originating power acting 
from within in obedience to a law from which it 
is impossible to deviate, which gradually develops 
every part in relation to every other part. 

With respect to this objection, I observe that, 
while it professes to show how these marvellous 
adjustments and adaptations can have originated 
without the intervention of intelligence, it leaves his 
difficulty precisely where he found it. It is no 
account of their origin to say that they are a 
growth. What, I ask, has enabled unintelligent 
atoms and forces destitute of volition and purpose 
to grow a mass of adjustments and adaptations, 
suitable for performing functions necessary for their 
existence, not a few of which are of so highly com- 
plicated a character, that it has taken ages of careful 
study and investigation before they have been dis- 
covered? Surely a cell possessed of the properties 
which Sir J. Lubbock has attributed to it in 
the work from which I have quoted above, could 
only have been produced by an intelligence of the 
highest order. He himself calls it “a standing 
miracle.” 


To account for the existence of the innumer- 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 133 


able adjustments, adaptations, and correlations with 
which the animal and vegetable kingdoms abound, 
by telling us that “they grew,” is to throw dust into 
our eyes. Tell us how, why, and by what agency 
devoid of intelligence they grow? Not only are 
they, and the parts of which they are composed, 
adjusted to one another, and to the organized being 
as a whole, but they are adjusted and correlated 
to the external universe; and unless they were 
thus adjusted and correlated it would perish. Can 
these, I ask, be growths? That they are not 
growths by means of any power acting from within 
them is certain. They must, therefore, have been 
the production of a being possessed of boundless 
power and intelligence, who was capable of ad- 
justing the animal and vegetable kingdoms to the 
previously existing external universe, or of adjust- 
ing it to them, when as yet they existed only in 
His creative purpose. Further; as to the objection 
that the adjustments and adaptations in animal and 
vegetable bodies are the result of a power ener- 
cizing within them, I have only to observe that, 
if this has been the mode of their production, 
Christian Theism has nothing to say to the con- 
trary; for, respecting the mode in which the 
Creator has operated in effecting His creative 
work, and operates in upholding it in being, and 
directing and controlling it by His providence, it 


is silent. 


134 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


3.—Lhe Adjustments and Adaptations by means of 
which the vocal organs, and the organism of the 
ear, are adjusted and correlated to the atmosphere. 


The vocal organs, and the organism of the ear, 
with all their wonderful adaptations and correlations, 
would have existed to no purpose but for the 
existence of another body, the atmosphere, which 
is not, like them, a growth; but an existence entirely 
distinct and independent of both. It must have 
been formed anterior to the birth of either vegetable 
or animal life on the globe, for without it neither 
of them could have existed; yet it is in the most 
intimate manner correlated to each. I ask the reader 
particularly to observe that, to render hearing pos- 
sible it is absolutely necessary that the motions of 
the vocal organs should be conveyed to the organism 
of the ear, and reproduced in it. How, then, is 
this effected, for within the body there is no con- 
necting link, by means of which the motions of the 
one can be transmitted to the other ? This connecting 
link is supplied by the air, which, although it must 
have been brought into existence long prior to, the 
formation of either organism, is so intimately corre- 
lated to both, that every motion which is produced 
by the one is faithfully transmitted by it to the other. 
The motions of the vocal organs produce atmospheric 
waves precisely corresponding to them, and these 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 135 


produce motions precisely corresponding in the 
tympanum of the ear. The vastness of their 
number may be estimated by the consideration that 
minute as are the variations of sound, which we are 
Capable of perceiving, there must be a wave in the 
atmosphere exactly corresponding to it which faith- 
fully transmits every motion of the vocal organs to 
the ear. The whole of these adaptations and cor- 
relations, therefore, are inconceivably complicated ; 
yet they work in harmony. Is it possible, I ask, to 
believe that this complicated machinery has been pro- 
duced by the interaction of blind forces undirected 
by intelligence ? 

Here let it be observed that thus far this mass of 
complicated machinery has produced neither sound 
nor voice, but motions only. Al] that it has accom- 
plished is to have transmitted these motions to the 
auric nerve, and through it to the brain. Still we 
have nothing but motions. Before either sound or 
hearing can be produced, another agent must be 
present, namely, a percipient and conscious mind, 
which must be capable of first setting the organism 
in motion; and then, when the motions have been 
transmitted to the brain, of translating them into 
sensations and ideas; and when they have been 
thus translated, to enable them to arouse the affec- 
tions, and stir the emotions of our moral and 
spiritual being. 

But while the atmosphere is so constituted, that 


136 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


without it the production of sound, voice, and 
language would have been impossible, it also fulfils 
functions no less important in other departments of 
nature. To one of these, I must ask the reader’s 
attention at the hazard of somewhat deviating from 
the direct line of my argument. Without it neither 
vegetable nor animal life could exist. It consists 
of a mixture of two gases, one of which is necessary 
for the support of vegetable, and the other of animal, 
life; and what is most remarkable, the gas which 
is necessary for the support of the one, is destructive 
of the other; and if either of them existed in pro- 
portions in any considerable degree varying from the 
present one, it would be destructive of both. How 
then, is this proportion maintained, when animals 
are constantly abstracting the one from it, and 
vegetables the other? So intimately are they corre- 
lated to it, that decay and death return to it those 
portions which growth has abstracted from it, and 
thereby its proper equilibrium is preserved. This 
is a marvellous adjustment; for, vegetable and 
animal life being yet non-existent, it must have been 
adjusted and adapted to the requirements of both 
while they were yet in the distant future. In a word, 
in this respect, its constitution may be justly said 
to have been prophetic. Such an adjustment the 
constitution of our minds compels us to ascribe to 
intelligent purpose, and forbids us to believe that it 
can have been the result of the interaction of forces 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 137 
destitute of intelligence and volition. It would too 
much encroach on my space if I were to attempt to 
describe the other most important purposes which 
‘t realizes in connection with animal and vegetable 
life, and above all with the life of man. 

Such are the complications of the instrumentality 
by which hearing 1s effected in man. How is it 
with that vast army of the animal kingdom, which 
possesses in some form or other this faculty of 
hearing? In their case the organism undergoes an 
‘ndefinite number of modifications, each fitted to the 
condition of things in which the animal exists. How, 
then, does the anti-Theist attempt to account for 
these innumerable adjustments, and adaptations ? 
He endeavours to persuade us that they have ori- 
ginated-in a struggle for existence, in the course of 
which, by the throwing out of favourable variations, 
and the perishing of unfavourable ones, the endless 
varieties of animal organisms have become accommo- 
dated to their environment, and have by this means 
gradually advanced from imperfect to more perfect 
forms, until they have culminated in man. Such is 
the theory. What, I ask, is the answer of common 
sense? That the presence of intelligent purpose, 
united with boundless power, is a rational account of 
their origin; but that the anti-theistic mode of their 
production is both inconceivable and incredible. 

I have given a somewhat minute description of 
the instrumentality by means of which sound, voice, 


138 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


and articulate speech are produced, in order that 
I may impart to the reader a lively idea of the over- 
whelming force of the evidence which these adjust- 
ments, adaptations, and correlations furnish in proof 
of the existence of an intelligent Creator. But as 
others in numbers past comprehension exist in the 
human body, it will be desirable that I should adduce 
a few additional examples of the most important 
ones as illustrations of my present argument. Let 
us, therefore, give a brief consideration to 


4.—TLhe Manner in which Viston ts effected. 


The organism of the eye has always, and most 
justly, formed with Theists a favourite illustration of 
the argument from adaptation. Space will not allow 
me to enter on a minute description of it ; I shall, 
therefore, only draw attention to some of its most 
striking adaptations. As an organism, it is no less 
complicated than those by means of which we are 
capable of perceiving the innumerable modifications 
of the human voice. It is in the strictest sense 
an optical instrument, as much as, nay more so than, 
a telescope or a microscope, the distinction between 
them being that the eye is a growth, whereas these 
instruments are composed of substances previously 
existing, put together by the ingenuity of man, and 
so adjusted as to be capable of conveying rays of 
light in numbers inconceivably vast, and converging 


ILLUSTRA TIONS OFTHE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 139 


them on that portion of the eye designated the 
“retina,” which is an expansion of the optic nerve, 
which conveys their impressions to the brain, where 
the percipient mind translates them into that which 
we designate Vision. 

In various points, however, the eye transcends all the 
optical instruments which have ever been invented by 
man for enlarging his sphere of vision. The telescope 
is constructed so as to enable us to see distant objects 
only, the microscope only those that are minute and 
near ; but no instrument of human invention has been 
able to combine the two. The human eye, on the 
contrary, contains within itself a machinery of a most 
elaborate description, whereby it is capable of changing 
itself from a telescope into a microscope, and from a 
microscope into a telescope, on the order of the mind 
conveyed to it through the nervous system ; and this 
takes place often every minute without our being 
conscious of the re-adjustments of its machinery. It 
also contains within itself an instrumentality, by 
means of which whatever is requisite for keeping it 
in constant repair is extracted from the blood. Spec- 
tacles, telescopes, and microscopes require frequent 
cleaning; the eye is supplied with a self-acting 
machinery which enables it to clean 1tSclL eso 
exclude excess of light, and to render objects visible 
when there is only a small supply of it, the hole in 
the eye called the pupil, through which the rays of 
light pass is so formed as to be capable of dilating 


140 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
Fie oa er a ee 
itself, when it requires a larger, and of contracting 


itself when it requires a less number of rays to enter 
it. This is effected by a number of nerves and 
strings of extreme minuteness, adjusted, and corre- 
lated together with such wonderful precision that 
throughout every change this hole retains its circular 
form. Thus, the chamber of the eye is a kind of 
camera obscura, which, when the light is too little, can 
enlarge its opening, and when it is too great, can 
contract it by a self-acting machinery. The retina, 
which is somewhere about half-an-inch in diameter, is 
a most marvellous structure. On it, whenever we see 
an extensive view, is painted by means of rays of light 
the entire landscape in a form inconceivably minute ; 
yet so complete and perfect that under ordinary cir- 
cumstances we are capable of distinguishing a minute 
change in the landscape, when the distance does not 
exceed two miles. Further, let it be observed that 
what we see is not the object itself, but a painting of 
iton the retina. Small, however, as is the retina, its 
structure is extremely complicated. The following 
is an abridgement of Sir John Lubbock’s description 
of it in the work above referred to— 


“Though no thicker than a sheet of thin paper, 
it consists of no less than nine separate layers, 
the innermost being the rods and cones which are 
the immediate recipients of the rays of light. The 
number of the rods and cones in the human eye is 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 141 


enormous. At a moderate computation, the cones 
may be estimated at over three millions, and the rods 
at thirty millions. .. Light is the effect produced 
on us, when waves of light strike the eye. When 
four hundred millions of millions of undulations of 
ether strike the eye in a second, they produce 
red; and as the number increases, orange, then 
yellow, blue, green, and violet ; but between forty 
thousand millions in a second, and four hundred 
millions of millions, we have no organ of sense 
capable of receiving the impression. Yet between 
these limits, any number of sensations may exist. 
We have five senses, and sometimes fancy that no 
others are possible. But it is obvious that we cannot 
measure the infinite by our narrow limitations” 


(The Senses of Animals, pp. 122, 123, 191). 


Further, although we have two eyes, each of which 
possesses a retina, with an image of external things 
painted on it, yet they are so adjusted and corre- 
lated that no confusion of vision results therefrom, 
and we are only percipient of a single image ; yet if 
one eye gets damaged, or even destroyed, we are 
able to see with the other, though we cannot embrace 
so large a field of vision. 

Such are some of the most remarkable adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations in that wonderful organ 
by which we are rendered capable of seeing. Thus 
far, however, we have got motions, undulations, and 


142 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


vibrations only, not sight. Unless this complicated 
apparatus had been in the most intimate manner cor- 
related to two other existences, it would have existed 
to no purpose. One of these is that element, distinct 
from, independent of, and external to, the eye which 
we call light; but which really only becomes light 
through the agency of the percipient mind. In 
itself, as above described, it is neither more nor less 
than an inconceivable number of vibrations of an 
intangible element, which is assumed to fill space, 
designated “ether.” To enable sight to be produced 
it is necessary that the complicated organism of the 
eye should be so closely correlated to it, or it to the 
eye, as to enable the eye to collect and concentrate 
its innumerable vibrations on the retina, and thence 
to transmit them through the optic nerve to the brain. 
Still as yet we have got nothing but vibrations and 
motions. Before sight can be produced, this com- 
plicated apparatus must be correlated to another 
existence, namely, to a mind which possesses the 
power of translating these motions, which in their 
numbers numberless are concentrated on the retina, 
into sensations and thoughts, thus enabling us to ac- 
quire that mass of knowledge which is communicated 
to us through the faculty of vision. 

Between the organisms through which we see, and 
those through which we become percipient of articulate 
speech, there is, however, this remarkable distinction. 
The first consists of two organisms, and the second 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 143 


of three, adjusted to one another in the manner above 
described. Between the eyes, the ears, and the 
brain, there is a direct communication within the 
body by means of a set of complicated adjustments. 
This admits of our viewing the two eyes in the one 
case, and the two ears in the other, as a single com- 
plicated organism; yet so constituted, that, while 
each two coneur in producing a common result, if 
one of each pair be destroyed, the remaining one is 
able to discharge its function so as to produce vision 
and the other articulate speech. But between the vocal 
organs and the ears, as already observed, there is no 
means of communication within our bodies. Each, 
therefore, unless the motions originated by the one 
could be transmitted to the other through a medium ex- 
ternal to, and existing independently of, both, would 
be useless for the production of sound. But such 
a medium exists in the atmosphere, which must have 
had an existence not only independent of the vocal 
organs and the ear, but must have existed long ages 
prior to the formation of either. Surely, therefore, this 
adjustment of the one to the other—so complicated, 
yet, at the same time, so independent of one another ; 
composed of parts so minute, yet by their adjust- 
ments and adaptations of part to part, so exquisitely 
fitted to realize a result so important to the well-being 
of man that without it he would have only possessed 
the powers of a mute—affords an unmistakable proof 
of the presence of a designing mind, 


144 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Objections have been urged against the argument 
from the structure of the eye, as affording proof of 
the existence of a Creator, to whose wisdom it is 
impossible to assign limitations, on the ground that 
it has several imperfections as an optical instrument. 
I quote from Dr. Carpenter's posthumous work, 
entitled Mature and Man— 


“The perfection of this adaptation, however, has 
been partially denied by several modern writers, 
who have based their denial on a statement in a 
very interesting and instructive lecture on ‘The 
Eye and Vision,’ given some years ago by my very 
distinguished friend, Professor Helmholtz: ‘Now it 
is not too much to say,’ continues the lecturer, 
‘that, if an optician wanted to sell me an instrument 
which had all these defects, I should think myself 
quite justified in blaming his carelessness in the 
strongest terms, and in giving him back his instru- 


TEL bere peel ey, 


Here I cannot help remarking, even if this state- 
ment of the Professor contained the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, that it is utterly 
invalid against the preceding reasonings. It is 
undeniable that the adaptations and correlations 
above referred to actually exist. The question really 
at issue between the Theist and the anti-Theist is 
not whether the eye is a perfect optical instrument, 
but whether its intricate adjustments, adaptations, 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 145 


and correlations can have resulted from the inter- 
action of forces destitute of intelligence and volition ; 
or whether they do not prove the presence of a 
designing mind. An instrument may not be one 
abstractedly perfect, but yet it may afford over- 
whelming proof of the presence of intelligence. 

But, whatever we may think of the prudence of 
the language of Professor Helmholtz, the citation 
of it apart from the context in which it stands, is 
scandalously unfair, for it contains a statement 
which entirely qualifies the words above cited ; and, 
as far as the Theistic argument is concerned, renders 
them absolutely nugatory. Let us~ again hear 


te @arpcnter-—— 


“Everyone who has any, knowledge of theological 
controversy will recollect how frequently the charge 
has been justly raised of unfairness of quotation ; a 
single passage detached from its context may convey 
a meaning altogether different from that which it 
bears when taken with its context, so that even the 
devil can cite Scripture for his purpose. Those who 
take the anti-theological side are specially bound, 
as it seems to me, to abstain from doing the very 
thing for which they severely blame their opponents ; 
and, yet I have seldom met with a case so unfair 
as the citation of this statement without any of 
the qualifications which it subsequently receives. 
The following are the salient points of Professor 

IO 


ae CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Ee 


Helmholtz’s eee ee -—If I am asked why | 
have spent so much time in explaining the imperfec- 
tion of the eye, I answer that I have not done so in 
order to depreciate the performances of this won- 
derful organ, or to diminish our admiration of its 
construction. It was my object to make my reader 
understand that it was not any mechanical perfec- 
tion of the organs of our senses, which secures for 
us such wonderfully true and exact impressions 
of the outer world. The perfection of the eye 
is practical not absolute—z.e. adaptation to the 
wants of the organism ; the defects of the eye as an 
optical instrument being all so counteracted, that 
the inexactness of the image which results from 
their presence very little exceeds under ordinary 
conditions of illumination the limits which are set 
to the delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the 
retinal cones” (p. 423). 


The preceding observations apply exclusively to 
the human eye. In the animal kingdom the eye 
undergoes various modifications, by which it is 
adapted to the condition of things in which the 
animal is destined to live. Thus, the eyes of birds of 
prey are so constructed that they are able to discern 
a minute object, when they are soaring at a consider- 
able height; those of animals which have to seek 
their prey during the night, so as to be able to see in 
a very small quantity of light —e.g. those of the mole 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 147 


to a life of burrowing. Insects which are incapable 
of moving their eyes, and consequently if they had 
only two immovable eyes would be able to com- 
mand only a very limited view, are endowed as a 
compensation with multitudes of little eyes, each of 
which is framed on the strictest principles of optics. 
To describe the endless modifications of this organ 
in the different orders of animal existence would 
occupy a space which would far exceed the limits 
which can be assigned to this entire work. Suffice 
it to say, they are as numerous as the different 
species of animal existence, which are now known to 
be almost past counting. 

How, then, does the anti-theistic evolutionist 
endeavour to escape the inference that these innu- 
merable adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
IUstenaveusbeenediues=to the-eactions of a being 
possessed of an intelligence and a power to which it 
is impossible to assign limitations ? Here, again, 
the old answer will be repeated, that they have been 
gradually evolved through the endless attempts of 
some primeval beings to adjust themselves to their 
environment at some remote period of the past . 
which at length resulted in the formation of a 
rudimentary eye, which has_ been _ gradually 
improved to its present form by the attempts of 
each succession of animal races, to adapt them- 
selves to the ever varying conditions of their 


existence. 


148 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Whether this ee affords a reasonable account 
of the origin of the innumerable adjustments, adapt- 
ations, and correlations through which vision is 


produced, let the reader judge. 


3.—The Processes through which Nutrition ts effected. 


The following facts are indisputable— 

(i) Our bodies grow. To render their growth 
possible, a supply of food from some external 
source is necessary.. This supply is provided. 

(ii) Every act of exertion occasions a waste of 
their substance. The body, therefore, stands in need 
of constant repair. It contains a very complicated 
system of organisms, adjustments, and adaptations, 
mutually correlated to one another and to the ex- 
ternal universe, which supply it with, and convey to 
every part of it, the materials necessary for repair- 
ing this waste, to which it is capable of imparting 
its own life, and of incorporating them with its 
own substance. 

(iii) The, wasted matter, if it remained in the 
body, would produce disease and death. How, 
then, is this catastrophe avoided? ‘The body con- 
tains within itself a complicated machinery which 
relieves it from the presence of this noxious 
matter. 

Whence, then, are derived the necessary materials 
to enable it to grow and repair its waste? Man 
cannot assimilate mineral substances until they 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 149 


have been incorporated into other bodies, nor can 
he live on air or water. The needful materials 
must, therefore, be drawn from the animal and 
vegetable kingdoms. The animal portion of our 
food is composed of substances of vegetable origin, 
which other animals have incorporated into their 
bodies; and these of substances which have been 
incorporated into them and extracted by a very 
complicated machinery out of the earth, the atmo- 
sphere, and water; the power which enables. them 
to do so being seated in the distant sun, without 
whose rays not a single vegetable could exist. It 
follows, therefore, that the supplying the child with 
the materials necessary for its growth into a man, 
involves an inconceivable number of adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations, some of which unite 
the infant with the sun, ninety-three millions of 
miles distant, and with the universe beyond; for, 
to speak of nothing else, the force of gravitation 
operates at the remotest distance to which the 
telescope has enabled the eye of man to penetrate. 
Is it conceivable, I ask, that these adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations can be accounted for 
by the anti-theistic theory? 

The necessary supply of food having been thus 
obtained, I will now describe the processes by 
which it is converted into the various substances 
which compose our bodies. In doing this, it will 
be impossible to enter on a minute description of 


150 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


them, for they are very complicated ones. The 
following description must be viewed only as a 
very brief and imperfect outline of them. 

The food having been conveyed by the hands 
into the mouth, there finds ready at hand an 
apparatus, namely, the teeth aided by the tongue 
necessary for masticating it, its mastication being 
a necessary preliminary to its digestion. During 
mastication a distant gland, by a chemical process, 
secretes a fluid called saliva, which is conveyed by 
a pipe from the place where it originates into the 
mouth, where it is needed, and there gets mixed with 
the masticated matter, the union of the two being 
necessary to facilitate the future process of digestion. 
Thence by another set of machinery of no little 
complication, the food is conveyed to the stomach. 
In the course of this journey, it passes over the 
trap-door which I have above described, the failure 
of which to execute its proper function would be 
death. 

In the stomach the process of digestion takes 
place, and the food is reduced into a pulp. This 
is effected by the aid of a secretion called the gas- 
tric juice, which is produced through a chemical 
process by a gland, whence it is conveyed by pipes 
to the place where it is wanted, namely, the stomach. 
It is particularly worthy of notice that this sub- 
stance is only capable of dissolving dead matter ; 
but while it acts powerfully on it, it leaves the living 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 151 


stomach unharmed. Another remarkable peculiarity 
of it is that different animals secrete a gastric juice 
which is fitted to act on their different kinds of 
food, and which refuses to act, or only acts imper- 
fectly, on other substances. When the food is 
sufficiently dissolved, the muscular ring of the 
pylorus, which guards the entrance of the bowels, 
and prevents the matter which has passed it from 
returning into the stomach, is relaxed, and allows 
its contents to pass into the duodenum. Here, for 
the purpose of completing the digestion, two other 
substances are required, namely, the bile and the 
pancreatic juice. Accordingly, two secreting appa- 
ratuses are provided; and their secretions are 
conveyed by pipes to the place where their pre- 
sence is necessary, namely, into the first of the 
intestines. Here the whole of the food which has 
entered the mouth, however numerous may have 
been the substances of which it was originally 
composed—those who are addicted to the pleasures 
of the table know how many they partake of at a 
single meal—is converted into a pulp nearly uni- 
form in substance, called chyle. From hence the 
entire mass is propelled by a suitable apparatus 
through the bowels. These may not inaptly be 
described as a pipe, about six times the length of 
the human body, capable of lying in folds, and 
endowed with the power of propulsion by con- 
traction. This last operation is effected by a 


152 CHitosiaiv Paki sm, 


minute but very numerous and complicated set of 
muscles. 

Complicated, however, as is the process, we are 
still destitute of a substance suitable for incorpo- 
ration with our bodies. To provide this another 
process is necessary: the essence of the digested 
matter has to be strained off. Here, again, a very 
complicated machinery is provided, namely, a mass 
of innumerable capillary tubes, as small as hairs, 
which open their mouths into every part of the 
intestines, and drain off from the digested matter 
in its passage through them all in it which is 
useful for nutrition. These minute pipes expand 
into larger branches, and convey their contents into 
a common receptacle ; and from thence by a suitable 
machinery it is, strange to say, propelled uphill, 
until it reaches the neck. It is obvious that in 
this uphill journey there must be a tendency to 
fall backwards, whenever the propelling muscles re- 
lax ; but it finds, at suitable intervals, a machinery 
already provided resembling the valves of an or- 
dinary pump, which open to allow it to pass 
upwards, and close to prevent it from falling down- 
wards. This obviates the difficulty. From this 
receptacle a propelling power causes it to discharge 
its contents into a large vein through which the 
old blood is flowing, which conveys both to the 
heart. 

Still, after these various processes have been 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 153 


completed, and this long journey has been accom- 
plished, the work of supplying the body with the 
materials necessary for repairing its daily waste is 
very incomplete. Before this could be effected, a fresh 
agency of a most extremely complicated character 
had to be brought into existence. The old blood in 
its passage through the body has had abstracted 
from it some of the materials most necessary for 
supporting life, one of which the new matter has 
never possessed. To supply this deficiency both 
require to be brought into contact with the air. 
How is this effected? By what must be admitted 
to be a wonderful set of adaptations. The bellows- 
like action of the chest, by the aid of a suitable 
machinery, forces the atmospheric air into the lungs, 
and these into millions of little bags, designated air- 
cells. But it is necessary that the old blood and 
the new matter should be brought into contact with 
these air-cells. To effect this an engine, namely, 
the heart, is found ready at hand, and prepared for 
working. It may be described as a pumping machine, 
but differing from ordinary pumps in possessing a 
self-acting power of contraction and dilation. The 
reader is probably aware that ordinary pumps depend 
for their successful action on being provided with 
valves, to prevent the water when once pumped up 
from falling back again. Accordingly, the heart is 
provided with this necessary apparatus, without 
which its power of propulsion would be useless, It 


154 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


may be said to consist of two hearts, united into a 
single organ. Of these, one forces the old blood and 
the new matter into the hairlike capillary tubes of 
the lungs, which lie on the surface of the air-cells ; 
the structure of which is so delicate as to admit of 
a free interchange of gases—the carbolic acid being 
given off, and the oxygen imbibed. From thence, 
after the old blood and the new matter have been 
sufficiently exposed to the action of the air, both are 
forced back into the other section of the heart, in 
order that it may force it by the aid of another set 
of highly complicated machinery through every part 
of the human body. 

By the agencies above described, the old blood 
and the new material have been mixed together, and 
brought into a state fit for nourishing the body, en- 
abling its glands to secrete the secretions necessary 
to enable its numerous organs to perform their 
functions, and to supply its waste. Still it is useless 
until it is conveyed to those parts of the body where 
it is wanted; but of this more. presently. Here, 
however, I would ask the reader’s attention to the 
marvellous fact, that from one and the same substance 
these glands secrete “about twenty different fluids, 
in their sensible properties, in taste, smell, colour, 
and consistency, the most unlike one another that is 
possible ; thick, thin, salt, bitter, sweet, etc. And if 
from ourselves we pass to other species of animals, 
we find among their secretions not only the most 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 155 


various, but the most opposite, properties; the 
most nutritious aliment and the deadliest poison ; 
the sweetest perfume and the most fcetid odours.”* 
Yet we are invited to believe that such a substance, 
the production of which would baffle the resources 
of all the chemists in the world, has been produced 
by forces destitute of intelligence. 

The aliment necessary for nourishment has now 
arrived at that place from whence it is necessary, if 
it is to be of the smallest use, that it should be pro- 
pelled to every part of the body. On its arrival here, 
it finds the machinery requisite for effecting this all 
ready at hand. The heart, a self-acting pumping 
machine is waiting to undertake the work of pro- 
pulsion. It is capable of discharging two table- 
spoonfuls of blood at every beat into the arteries ; 
and as each contraction is followed by a dilation the 
blood which was propelled by the contraction would 
fall backwards, unless a machinery was provided 
ready at hand necessary for preventing it. This 
consists of ‘a set of valves placed wherever their 
services are required, which open to let the blood 
pass onwards, and close to prevent it from returning 
backwards. Destitute of these the heart could no 
more perform its functions than a pump can. It is 
further to be remarked that its dilation gives the 
heart the necessary rest. 


* Parey: Natural Theology, revised to harmonize with Modern 
Science, 


156 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


The arteries constitute a very complicated system 
of pipes, resembling those by which a city is supplied 
with water ; but unlike them, they are endowed with 
a contractile power to aid the pump—perhaps 
syringe would be the more expressive term—in its 
work of propulsion. These pipes gradually contract 
in size, until they become indefinitely minute. Hére: 
however, the analogy between those which supply a 
city with water and those which supply the body 
with the necessary aliment ceases. There is no 
necessity that any portion of the water should be 
carried back to the reservoir from whence it came ; 
but it is necessary, after the very complicated organism 
which is provided for that purpose has abstracted 
from the blood all that is required for the nourish- 
ment of the body, that the remainder should be 
returned to its source; and after having had its 
expended powers recruited by being mixed with 
new aliment, and by imbibing a fresh supply of 
oxygen in the lungs, should be returned to the 
heart, in order that it should be by it once more 
propelled on a fresh journey through the body. 

Further: “To effect this complete circulation of 
the blood four cavities in the heart are necessary, 
and four are accordingly provided—two called 
ventricles, which send out the blood, one into the 
lungs, and the other to the mass of the body after it 
has been returned from the lungs; and two others 
called auricles, which receive the blood from the 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 157 


veins: one as it comes immediately from the body ; 
the other, as the same blood comes a second time 
into the circulation through the lungs . . . So that 
there are two receiving cavities, and two forcing 
cavities. The receiving cavities respectively com- 
municate with the forcing cavities, and by their 
contraction unload the received blood into them. 
The forcing cavities, when it is their turn to 
contract, propel the same blood into the mouths 
of the arteries.”* 

This complicated system of pipes, the arteries 
and the veins, convey nourishment to every part 
of the body, and bring back again the super- 
fluous matter to the proper place for enabling it to 
enter on a fresh journey. They are too numerous 
to be counted. ‘They run along the surface of the 
membranes, pervade the muscles, and even penetrate 
the bones. Every tooth is supplied with an artery 
and a vein; the one to feed the bone, and the other 
to bring back the spare blood from it. At the point 
of junction the arteries and veins are inconceivably 
minute. The fact that one cannot prick oneself 
with a pin without drawing blood—that is, without 
rupturing a blood-vessel—will convey to the reader 
an idea of their number and minuteness. But in 
addition to this complicated system of pipes for the 
purpose of supplying nourishment, a system of 


* PaLey: Natural Theology, revised to harmonize with Modern 
Science. 


158 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 


nerves, which acts as a kind of electric telegraph, 
pervades every part of the body, and establishes a 
rapid communication between every part of it and 
the brain. It consists of two sets of nerves, one of 
which transmits motions, and the other sensations ; 
but neither of which are capable of performing. the 
function of the other. The vastness of their numbers 
is proved by the fact that it is impossible to prick 
oneself with the finest needle without producing a 
sensation. By these means a rapid communication 
is established between every part of the body and 
the brain, where these motions are translated by 
the mind into sensations and thoughts. The whole 
enables information to be received by the mind, 
and a message returned in a time so short that to 
us it 1s imperceptible. 

The above is a very imperfect description of the 
complicated machinery by which nourishment is 
conveyed to every part of our bodies, their waste 
repaired, the noxious matter drawn off from them, 
and the means by which a rapid communication is 
established between every part of them and the 
brain. It will, however, enable the reader to form 
some idea of the innumerable multitude of the ad- 
justments, adaptations, and correlations which it 
involves—the absence of any one of which would 
mar the working of the whole; and its disorder, as 
we know from experience, causes disease or even 
death. 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 159 


I must now ask the reader to pause, and calmly 
weigh the evidence which those numberless adjust- 
ments and adaptations furnish, that their formation 
must have been due to a being, to whose power 
and intelligence it is impossible to assign limita- 
tions. For my own part, I am almost tempted 
to accommodate the language of the Psalmist, and 
say: ‘‘Foolish is the man who says in his heart 
that they have been produced by the interaction 
of forces, destitute alike of intelligence, purpose, 
and voluntary agency, or in other words, ‘ There 
TomnOa TOC 

Let me take one more illustration from the human 
body. Look at the hand. It will be unnecessary 
to enter into a minute description of the parts 
of which it is composed, or of the mode in which 
its bones and muscles are adjusted to one another. 
One thing, however, must strike every observer 
as a marvellous adjustment. What, I ask, would 
have been the result, if instead of our having four 
fingers and a thumb, we had had five fingers and 
no thumb? We should have been unable to ac- 
complish with our hands one thousandth part of 
what we are now able to effect by them. The anti- 
Theist will doubtless ask us to believe that the 
thumb is a natural growth, the production of the 
unintelligent forces of Nature during a long course 
of evolution, acting through the principle of natural 
selection and the survival of the fittest; and that 


160 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


traces of its gradual growth may be found in the 
lower animals. But what set these forces in motion 
to produce a thumb instead of a fifth finger? What 
period of time would it take to produce this single 
adaptation? And how, destitute of a thumb, or while 
one was gradually growing, could defenceless :man 
have survived in his struggle for existence with 
animals of vastly superior strength? Let the 
anti-Theist answer. 

It would have been easy to have continued these 
illustrations to almost any extent, because the 
universe is everywhere loaded with them; but I 
cannot but think, that those who are unconvinced 
by the adjustments, adaptations, and correlations 
which I have adduced, that intelligence must have 
presided over their formation, will still continue un- 
convinced by any additional number of them. At 
any rate, they will be amply sufficient to enable the 
reader not only to form a clear idea of the value of 
the argument in question, as affording proof of the 
existence of an intelligent Creator, but to use it 
himself, when he contemplates the other parts of 
his bodily constitution, or the innumerable adjust- 
ments and adaptations which exist throughout every 
part of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. The 
author of Psalm cxxxix., whose knowledge of 
anatomy was doubtless extremely limited, who 
knew nothing of the nervous system, of the circu- 
lation of the blood, of the means by which it is 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 161 « 
effected, or of the complicated machinery by which 
the food which is introduced into the mouth is 
rendered fit for the nourishment of the body, and 
conveyed to every part of it, yet, impressed by - 
what is visible and palpable could justly exclaim, 


‘“T will give thanks unto Thee ; for I am fearfully 
and wonderfully made: Wonderful are Thy works: 
and that my soul knoweth right well. My frame 
was not hidden from Thee, when I was made in 
Secret. ... Thine eyes did see mine unperfect 
substance, and in Thy book were all my members 
written, which day by day were fashioned, when as 
yet there there was none of them.” 


This is the language of common SCISC a teias 
been reserved for a certain class of philosophers and 
scientists to propound the theory that these innumer- 
able adjustments, adaptations, and correlations have 
resulted from the action and interaction of forces 
incapable of forming a purpose, and destitute of in- 
telligence and volition. If this has been so, these 
forces have effected results, compared with which all 
those effected by the combined intelligence of man 
are as nothingness. Let the reader judge. 

Before closing this chapter, it will be desirable to 
take a single glance at the vegetable kingdom. 
Having taken a cell, let us now take a seed for an 
example. From it has been produced the mighti- 
est monarch of the forest, the humblest plant, and 

a 


162 CHRISTIAN -THEISM. 


everything intermediate between them. To prepare 
it for its future destination— 

‘adjustments had to be completed between it and 
things in the earth, in the air, in the water, and 
in the distant worlds whence come light and heat. 
It has to live with and by the earths. It contains, 
ready and adjusted, an apparatus for decomposing 
earths, and turning their compounds into its future 
substance. It has to depend on water. It has, ready 
and adjusted, an apparatus for decomposing water, 
and nourishing its own material with the new liquid. 
Alongside of this partly retrospective apparatus exists 
a purely prospective one, ready made and adjusted, for 
pumping the new liquid elaborated by the last ap- 
paratus, for making it run uphill, and for spreading 
it out on this side and on that. The seed has to 
depend on air. It contains, ready and adjusted, an 
apparatus for decomposing air, and for incorporating 
its component parts in various forms with its own 
tissues. 

‘“‘ Again, if the other world, that is, the sun, is in- 
accessible to the seed, it does not follow that the 
seed is inaccessible to the other world. Other worlds 
have long arms. Across open spaces, towards bridging 
over which all the trunks grown in the forests during 
terrestial ages would not go so far as would a boy’s 
boat towards bridging over the Atlantic—across these 
that other world can put fcrth its emanations till 
they reach the seed, till they enter into it, till they 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 163 


pass through again and again its cone, till they 
diffuse over every one.of its cells a force from on 
high, which, in ways we know not, turns its array 
of possible energies into actual powers, bringing 
forth noble products—that is, covering the earth 
with vegetation” (Arthur’s Fernley Lectures, pp. 54, 


55, 50). 


I need hardly draw the reader’s attention to the 
fact, that every one of the things above enumerated as 
necessary for the life and growth of the seed involves 
a countless number of previously existing adjust- 
ments, adaptations, and correlations ; if those things 
were otherwise, both animal and vegetable life would 
perish. Is it conceivable that they can have been the 
hap-hazard productions of unintelligent forces ? 

I cannot forbear quoting one more passage from 
the same author, whose work | strongly recommend 
for the perusal of the reader — 


“Yet what sense detects in the cells the apparatus 
for decomposing air, that for decomposing water ; 
that for decomposing sunbeams, that for turning the 
heat ray to one use, the colour ray to another, the 
actinic to a third; that for compounding protoplasm, 
that for turning one element into fibre, another into 
complexion, another into odour, another into pumping 
force, what sense detects within the seed of the 
maple, the special apparatus pre-established to dot 
with its pretty bird’s eyes generation after generation 


164 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


of its offspring. To tell us that we do not know that 
these exist! It is just the thing that we do know. 
Apparatus may not be the right name for them. But 
the invisible power is there, and we know it. These 
various powers stand to one another in relations pre- 
established ; and they, in turn, pre-determine long 
beforehand the relations of things which as yet are 
not in existence. But although they fill with wonder 
the minds of men, who are content to let mind work 
without lacing it up. against free movement in search 
of cause or design—with wonder at the skill, the 
design, the adaptation, the power, of which they are 
full—they do not, any more than relation among 
inorganic bodies, present to us any moral ties, or 
virtues, or defects” (p. 56). 


If, then, as Sir J. Lubbock affirms, “every cell in 
the animal body is a standing miracle,” I think that 
we are entitled to affirm that every seed in the 
vegetable kingdom is also a standing miracle. But 
both these miracles sink into nothingness, if it is 
true that all the adjustments, adaptations, and correla- 
tions with which every part of the universe absounds ; 
and which unite it into a complicated whole, so that 
what affects one part affects every other part; have 
been the result of the action and interaction of forces 
which are destitute of intelligence, incapable of 
purpose, foresight, or volition; and whose sole and 
only agency is necessary agency impelling them in 


ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 165 


a eee oe ee tty 


a course from which it is impossible for them to 
deviate to the right hand’ or to the left. If,- then, 
we feel that it is one of the highest of certitudes, 
if when twelve dice are thrown at hap-hazard into 
the air, they fall a hundred times in succession with 
their aces upwards, that they are loaded, infinitely 
more commanding is the proof which the adjust- 
ments, adaptations, and correlations of the universe, 
existing as they do in numbers passing all human 
comprehension, furnish that it also must be loaded in 
every part. With what then only can it be loaded ? 
I answer, With the presence of Deity, energizing 
in, directing, and upholding all its forces, so that 
if we ascend up into heaven, He is there; if we go 
down to hades, He is there ; if we take the wings 
of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts 
of the sea, even there shall His hand lead us, and 
His right hand shall hold us. If we say, Surely the 
darkness shall overwhelm us, and the light shall be 
as the night; even the darkness and the light are 
both alike to Him. Great and marvellous are Thy 
works, Lord God Almighty. Thou hast created all 
things, and by Thy will they are, and were created ; 
and even the minutest creature which exists was 
brought into being and fashioned by Thy bound- 
less power and wisdom, and is the subject of Thy 
providential care, 


CHAPTERS RVALLT: 


THE EXISTENCE OF THE MORAL NATURE OF MAN 
PROVES THAT A GOD EXISTS, WHO Ioeaenr 
A MERE IMPERSONAL FORCE, BUT A MORAL 
BEING. 


EFORE I attempt to offer a direct proof of this 
position it will be necessary to lay down certain 
fundamental principles on which this argument will 
be based. These are facts, the truth of which each 
of us may verify for himself, by an appeal to the 
affirmations of his consciousness. These form the 
highest of our certitudes. What, then, does it 
affirm ? 

I.—It affirms that we are free agents—that is, that 
we possess a power of choosing between one or 
more alternatives, of originating action, and of 
adopting or refusing to adopt a particular line of 
action. 

This position is controverted by anti-Theists. 
I must, therefore, endeavour to make the theistic 
position clear. It is objected, that when we affirm 
that man is a free agent that it is equivalent to 


PHYSICAL, AND’ MORAL. AGENTS 167 


saying that he possesses a freedom which is devoid 
of limitations. This is a misrepresentation ; for all 
that we intend is, that he possesses a freedom of 
choice within certain definite limits ; that is, that he 
possesses a power to act or to forbear acting sufficient 
to constitute him a responsible agent. Into the 
origin of this power I shall not inquire, for it will be 
sufficient for the purpose of the present argument to 
prove that it exists as a fact in whatever way it may 
have originated. 

As the possession of this power is one of the most 
important characteristics which distinguish man from 
all other agents in the world, it will be necessary 
clearly to point out the nature of this distinction. 
Physical agents, by which I mean beings devoid of 
volition, act in the manner in which they act, because 
they are incapable of doing otherwise. They act 
because they are forced to act; and they invariably 
act in the same manner under the same conditions. 
They are destitute of will, intelligence, and purpose. 
Force is the only thing which can set them in motion, 
and when they are once set in motion, they are 
incapable of acting in any other manner than that 
which the forces acting on or inherent in them 
compel them to act, notwithstanding any terrible 
consequences which may result from their activity. 
They know not what they do; they have no choice; 
to all persuasion they are deaf; and do what they 
may, no one ever thinks of holding them responsible 


168 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


for the results which follow. Man, on the contrary, 
is the opposite of all this. He is capable of choosing 
between two courses of action which of them he 
will pursue. Though he is incapable of altering the 
forces which act in or on physical agents, he possesses 
the power of giving them a different direction from 
that which they must have taken, apart from his 
intervention ; and of combining and directing them, 
So as to compel them to execute the purposes of his 
will, and thus make them, instead of lording it over 
him, his servants. | 

As this is a very important point in the Theistic 
controversy, I will illustrate my meaning by a very 
familiar exampie. A steam engine can only act in 
one way, as long as the forces acting on, or inherent 
in it, continue to energize; but man, although he is 
incapable of altering those forces, is capable of 
giving them a direction, within certain limits, accord- 
ing to his pleasure; or even, of bringing its action 
to a standstill. Thus, we never think of blaming an 
engine for any amount of destruction which it may 
occasion ; but if the engineer has failed in his duty 
in controlling its motions, we hold him to be guilty 
of manslaughter or of murder, according to the degree 
of his culpable negligence. Physical agents we 
neither praise, blame, persuade, nor hold responsible, 
Men we praise, blame, attempt to persuade, and 
hold responsible, because we entertain no doubt that 
within certain well-known limits, they possess the 


PHYSICAL AND MORAL AGENTS. 169 


power of voluntary action. Whence this persuasion ? 
We know, with an assurance of absolute certainty, 
that we ourselves possess this power; and we infer 
with an assurance of equal certainty, that all other 
human beings possess it likewise. 

Here it is necessary to meet an objection. It has 
been urged by anti-Theists, as an argument against 
the theistic position, that various animals possess a 
freedom of choice, yet no one on this account argues 
that they are liberated from the laws of necessary 
agency. I fully admit that they, especially the 
higher orders of them, possess an intelligence, and a 
power to choose between two or more alternatives 
within certain narrow limits; but these limits are so 
narrow that no one considers them to be responsible 
for their actions. Noxious animals simply obey the 
impulses of their nature, and cannot help doing so. 
We destroy them, not because we hold them respon- 
sible, but simply because they are noxious. True it 
is, that on the higher order of animals, we inflict 
pain when they offend us; but we do this, not as 
a punishment for wrong-doing, but for the purpose 
of deterring them, through the influence of fear, from 
acting in a similar manner in the future. In this 
case the appeal is not made to any sense of right, or 
wrong, possessed by the animal, which merely follows 
the course which its impulses or its instincts suggest, 
but to the principle of the association of ideas. 
Thus, when a dog offends us, we whip him as a 


170 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


deterrent from acting again in a similar manner ; 
and our doing so becomes efficacious, because the 
animal associates the pain with the act in question, 
and therefore he avoids it for the future. But this is 
only efficacious when the pain is inflicted immediately 
after the offence; if it is delayed for any consider- 
able time, it would fail to act as a deterrent, and 
would be cruelty pure and simple. But man under- 
stands what punishment means, however long it may 
be delayed after the crime; and our moral nature 
affirms, when retribution at last overtakes the 
offender, that the punishment is just; and he under- 
stands it likewise. 

Further: We never charge an animal which has 
injured us with having committed a sin ora crime, 
because we consider, and that rightly, that it has 
only acted in conformity with impulses which it had 
no power to restrain; all that we demand is, that it 
should be prevented from doing mischief for the 
future. But with man it is the contrary. Why is 
this? It is because we feel assured that he possesses 
a power which would have enabled him to avoid 
doing the evil act. It follows, therefore, that what- 
ever amount of intelligence and power to choose be- 
tween different alternatives is possessed by animals; 
or even if the higher orders of them possess some of 
the rudiments of a moral nature ; that between their 
endowments, and those of man, the gulf which separ- 
ates them is so wide as to make us as it were by a 


PHYSICALZANDI MORAL AGENTS. 171 


kind of intuition hold them irresponsible for their 
actions, while we hold men responsible. The 
possession of that degree of freedom which is 
necessary for constituting responsibility is an 
essential ingredient in the conception of a moral 
being. 

II.—It forms a certitude, than which we have none 
stronger, that man is not a thing but a person. 
As this is an important point in the theistic con- 
troversy, anti-Theists have done their best to 
confuse this subject, by the aid of a number of 
metaphysical subtleties, into the discussion of which 
I shall not enter. I admit that it is difficult to give 
a logical definition of personality; but we all of 
us intuitively understand what we mean when we 
affirm that we are persons, and not things. Among 
other things, the conception of personality involves 
the power of volition, of free agency, and a sense 
of sameness and persistent existence during long 
intervals of time, notwithstanding any amount of 
change that we may have passed through during 
our previous lives. Thus we intuitively feel: that 
we are the same beings that we were, say, some 
twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty years ago, or from 
the earliest dawn of our conscious recollection, and 
no amount of reasoning can persuade us to the 
contrary. 

The fact that we are persons, is one of the 
greatest importance in relation to our present 


172 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 


argument, because scientific men assure us that 
during the shortest of these intervals, our bodies 
have undergone so complete a change that our 
present bodies do not contain in them a single 
particle which they possessed at some not very re- 
mote period of the past. But notwithstanding this 
complete change in our bodily framework, we feel 
that it is one of our highest certitudes, that we 
were at the earliest dawn of our conscious recol- 
lection the same persons that we are at the present 
moment. From this the all-important inference is 
inevitable, that the beings which we designate 
Ourselves, have an existence distinct from the 
atoms which compose our bodies. This being so, 
it follows that other beings exist than those com- 
posed of matter impelled by blind unintelligent force ; 
namely, beings which can neither be seen by our 
eyes, felt by our hands, weighed by our scales, 
nor become the subject of our senses. 

The universe, therefore, consists of three orders 
of beings—persons, animals, and things. Stated 
briefly, a person may be defined for all the pur- 
poses of our present argument as a being which 
possesses self-consciousness, and which is capable 
of affirming of itself, | Myself, which no thing, and 
no animal, as far as we can judge, can. Animals, 
therefore, are destitute of those attributes which 
constitute personality, and are, consequently, irre- 
sponsible for their actions. On the other hand, 


i atl 


J 


PHYSICAL “AND MORAL AGENTS. 173 


everyone who possesses personality, feels himself 
responsible for them and for the consequences 
which have resulted from them, however remote 
they may have been in point of time. This cer- 
tainty that we exist, and that we possess the 
attributes above referred to, not only removes all 
difficulties in believing that other beings exist 
who possess similar attributes, but renders it in 
the highest degree probable that they do so. The 
above considerations, therefore, make short work 
with what is called materialism. I mention this 
in the present place for the purpose of pointing 
out the importance of the position in question. 
III.—We possess the highest certainty that we 
are beings who are capable of distinguishing be- 
tween right and wrong, and this, irrespective of any 
consequences which may result to ourselves; that 
there is something within us which tells us that 
we ought to pursue the conduct which is right, and 
abstain from that which is wrong, and which visits 
us with a feeling of self-condemnation if we dis- 
obey its dictates. This principle we call conscience, 
or moral sense; but it is immaterial to our argu- 
ment by what term we designate it, or how it may 
have originated, provided we recognize its existence 
asa fact. I make this observation, because nu- 
merous attempts have been made to disprove its 
existence by propounding some particular theory 
about its origin ; or by appealing to the imperfect 


174 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


perceptions of savages, or other imperfect specimens 
of human nature, as affording proof that the belief 
that we possess any inherent perception of the dif- 
ference between right and wrong, is a delusion. 
All that it is necessary to contend for, as far as 
concerns our present argument, is, that however it 
may have originated, it exists in fully developed 
men and women, and that it is a simple fact that 
each one of us (I may say all civilized men) is 
conscious that there is something within us which 
tells us that it is our duty to do this, and to abstain 
from doing that, and which visits us with various 
degrees of disapprobation, if we neglect to obey its 
behests. 

What, then, in brief, are the certitudes which 
each of us intuitively feel that our conscience or 
moral sense affirms as indubitably true? I answer, 
that there is a distinction between right and wrong ; 
that it is our duty to do what it affirms to be right, 
and to abstain from doing what it affirms to be 
wrong; that there is a clear distinction between 
things, as they ought to be, and things as they 
actually are; and that it is our duty to aim at 
realizing the former, and to strive to elevate both 
ourselves and others above the latter. 

I'V.—Our consciousness affirms that we possess 
certain affections widely different from the mere 
instincts of animals, which constitute what we 
designate character; and that we possess within 


PHYSICAL, AND MORALS AGENIS: 175 


certain limits a power of modifying our characters 
either for good or for evil by means of another 
principle inherent in us, the principle of habitua- 
tion. It is true that what we frequently, though 
inaccurately, designate character in other members 
of the animal kingdom, is capable of undergoing 
various modifications ; but these can only be effected 
by influence exerted on them from without. Man 
alone is capable of modifying his character dy an 
act of self-determination originating in himself. This 
power renders him within certain limits responsible 
for his character, and for the actions which result 
from it. That we possess such a power is a direct 
affirmation of our consciousness, the existence of 
which anyone may verify for himself by carefully 
reflecting on his past history. The possession of 
a power of modifying our characters by an act of 
self-determination is disputed by anti-Theists. A 
very palpable instance to the contrary disproves 
this. It is an unquestionable fact that, by an act 
of self-determination, we can modify our tempers. 
The above positions and the following arguments 
are based on the assumption that the concurrent affir- 
mations of the consciousness of the overwhelming 
majority of mankind form the highest of certitudes— 
certitudes so complete that they cannot be shaken by 
any amount of adverse reasoning. This has been 
denied, but the denial pushed to its legitimate con- 
sequences means intellectual suicide; for, every truth 


176 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


which we arrive at by a process of reasoning must 
rest on the assumption that there are truths which 
Wwe arrive at independently of any reasoning process 
whatever, whether inductive or deductive, which, 
being self-evident in themselves, ultimately rest on 
one or more of the affirmations of our consciousness 
as the ground of our convictions. If it be objected 
that the consciousness of some, such as madmen 
or visionaries, though real in themselves, point to no 
reality corresponding to them, I answer that the 
appeal must be made from minds thus diseased to 
the consciousness of men and women in considerable 
numbers, and when the overwhelming majority of 
their experiences concur, they must be accepted as an 
ultimate test of truth ; otherwise universal scepticism 
would be the result. It will be desirable that I 
should here briefly enumerate these certitudes as far 
as they bear on our present argument. 

1. That we are persons in the sense above 
described. 

2. That within certain limits we are possessed of 
free, as distinct from necessary, agency. 

3. That we possess the power of originating action. 

4. That although we cannot create any force 
additional to those already existing, we are capable 
of imparting to’existing forces a direction different 
from that which they would have taken apart from 
our intervention, and thus of compelling them within 
certain limits to work out our pleasure, 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC POSITION. 1747 


5. That we possess a conscience, or moral sense, 
which utters authoritative judgments as to what it is 
our duty to do or to forbear doing; and which visits 
us with a feeling of self-condemnation if we neglect 
to obey its behests. 

6. That our belief that moral beings exist, which 
are not ourselves, is no phantom of the imagination, 
but a great reality. 

If these positions are true, they afford such strong 
evidence that a God exists such as Christians believe 
in, that we need not wonder that anti- Theists— 
whether they are Atheists, Pantheists, Positivists, 
or Agnostics—have endeavoured to prove that the 
affirmations of our consciousness are unreliable. A 
few additional remarks, therefore, will be necessary 
for the purpose of enabling the reader to judge of 
the fallacy of their objections. 

Every form of anti-Theism is based on the assump- 
tion that mind is an evolution out of matter, that it 
has no existence apart from matter, and that the 
phenomena which we call mental, be they intellectual 
or be they moral, have been produced by a slow and 
gradual evolution out of that which originally pos- 
sessed no one quality which we designate intellectual 
or moral. In a word, life has been spontaneously 
evolved out of non-life, or has been the result of the 
different arrangements, motions, and combinations of 
particles of matter during the ages of the past, which 
in their original state were devoid of life; and that 

12 


178 CHRISTIAN THETSM. 


our intellects, with all their mighty powers, and our 
moral nature, with its noblest aspirations, have either 
sprung spontaneously into existence, or have been 
evolved out of things devoid of intelligence, moral 
agency, and affections. From these principles the 
inference has been drawn by anti-Theists—-and, I 
admit, has been justly drawn if these principles 
are true—that what Christians understand by the 
words ‘‘spiritual” and “moral” has no objective 
reality ; that moral agency is neither more nor 
less than a modification of physical agency; and 
that when we fancy that we are free to act, or to 
forbear acting, or are capable of exercising choice, 
we are really acting under as iron a law of ne- 
cessity as that which regulates the motions of the 
planets. 

This, stripped of all disguises, is the position taken 
by anti-Theists. Perhaps not a few of my readers 
may think that its best refutation is its simple state- 
ment; for I feel persuaded that, whatever anti-theistic 
philosophers and scientists may affirm, or by what- 
ever amount of complicated arguments these positions 
may be attempted to be proved, that the common 
sense of the overwhelming majority of intelligent men 
and women will refuse to believe that intelligence 
has been evolved out of non-intelligence; per- 
sonality out of that which is not only impersonal but 
unconscious ; the freedom and the power of volition, 
which each of us is conscious of possessing, out of 


THE ANTI-THEISTIC POSITION. 179 


agents devoid of both, which can only act be- 
cause they are forced to act, which are destitute 
of all power to regulate or modify their action, and 
can only act in conformity with an iron law of 
necessity. In a word, our common sense affirms that 
it is impossible to evolve out of a thing that which 
Was never in it. 

But as these positions have been loudly trumpeted 
by men of unquestionable eminence as philosophers 
and scientists, as affording proof that our belief that 
we are free agents is no better than a delusion, and 
consequently that there can be no God who is a 
free agent; and as not a few are influenced by the 
authority of great names, it will be necessary to 
ofter a few additional observations on them. These 
positions are, of course, propounded in a form less 
Tepugnant to common sense than that in which | 
have stated them above. Thus, it is affirmed that 
we can only act in conformity with the strongest 
motive, and that when different motives present 
themselves to our minds the strongest necessarily 
prevails, and leaves us no choice as to the course 
of action which we will pursue; and that all our 
actions are the necessary result of our characters, 
over the formation of which we have exerted no 
control, because they have been partly transmitted 
from ancestors more or less remote, and partly the 
creation of our surroundings. This being so it is 
urged that to speak of man as a free agent is absurd, 


180 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


and therefore that the consciousness which we feel | 
that we are free agents must be a delusion. Further : 
It is objected that what is commonly called “the 
freedom of the will involves the affirmation that man 
can act without motives. 

First, then, it will be necessary to inquire , what 
is the meaning which anti-Theists attach to the 
word “motive,” for it is the vagueness with which 
it is used in this controversy which gives to the 
objection its entire plausibility. The term ‘‘ motive x 
is in popular language used to denote incentives 
to action which differ as widely as an affirmation 
of our conscience that it is a duty to act or forbear 
acting in this or that particular manner, differs from 
an impulse to gratify some of our animal passions. 
The reader will at once see that incentives which 
differ thus widely in character are incapable of being 
measured by any common measure of pleasure or 
pain with which our yielding to them may be 
attended. Anti-Theists in this controversy are in 
the habit of confounding together under the term 
“motive” things differing as widely as incentives 
to action arising from certain affections, passions, or 
impulses of our nature, from the determinations of 
our reason, and from affirmations of our conscience 
which tells us that it is our duty to pursue a certain 
course of action, notwithstanding any amount of 
self-sacrifice with which it may be attended; and 
then tell us that freedom of choice between these 


MAN CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN “ALTERNATIVES. 181 


is impossible, because the strongest motive must 
prevail, and that the strength of a motive must be 
dependent on the degree of pleasure or pain with 
which its gratification is attended. How, I ask, 
can we apply any common measure to the pleasure 
with which an animal gratification is attended, and 
an act of self-sacrifice in obedience to ‘the demands 
of duty ? The incentives to action, therefore, 
which are confounded together under the common 
term “motives,” not only differ in degree, but 
in kind. . 

Abandoning all theory, let us consider what are 
the actual facts. Man is an animal, but he is 
also something more. His animal nature, unless 
restrained by some higher principle, would irresis- 
tibly impel him to seek sensual gratification as his 
highest good. His nobler affections lead him to 
pursue various ideals too numerous to mention. 
But in addition to these, there is another portion 
of his being, wholly different in character from his 
animal passions, or even his nobler aspirations, 
which asserts its right to prescribe to him what 
he ought to do, and what he ought to forbear 
doing—namely, his conscience, and his sense of right 
and wrong. ‘This, despite of all the arguments which 
anti-heists have adduced to prove that it has no 
independent existence in man, the testimony of every 
language spoken by civilized man proves that we 
are conscious of possessing. So completely have the 


182 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


believers in man’s personality, free agency, and power 
of self-determination, held possession of the ground 
during the ages of the past, that it is impossible to 
express oneself for five minutes in the ordinary 
intercourse of life, without using language which 
assumes that these things are not phantoms, but 
realities. Here, then, the intuitions of mankind stand 
in direct opposition to the theories and reasonings 
of anti-theistic philosophers and scientists. 

One form of the anti-theistic theory, however, 
virtually concedes the point at issue, for it admits that 
we are capable of controlling those impulses which 
urge us to the pursuit of immediate pleasure so 
as to pursue future happiness as an end of life, 
rather than yield to present gratification which 
may be subversive of it. If this be so—and who, 
I ask, has not had experience that it is so ?—it is 
evident that we are capable of exercising a choice 
between various impulses which of them we will 
follow; and that we are under no compulsion to 
yield to that which for the moment may appear to 
be the most seductive one: for the possibility of 
regulating our actions on prudential considerations 
involves a power of self-restraint, and of choosing 
between different incentives to action. The desire 
of present gratification is, perhaps, the strongest 
impulse in human nature, yet we all know for certain 
that we are capable of controlling and resisting it. 
No impulse is stronger than that which urges the 


MAN CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES. 183 


drunkard to his bottle ; but until he has arrived 
at that state of een in which by habitual 
indulgence in his vice he has destroyed his power of 
self-restraint, to say that he is irresistibly impelled 
to yield to temptation is contrary to fact. 

The subject which we are now considering is so 
important in its bearing on the theistic controversy, 
that it will aid us in its elucidation if I give a brief 
analysis of what we are conscious of doing, when a 
number of incentives to different courses of action 
present themselves to our minds. Let us suppose 
that one of them is a strong desire to indulge in 
some particular pleasure ; another is an affirmation 
of our reason, that its gratification will be attended 
at some period of the future with results which are 
highly undesirable ; and that a third is an authori- 
tative declaration of our conscience that to gratify 
the appetite in question would be morally wrong, 
and that it is our duty to abstain from it. What, I 
ask are we conscious of doing under these circum- 
stances? This question is capable of receiving a 
distinct answer, because they are circumstances of 
which every one of us has had experience. Let us 
assume that the desire in question is one of the 
strongest impulses of our animal nature. Do we, I 
ask, feel irresistibly impelled to gratify it? I admit 
that its gratification is certain, if we shut out every 
other consideration, and concentrate our.attention on 
the pleasure arising from its indulgence. But there 


184 CHRISTIAN. THEISM, 


are other alternatives. We know on the testimony 
of our consciousness that we possess a power of 
withdrawing our attention from an impulse however 
strong, the indulgence of which our reason pro- 
nounces to be undesirable, or which our conscience 
pronounces that it is our duty to abstain from ; and 
of concentrating it on some other incentive to action, 
be it a prudential consideration, or a sense of duty ; 
and that by this means we are capable of giving the 
prudential consideration, or the sense of duty, the 
victory over the temptation. 

What, then, are we each of us conscious of 
having done when we have been assailed by a 
powerful temptation to do that which our conscience 
has affirmed to be morally wrong? Did we feel 
that we had no power of resistance, or that we 
were compelled to yield to the temptation? We 
are certain of the contrary. We were conscious 
of possessing a force within us which we designate 
‘will,’ which enables us by a vigorous exertion to 
withdraw our attention from the unhallowed grati- 
fication, and to concentrate it on our sense of duty. 
The struggle may have been, and often is, a hard 
one; but who does not know from his own experi- 
ence that in this way he has exerted a choice over 
different impulses to action, and that he has thus 
enabled his sense of duty to obtain the victory over 
those impulses of his nature, which, if unrestrained, 
would have impelled him to the pursuit of present 


MAN GAN CHOOGSEVEEDIVEEN ALTERNATIVES. 185 


pleasure? Further: Although conscience utters its 
affirmations in the most authoritative form that it is 
our duty to do this, and to forbear from doing that, 
and we cannot help feeling that we ought to yield 
obedience to its behest, we all know from our own 
experience that obedience to its commands is not a 
matter of necessity, but that it is in our power to 
disobey them if we so choose. 

Let us now briefly analyze the mode in which an 
evil impulse is yielded to. I here again appeal 
to our own experience. We feel a strong desire for 
its gratification. Conscience remonstrates; and a 
struggle takes place whether we will yield to its 
remonstrances, or indulge in the unhallowed grati- 
fication. For a while we hesitate. What takes place 
when we adopt the downward course? We allow 
ourselves to concentrate our attention on the sinful 
gratification. . This imparts additional strength to 
the evil desire. Still we dare not gratify it, until 
the remonstrances of conscience have been in some 
way got rid of. What, then, is the next step? We 
persuade ourselves that the evil is not so great as 
conscience has affirmed it to be; at any rate that 
we will only indulge in the evil. gratification once; 
and then cease for evermore. Having in some such 
manner silenced the remonstrances of conscience, 
the yielding to the temptation becomes possible— 
nay, inevitable. The next time the temptation 


occurs, its force becomes stronger, and the remon- 


186 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


strances of conscience weaker, until indulgence after 
indulgence gives it. undisputed sway; or to adopt 
the words of a sacred writer : “Sin, when it is full 
grown, brings forth death.” 

These various stages of this process whether for 
good or for evil are matters of our direct experience ; 
and, therefore, their truth requires no further proof. 
Within these limits, we are conscious of being free 
agents; and by habitually pursuing the course of 
action which conscience approves, and by exerting 
the whole force of our wills in restraining our im- 
pulses in a contrary direction, we are capable of 
modifying our characters for the better, or by pursuing 
the opposite course of altering them for the worse. 
So far, then, the formation of our characters are 
within our own power, and we are responsible for 
the results which flow from them. 

It has been necessary to dwell on these points 
somewhat in detail, because a principle called 
“Determinism” has been widely adopted by certain 
popular writers, and set forth by them in many 
seductive aspects. It is desirable that the reader 
should clearly understand what this term really means, 
and be made aware of the hollow foundation on 
which the entire system rests. Determinism is a 
term recently invented for the purpose of getting rid 
of the harsher expression “ Fatalism,” which is its 
real equivalent. When stript of all disguises, it means 
that our actions are determined by as necessary a 


MAN CANSCHOOSTRBELWERNGALTERNATIVES: 187 


law as that which governs the motions of the planets ; 
that human actions are all calculable; that man is 
the creature of his birth and his surroundings ; that 
our belief that we exercise any choice in our mode 
of acting is a delusion, and that will is a factor 
which exerts no influence on the course of human 
actions. In a word, that force, and not a being who 
possesses the attributes which Christian Theism 
ascribes to God, rules the universe; and that the 
God of Christian Theism is a creation of the 
imagination. 

Let the reader observe, that to the various 
forms of this theory, as it is propounded by anti- 
theistic writers, there is one effective reply, namely, 
that we profess no higher certitudes than the affir- 
mations of our consciousness; and that one of these 
is a conscious perception, that within certain limits, 
in every act which we perform, we are free agents. 
Of this we are as absolutely certain as that two and 
two make four. Let it be observed that I am not 
speaking of abnormal specimens of mankind, that is, 
of men who are sunk into sucha state of degradation, 
that they, like animals, act on the first impulse which 
presents itself,—I fully concede that there are such 
—but of persons we meet with in ordinary life, who 
are in the habit of employing their reasoning powers 
in determining the course of action they will pursue. 
If you were to tell one of these, who was a stranger 
to the teachings of the anti-theistic philosophy, that 


. 


188 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


he possessed no control over his actions, but that in 
everything he had done during the day, he had 
acted in conformity with an iron law of necessity, 
which rendered it impossible that he could have acted 
otherwise ; he would reply: “I am certain that this 
affirmation of yours is untrue, for it is contradicted 
by every fact of my daily experience.” Nay, more: 
in practical life even the sturdiest necessitarian acts 
on the assumption, that it is possible to exercise a 
choice among the various incentives to action that 
present themselves to his mind which of them he 
will follow ; and on the additional assumption, that 
others possess this power also. The truth is, that 
necessitarians only affirm that man is not a free 
agent when they philosophize ; but when they engage 
in practical life they act like other men. Ifa burglar 
should plead as an excuse for an act of burglary that 
he was impelled to it by a set of forces which he 
had no power to resist, and that by the same forces 
he was compelled to use a revolver in case he met 
with resistance, it may be questioned whether a 
single necessitarian could be found who would 
accept such a plea as valid. But what is practically 
untrue must be theoretically false. 

Before closing this portion of our subject, it will 
be desirable that I should notice one objection more. 
Nothing can afford stronger proof that there is some- 
thing in man which is capable of controlling his 
strongest impulses, than the martyr in obedience to 


MAN CAN CHOOSE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES. 189 


the dictates of conscience freely yielding himself up 
to a torturing death, notwithstanding every induce- 
ment held out to him by the persecutor to deny his 
conviction and live. It will not be denied that the 
desire to live is instinctive in human nature, and that 
it contemplates a torturing death with horror. Yet it 
is a fact beyond dispute that numbers in obedience 
to a sense of duty have chosen such a death rather 
than by apostasy to live. It has been objected, how- 
ever, that this proves nothing in favour of our present 
argument, for the martyr only obeys his strongest 
motive, and is incapable of acting otherwise. Ina 
word,:he has made this sacrifice in the full persuasion 
that he will receive ample compensation in a world 
beyond the grave for the torments which he has 
endured here, and that it is this belief which has 
enabled him to triumph over them. To this I 
answer, even if this is a true statement of the case 
—which it is not—that it proves that the martyr 
is no mere machine which acts because it cannot act 
otherwise, but, on the contrary, that he possesses 
a power of choosing between the alternative of a 
torturing death, and life with many prospects of 
enjoyment—in other words, he is a voluntary agent. 

I have no wish to deny that a firm belief in the 
unspeakable realities of the unseen world has largely 
contributed to the support of many a martyr in his 
trying hour. Few, I hope, will venture nakedly to 
affirm that the noble army of martyrs—and other 


190 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


religions besides Christianity have had their martyrs 
—have yielded themselves to tortures and to death 
in obedience to an iron law of necessity. Have they, 
I ask, had no choice? Have they had no power 
to apostatize ? But there have been those who have 
yielded up their lives in obedience to a sense of 
duty whose belief in the future state was extremely 
uncertain. Such, if the Phedo of Plato be not a fiction, 
was Socrates. The philosopher had before him the 
alternative of a fully secured escape from prison, or 
certain death. Yet he chose to die. What sustained 
him in this resolution? Not a certain conviction 
that he would survive the stroke of death, or that he 
would realize his greatest happiness by dying. He 
himself expressly affirms, that although he had a hope 
that death would not be the termination of his being, 
yet that he had nothing certain to affirm respecting 
it. The alternative before his mind was a possible 
survival, in which case he would hold converse 
with the gods, the heroes of the past, the great and 
the good; or else that death would be a sleep un- 
disturbed by care from which there could be no 
awakening. Yet, uncertain as was his expectation 
of survival, he chose to die, under the conviction that 
it was his duty to obey his country’s laws. Was the 
philosopher, | ask, in adopting this resolution, impelled 
by forces which rendered it impossible for him to act 
otherwise ? Or is the man who rushes into the 
waves to save the life of another at the hazard of his 


CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. IgI 


own, impelled to do so by forces which leave him no 
choice whether he will do so, or continue a spectator 
of the drowning man being submerged by the angry 
waves at a safe distance on the shore? All that is 
best in human nature repels such a_ suggestion. 
What is the legitimate, I may say the necessary, 
conclusion which follows from these premises? A 
moral world exists, in which freedom reigns ; and 
if a moral world exists, a God must exist who is 
a moral being. 

Before entering on the direct proof which the moral 
nature of man affords of the existence of a God, it 
will be desirable that I should succinctly set before 
the reader the chief facts respecting it which have 
been established in the course of the previous 
reasonings, and on which the following arguments 
will be based. 

I. That personality, as we commonly understand 
that term is a thing which actually exists, whatever 
account may be given of its origin; and that the 
attempts of anti-Theists to explain away that per- 
sonality which each of us is conscious of possessing, 
and substitute something else in the place of it, are 
failures. 

2. That a power exists which we designate “ will,” 
which is the only force the existence of which we are 
directly conscious. 

3. That we are conscious of possessing a power 
of originating action, which enables us within certain 


192 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


limits to give a different direction to the forces which 
act in the world of necessary agents, from that which 
they would have taken apart from our interference, 
and thus of making them effectuate our pleasure. 

4. That within certain well-understood limits, we 
possess a power which we designate “ Free Agency.” 
This power enables us to choose, between the different 
incentives to action which present themselves to our 
minds, which of them we will follow, and that we 
possess such a power we are as certain as of our 
own existence. 

5. That we possess a power which is capable of 
discriminating between right action and wrong action, 
virtue and vice, what is morally right and what is 
morally wrong. This power is commonly known by 
the name of a “moral sense.” All, however, which is 
required for the purpose of our argument Is that we 
should recognize the existence of this power as a fact 
by whatever name it may be designated. 

6. That we possess a number of aspirations, intel- 
lectual and moral, of a wholly different character from 
any quality which is possessed by an animal or a 
physical agent. 

7. That we possess, aS an essential portion of 
ourselves, a power which we designate conscience, 
which tells us with authority that it is our duty 
to do this and to forbear from doing that, and 
which visits us with a feeling of self-condemnation 
if we refuse to obey its behests ; which also affirms 


CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 193 


that there are certain things which are right and 
proper, and which ought to be done; or, in other 
words, a power which raises us above that which 
is actual to the contemplation of something which 
transcends all the experiences of the past or of the 
present—that is, the ideal, or something in which 
perfection resides. 

Lastly: that matter, motion, and force, in fact 
all physical agents, are destitute of every one of 
these characteristics. 

Assuming these positions to be true, let us now 
consider what evidence they afford of the existence 
of a God who is not the mere impersonal force of 
anti- Theism, but a moral being. 

1. They prove that the universe consists of two 
orders of existence, which are separated from one 
another by an interval so wide that they possess 
no point in common: namely, beings which possess 
conscious personality, and things which are utterly 
devoid of it. What conscious personal beings are, we 
all know from our own experience. Experience, it is 
true, does not tell us what unconscious impersonal 
agents are, but our observation renders it certain 
that they are devoid of intelligence and the power 
of self-direction. Now, according to anti-theistic 
theories, in the universe in its primeval form nothing 
but impersonal unconscious agents existed, that is, 
matter, force, and motion. How, then, have per- 
sonal conscious agents been brought into existence ? 

13 


i94 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


There are only three alternatives. Either their 
existence is due to some act of spontaneous gene- 
ration; or to the hap-hazard action and interaction 
of matter, force, and motion, neither of which 
possessed in itself anything remotely resembling 
consciousness; or to the energetic will of a being, 
himself a person, who possessed in himself a power 
adequate to create finite conscious personal agents. 
Which of these alternatives is the rational one let 
the reader judge. 

2. That a power of originating action; of giving 
a different direction to the forces which energize in 
the world of necessary agents from that which they 
would have taken apart from man’s intervention ; 
of choosing between different incentives to action 
which of them we will follow: in a word, every- 
thing which is included under the term Ser 
agency,” in the sense in which it is used by 
Theists, unquestionably exists. Whence, then, 
has come free agency? How has it been pro- 
duced? The anti-theistic theory admits, as I have 
intimated above, that the universe in its primeval 
form contained nothing but matter, force, and 
motion, all of which were alike destitute of con- 
sciousness, personality, and freedom. Is it credible, 
I ask, that these by any amount of manipulation 
should have produced out of them that which was 
never in them? Can anyone in his senses believe 
that by any re-arrangement of the atoms which 


CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 195 


compose the table on which I am writing, or by 
any alteration in their motions, any being can be 
produced out of them which is capable of self- 
regulation, of exercising choice, or of feeling any of 
the affections of our moral nature, such as a sense 
of justice, a feeling of benevolence, or an aspiration 
after holiness ? Common sense affirms that before 
such things can be evolved out of them, they must 
be first involved into them from a source external 
to themselves. That source must be a being who 
has, inherent in himself, the power and the will to 
create a finite moral agent; or, in other words, a 
God must exist who is a moral being. It will be 
time for anti-Theists to ask us to accept their 
theories when they have succeeded in producing 
a free agent out of matter in which nothing but 
necessary forces are inherent; or even the lowest 
form of life out of that which was previously 
destitute of it. 

3. That it is a fact that we possess a power of dis- 
criminating between right and wrong, between virtue 
and vice, between what is noble and what is base, 
a power which is commonly called a “moral sense.” 
Whence came this power? Anti-Theists propound 
a singular theory of its origin. Primeval man was 
originally selfish ; that self-regard led him to seek 
his own greatest happiness, and that in the course 
of ages the discovery has been made that one’s 
own greatest happiness would be best realized by 


196 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


pursuing that line of conduct which we now designate 
virtuous ; in other words, that a virtuous man is a 
clever calculator of the results of. actions, and a 
vicious man a bad one. With respect to this 
theory, it will be only necessary to observe that I 
have elsewhere proved that it is no explanation of 
the facts of our moral nature. But if it were other- 
wise, we are entitled to demand an explanation of 
a further fact. The primeval atoms, forces, and 
motions were neither selfish nor otherwise ; they 
pursued their course without taking heed of conse- 
quences. How, then, did they succeed in producing 
a moral being? The anti-theistic theory, therefore, 
hopelessly breaks down ; and the only alternative 
to it is the theory of Christian Theism, that the 
existence of a moral nature in man proves the 
existence of a God who is a moral being. 

4. That it is a fact that man possesses lofty aspir- 
ations, both intellectual and moral. His intellectual 
ones have enabled him to measure the distance, and 
to explore the nature, of the remotest globes; his 
moral nature inspires him with a feeling of awe 
when he contemplates the starry heavens and 
the boundlessness of space. He also possesses 
affections, such as we are certain no necessary agent 
has. Whence came these? Can an atom, a 
molecule, or a necessary force, or any combination 
of the two entertain a lofty aspiration? Can either 


feel awe, gratitude, or love; a feeling of self-appro- 


CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 197 


bation, or one of self-condemnation ? Can such 
things be imparted to them, by any re-arrangement 
of atoms or of motions inherent in them? Our 
common sense replies, Incredible. Whence, then, 
came they? The only rational answer is, that 
they prove that a being exists, possessed of 
power and wisdom adequate to their production, 
who is not an unintelligent force, but a moral 
agent. 

5. We now come to the most important proof of 
the existence of a God who is not a mere force, 
but a moral being: namely, that derived from the 
testimony of conscience, when it affirms a law of 
duty. Its importance is so great that we must 
consider it in considerable detail. 

It has been urged by some writers that our con- 
science and moral sense furnish us with a direct 
intuition of a God. This, I think, is to place a 
weight on the argument which it will not bear. 
I myself am unable to discern that I possess such 
an intuition; and I[ infer that others are equally 
destitute of it. Besides, if such an intuition really 
existed, it would be universal, which it certainly 
is not. 

That of which conscience really affirms the exist- 
ence is an all-commanding law of duty, which free 
agents are bound to obey, but which it is possible 
for them to violate. From this the inference follows, 
that a being must exist to whom that duty is 


198 CHRISTIAN -THEISM, 


due, that is, who is the centre of obligation; and 
from its affirmation that such a thing ought to be 
in contradistinction to that which actually is, our 
reason draws the inference that a being must exist 
in whom the idea of perfection is realized; and that 
imperfect and finite beings ought to direct their 
efforts to realize the perfection of the perfect. 
Further: In visiting the violation of its behests 
with a sense of self-condemnation; and, in cases 
of great guilt, with a feeling of remorse; it con- 
veys to the sinner an intimation that in some 
way or other he will reap that which he has 
sown. 

What, then, is the precise idea which is conveyed 
to our minds by the words “It is our duty,” when 
conscience authoritatively proclaims it is our duty 
to do this, or to forbear from doing that, and this 
without any reference to the consequences that may 
result to ourselves from obeying its commands? I 
answer, that we are under an obligation to some 
being external to ourselves to act in the manner 
which it directs. 

It is true that it is not uncommon to say that there 
is a duty which we owe to ourselves. But this is 
a metaphor. All that we really mean is, that we 
are so constituted as to prove that it is the function 
of the higher affections of our nature, our reason, 
and our conscience, to bear rule over the lower 
ones; and that when the latter usurp the place 


CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 199 


which belongs to the former, the balance of our 
mental constitution is upset. We cannot in any 
strict sense of the word “owe” a thing to our- 
selves, because this would involve being debtor 
and creditor to the same person at the same time, 
which is absurd. A duty, therefore, must be due to 
a being who is external to ourselves; and as we 
intuitively perceive that we can owe no duties to 
things, it follows that a duty can only be due to a 
personal moral agent. A moral agent, therefore, 
must exist, in whom all obligation centres—that is, 
one who possesses the attributes which Christian 
Theism ascribes to God. 

Again: The idea of duty implies that the being 
to whom the duty is due, stands to us in the relation 
of a benefactor who, prior to the duty being due, 
has conferred on us benefits, in return for which 
conscience affirms that he has a right to the duty 
in question. It, therefore, authoritatively affirms 
that we owe duties to all who have benefited us. 
But there is one benefit which we have received, 
existence and its accompanying blessings, without 
which all subordinate ones would be impossible. If, 
then, we are neither self-created nor evolved out 
of unconscious matter, nor produced by means of 
various arrangements of the molecules which com- 
pose our bodies, a moral being must exist, who 
has bestowed on us every blessing which we enjoy. 
To Him, therefore, every duty which man can 


200 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


render must be due, and in Him every obligation 
centre. 

Moreover: Our reason and conscience affirm that 
we owe duties not only to the Author of our 
being, but to others, and even to those who have 
not benefited us. What, I ask, makes us recog- 
nize these as duties ? What so unites us to others, 
that it becomes a duty on our part even to practise 
acts of self-denial in order that we may do them 
good? I answer, that we are so constituted that 
we intuitively feel that the moral law is reasonable 
which requires us to do to others as we would that 
they should do to us. How, then, have we become 
so constituted ? Is it credible that such a conviction 
has been produced by the meeting together of a 
multitude of unintelligent atoms impelled by blind 
forces acting under an iron law of necessity ? But 
if this is unbelievable, what is the only possible 
alternative ? That this constitution of our being must 
be due to the will of a Creator, who, being Himself a 
- moral being, has so framed our conscience and moral 
sense, as to pronounce this duty to be reasonable, 
just, and good; and who, therefore, has a right to 
say to every moral being whom He has created, with 
an authority which conscience tells us we ought to 
obey: “You shall do to all men as you would desire 
that they should do to you.” I fully admit that, 
apart from this, it may be convenient, and even 


that it may gratify some impulse of our nature, to 


CONCLUSIONS FROM PREVIOUS REASONINGS. 201 


act kindly towards others; and even that an im- 
pulse may be so strong as to prompt us to an act 
of self-sacrifice on their behalf; but it is impossible 
to prove that we are under any obligation so to act, 
except that it is the will of Him that made us that 
we should do so, and that He has a right to demand 
obedience on our part. 

Further: A moral law involves the conception 
of a moral lawgiver. This is a point the bearing 
of which on our argument is so important that I 
must endeavour to make it clear. I have already 
observed that a physical law denotes an order of 
events, and nothing more; and that physical agents 
act as they do because they are incapable of acting 
otherwise. But moral agents act in conformity with 
a law of a wholly different character. Moral law is 
not an expression of the order of actions, such as 
they actually occur in the moral world; but it pro- 
claims an order of actions such as they ought to be. 
Moral law, therefore, contemplates an ideal up to 
which moral beings ought to act; and its conception 
involves the idea of an authority which has a right 
to command, and of a power able to enforce its 
sanctions. But authority can only reside in a moral 
agent ; and supreme authority only in one to whom 
we are supremely indebted. But conscience, in 
affirming the existence of duty, affirms the existence 
of a moral law which is obligatory on man, and pro- 


nounces its censure on those who disregard ten, Ane 


202 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


affirmations, therefore, prove that there is a God; 
its approbation that He is on the side of well-doing ; 
its censure that He is opposed to wrong; and the 
remorse which it occasions, that under His govern- 
ment evil men will ultimately reap as they have 
sown. 

Once more: When conscience proclaims, “ You 
ought to do this;” ‘You ought not to do that;” what 
is the idea involved in this its authoritative utter- 
ance? The word “ought” means ‘‘ owe it;” “ you 
ought,” “you owe it.” The question therefore 
arises, “Owe it” to what, or to whom? I answer, 
that it is impossible to feel that we can owe any- 
thing to blind matter, force, or motion. Their action 
may be, and frequently is, beneficial to us; but 
we instinctively feel that we owe them no thanks, 
because they cannot act otherwise than they do. 
Thus, the man would be mad who would return 
thanks to a train for carrying him safely on a long 
journey. The only being to whom it is possible to 
feel that we ‘‘ owe it” to do this or that, is one who 
has benefited us, but who could have withholden the 
benefit if such had been his pleasure, z.¢. a free agent. 
The declaration of conscience, therefore, which au- 
thoritatively affirms, “You owe it—” (that is, ‘ you 
ought””)—“to do this,” carries with it the concep- 
tion of a God, who is our Creator, Preserver, and 
Benefactor, in whom the obligation centres. 

As a substitute for moral obligation as propounded 


ALTRUISM. 203 


by Christian Theism, modern anti-Christian unbelief 
has propounded a system of morality designated 


) 


“Altruism,” which teaches that it is our duty to 
labour for the good of others, without regard to any 
other consideration. It therefore dispenses with the 
being of a God; denies that. conscience and a sense 
of moral obligation are original principles in man ; 
affirms that while each individual man will at death 
pass into a state of unconsciousness, from which there 
will be no awakening, yet that it is his duty to 
labour for the good of future generations, in the 
elevation of which he will not participate; and that 
while the combined labours of successive generations 
will, after the lapse (it may be) of millions of years, 
at last produce an altruistic millennium, in which 
human nature will be so improved that it will be 
as natural to seek the good of others as it is in our 
present low moral condition to seek the good of 
self. Yet let it never be forgotten, that the only 
immortality which each self-sacrificer for the good 
of others is allowed to contemplate, will be that 
his noble acts of self-sacrifice will survive in the 
grateful remembrance of future generations. Such, 
In brief, are the principles of moral obligation, 
which the most elevated form of modern anti- 
Theism propounds, for breaking the force of that 
proof of the existence of a God which is furnished 
by the moral nature of man, and which it vaunts to 
be an adequate substitute for what it is pleased to 


204 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


designate the worn-out moral teaching of the New 
Testament. 

As this system is now loudly proclaimed, by not a 
few persons who hold a high position in the intel- 
lectual world, as the Gospel of the future, it will be 
necessary, before I close this chapter, to offer a few 
remarks on its leading principles. 

First: With respect to its position that it 1s our 
duty to labour for the good of others, without any 
reference to a God, about whose existence we can 
know nothing; or any expectation of good resulting 
to ourselves, either in this world or in a world be- 
yond the grave. How, I ask, do we know that this 
is our duty? The Altruist will reply that it is the 
highest conceivable form of virtue to act on the 
principle of pure disinterestedness ; that this alone is 
noble, and to be influenced by what we do witha view 
to any good resulting to ourselves is mean. I reply, 
Does not virtuous action conduce to self-elevation ? 
Is not an advancement in purity, holiness, and be- 
nevolence an object worthy of pursuit? Is the 
anti-Theist justified in denouncing the desire for self- 
elevation, or the wish to bring our animal passions 
into subjection to the higher principles of our nature 
an unworthy motive? If it be a duty to labour for 
the good of others, why, I ask, is it not equally a duty 
to labour for the good of self? Further: If the hope 
of realizing this helps to raise us to a higher eleva- 
tion of character, or to subdue the lower impulses of 


ALTRUISM. 208 


a * — a 


our nature, why speak of self-regard as degrading ? 
A reasonable self-regard is one of the essential 
elements of our nature. This being so, all attempts 
to exterminate it will be futile. 

Second: With respect to the altruistic position, 
which affirms that it is our duty to labour for the 
good of others, even of generations yet unborn, 
without any reference to a God, and regardless of the 
results which our exertions may entail on ourselves ; 
and this, too, while it is certain that in the life of 
these future generations we shall have no share; 
again I ask, how do we know that this is our duty ? 
Conscience only affirms that we owe duties to those 
to whom we are under obligations. What obliga- 
tions on Altruistic principles, can we be under to the 
non-existent ? If, then, duties are due to those who 
have never benefited us, they must be found in the 
will of one who is our Supreme Benefactor, and 
who, as such, has a right to demand every service 
which we can render, that is, God. But if there is 
no God, or if we are entitled to frame our conduct 
without any reference to Him, it is impossible to prove 
that anyone who has not benefited us has a right to 
claim duties at our hands. Such a one may appeal 
to our kindly feelings; our better impulses may 
prompt us to help him to the utmost of our power ; 
but neither kindly feelings nor impulses are duties ; 
and conscience affirms a stern law of duty which 
has a right to our obedience, not because we possess 


206 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


kindly feelings, but because it is our duty so to 
do. That law of duty, therefore, affirms the being 
of a God. 

What, then, is Altruism? Viewed at its best, it is 
Christian morality shorn of every moral and spiritual 
force which, amid the strong impulses which reside 
in our animal nature impelling us ina contrary direc- 
tion, can render the moral law which it announces a 
dominant principle in man. If, on the other hand, 
the Altruist appeals to the principle of self-regard 
which is inherent in human nature, and urges that 
the effort to realize the highest happiness of others is 
the most certain means of realizing our own, the 
question will present itself: How am I to be certain 
of this? ‘Tastes differ. Even if you are right I may 
never live to reap the fruit of my labours. It is use- 
less, therefore, to sacrifice present gratification in the 
expectation of some future good which I may never 
live to enjoy. If there is no God, and no hereafter 
for man, “let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we 
dies 

The person who adopted this sentiment as his 
own knew from painful experience what a life 
spent in struggles and sufferings encountered in pro- 
moting the good of others meant ; and his opinion on 
such a point is of far greater value than are the 
opinions of any number of theorizers who have 
never encountered either struggles, dangers, or 
sufferings on their behalf. 


ANTI-THEISTIC MORALITY. 207 


Before concluding this chapter, it will be desirable 
that I should offer a few observations on the results 
which follow from the anti-theistic position in their 
bearing on human conduct. ‘These are of so terrible 
a character, that thoughtful men may full well arrive 
at the conclusion that there must be some flaw in the 
reasonings by which it is sought to be proved that 
there isno God, and no hereafter for man. I abridge 
the following positions from the work of an eminent 
positivist and agnostic writer,* entitled, The Service 
of Man—who has had the courage to carry out the 
principles on which this system is based to their 
legitimate consequences. 

1. Necessary law reigns in the moral world, and 
men are under a delusion in imagining themselves 
free agents. 

2. That good men and bad men are irresponsible 
for the goodness and the badness of their actions ; 
the good and the evil which is in them being the 
necessary result of the conditions of their birth and 
their surroundings. 

3. That it is impossible for a man by any act of 
his own to modify his character, which has been 
formed for him and not by him. 

4. That what we call a bad man is no more re- 
sponsible for the evil which he does than an engine is 
for killing a man who trespasses on the line of rails. 
5. That all efforts to succour the weak and the 


* Mr. Cotter Morison. 


208 ; CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


miserable are’an interference with the laws of evolu- 
tion, which, if not interfered with, would crush them 
out of existence, and thus by preventing them from 
propagating their evil kind, hasten the advent of the 
anti-theistic millennium. 

6. That all attempts to convert the evil man from 
the evil of his ways are as much lost labour. 

7, That the sooner we get rid of the idea of re- 
sponsibility, the better it will be for society, and 
moral education. 

8. That the punishments which society inflicts 
on evil-doers have no other justification than the 
‘ right of self-defence, their object being not reforma- 
tion, but deterrent. 

9. That the Christian doctrine of forgiveness of 
sins is pernicious, and destructive of the best interests 
of society ; and that Jesus Christ, when he promised 
paradise to the robber, who on the cross, pro- 
fessed faith in him, did an act which was highly 
censurable. 

10. That the service of God is a hindrance to the 
service of man. 

11. That the principle of evolution, if left to take its 
course unimpeded by the action of so-called benevo- 
lence, will gradually extirpate the weak and the 
wicked, and thus bring about a state of things at 
some distant period of the future, in which none will 
survive but the good and the strong. 

12. That, as man’s individual consciousness will 


ANTI-THEISTIC MORALITY. 209 


perish at death; all those who have laboured to 
promote the advent of this anti-theistic millennium 
will have no share in its glories. 

These positions necessarily result from the prin- 
ciples on which anti-Theism is founded. It is true 
that few anti-Theists have had the courage to state 
them thus boldly ; but it is no less true that they are 
the logical consequences of those on which this 
System of philosophy is founded. They speak for 
themselves. shall, therefore, not occupy the 
reader’s time in endeavouring to prove that if they 
were universally adopted as the guide of life, 
they would subvert the principles on which obliga- 
tion rests, those which lie at the foundation of 
society ; and that every effort which js made in the 
modern world—and, blessed be God, it abounds 
with such efforts—to remedy the evils which meet 
us at every turn, mercy, the milder virtues, every 
hospital, and every institution to aid the weaker 
members of society, would be injurious to the best 
Interests of mankind. 

This system, therefore, instead of realizing a mil- 
lennium, would bring about a condition of things far 
more terrible than any which has been realized in 
the history of the past. If anti-Theism is true, the 
moral world is the creation of three necessary agents, 
matter, force, and motion ; and they ought to be left 
for the future to pursue their course unimpeded by 
man, Here the Theist may justly object: If the 


14 


210 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


universe consists of nothing but matter, force, and 
motion, how can man, who is their creation, impede 
their resistless force?” Yet the author I have re- 
ferred to, with no little inconsistency admits that he 
can, and pronounces that in so doing his action is 
pernicious ; and he even doubts whether the results 
of medical science are not so, in enabling the weak 
to live longer, and thus propagate their evil kind, 
whom, apart from its interference, the iron forces 
of Nature would crush out of being. But if such are 
the results of anti-theistic principles, what con- 
clusion are we entitled to deduce from them? As 
in mathematics, when certain premisses lead to absurd 
conclusions, the mathematician affirms with the 
fullest conviction of certainty that they are untrue, 
so in like manner we are justified in inferring 
that principles whose practical working would result 
in moral confusion are false also. It follows, there- 
fore, that our moral nature testifies to the existence of 
a God, who is not an impersonal force, but a moral 
being, a person, a free agent, who, having created us, 
having endowed us with every faculty, and having be- 
stowed on us every means of happiness we possess, 1S 
the centre of all obligation ; to whom is, therefore, due 
worship, reverence, love, and every service of which 
man is capable, and who is entitled to say to every 
moral being whom He has created : Be thou holy, for 
I, the Lord thy God, am holy. Act towards every 
man as you would that that man should act towards 


CONCLUSION. Fe 


you ; for I, who am your Father, am his Father also, 
Conscience, therefore, when it affirms a law of duty, 
affirms that a being must exist in whom that duty 
centres, z¢. that there is a God, who is the Moral 
Governor of the world, to whom we are responsible 
for our conduct here ; and who, although clouds and 
darkness obscure our view of His present government 
of the world, will ultimately render to every man 
according to his deeds, 


GHAR LER xe 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS AGAINST CHRISTIAN 
THEISM—THEIR VALUE ESTIMATED. 


HAVE placed the words “Christian Theism” 

at the head of this chapter, because, with 
the exception of Judaism and Mahometanism, it is the 
only form of theistic belief which attributes to the 
Deity a moral character which has a direct bearing 
on human conduct. It is true that a body of Theists 
exist, though their numbers are gradually diminishing, 
who, while they reject the supernatural element in 
Christianity, ascribe to God a character similar to 
that which Christian Theism attributes to Him, It 
will be unnecessary, however, to give to this form 
of theistic belief a separate consideration, because, 
as far as it resembles Christian Theism, the same 
objections, if they possess any value at all, are 
equally valid against both. In considering this 
portion of our subject, I shall confine my observa- 
tions to that class of objections which, owing to their 
apparent plausibility, are likely to exert an influence 
over those who have not made either philosophy or 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. ate 


science a subject of special study. These are for 
the most part based on considerations arising out of 
the present constitution of Nature and of man. 

But before I attempt to deal with them, I must ask 
the reader's attention to the following most important 
consideration, which is far too generally overlooked. 
The objections in question leave the conclusions ar- 
rived at in the previous chapters entirely untouched. 
Those who urge them make no attempt to prove that 
they are invalid. Thus, the argument from causation 
—-an argument resting on one of the most certain of 
our intuitions—proves that the universe in_ its 
present form is not self-existent ; but, however remote 
its origin may have been during the ages of the past, 
that its existence must have been due to the will of a 
being possessed of power and wisdom adequate to its 
production. Against this, the allegation that the 
world contains a vast amount of suffering falls power- 
less. The argument, from its numberless adjustments, 
adaptations, and correlations, the existence of which 
is not even disputed by the anti-Theist, proves that 
they cannot have been the result of the hap-hazar! 
interaction of blind atoms and unintelligent forces 
but that they must have been brought about by the 
energy of a being, to whose power and intelligence it 
is impossible to assign limitations. The strength of 
this argument is so overwhelming, that it is im- 
possible to set it aside by the allegation that there 
are a limited number of apparent imperfections 


214 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


in the structure of animal bodies, or that the amount 
of suffering which exists proves that it cannot have 
been the work of an intelligent, and benevolent 
Creator. The argument from the moral nature of 
man proves from facts, the existence of which is 
undeniable, that it is incredible that it can have 
originated from the interaction of atoms and forces 
which are totally devoid of the elements of a moral 
nature ; but that it must have owed its origin to a 
being in whom a moral nature is inherent and un- 
caused, and to whom conscience points as the centre 
of moral obligation ; in a word that unmoral atoms 
and forces can never by any possible combination 
produce out of themselves that which was never in 
them. These proofs stand by themselves on wholly 
independent grounds, and it is impossible that they 
can be invalidated by a limited number of supposed 
imperfections in the structure of men or animals, or 
by the existence of physical or moral evil in the 
world in which we live. Even if they admitted of no 
explanation, the utmost that they would prove would 
be that there are limitations to the power, wisdom, 
or benevolence of the Creator ; not that the universe 
has been brought into existence by the interaction of 
blind atoms and unintelligent forces. But when we 
consider its inconceivable vastness, and that the 
limitation of our faculties renders us incapable of 
fully grasping the creative plan, or the ultimate 
results which it is destined to produce, the inference 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 215 


would be far more in conformity with reason, 
that, with an enlargement of our knowledge of 
the creative plan and of the moral government 
of the world, all things will be ultimately found 
to be in harmony with the possession of bound- 
less power and wisdom, and perfect holiness and 
benevolence on the part of the Creator. In con- 
sidering this subject, we must never allow ourselves 
to forget that the world in which we live, compared 
with the vastness, may I not rather say the 
infinitude, of the universe is no larger than a 
grain of sand on the ocean’s shore ; and consequently 
that itis impossible that our finite powers can form 
an adequate estimate of the results which things 
which may seem to us imperfect, are in the course 
of the ages of the future calculated to produce. 

The popular objections against Christian Theism 
assume a great variety of forms, which in a work like 
the present it is impossible to deal with in detail ; 
but, numerous as they are, they resolve themselves 
into two great principles: namely, the presence of 
physical and moral evil in a world which Christian 
Theism affirms to have been created by a being who 
is almighty and all-wise and, at the same time, 
perfect in holiness and benevolence. In endeavour- 
ing to meet these objections, it would seem the most 
simple course to adopt to treat them under the two 
distinct heads of Physical evil and Moral evil, but 
this is rendered difficult, if not impossible, owing to 


216 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


evil originates in moral causes, which, if the latter 
ceased to act, would speedily disappear. I shall, 
therefore, be unable to keep the one subject entirely 
separate from the other; but as the widespread exist- 
ence of moral evil in the world not only forms the 
strength of the anti-theistic position, but has formed 
the severest trial to the faith of good and holy men 
in every age, I propose to consider the reasons why 
it is permitted to exist, and the purposes which its 
existence is designed to subserve, in a chapter by 
itself. 

The objections against the existence of a God, who 
possesses the character and attributes which Christian 
Theism attributes to Him, on account of the vast 
amount of evil with which this world abounds, may 
be compressed under the following heads— 

1. That it proves that this world cannot be the 
work of a being who is possessed of boundless 
power and wisdom, and whose benevolence is perfect. 

2. That if a creator exists, he must be deficient 
either in power, wisdom, or goodness. 

3. That an antagonistic principle must exist 
somewhere, which he was unable to subdue, which 
has marred the perfection of the Creator’s work. 
This objection assumes two forms. One which lays 
down that a tendency to evil is inherent in matter, 
which has an existence independent of the Creator’s 
will, and which tendency he was unable to overcome ; 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 217 


another, which postulates the existence of two gods, 
one good, and another evil, who have ever been at 
war with one another ; and although the latter is in- 
ferior in power to the former, and will be ultimately 
vanquished by him, he has succeeded in introducing 
into the world all the imperfections, the sins, and the 
suffering with which it abounds. 

4. That the imperfections in the. structure. of 
certain animal races, especially of man, and the fact 
that diseases are transmissible from ancestors to 
their descendants, prove that they cannot have 
been the work of a Creator whose intelligence and 
benevolence are perfect. 

The theory of Dualism has been effectually dis- 
posed of by modern science as affording a rational 
account of the existence of evi]. It has proved beyond 
controversy that the universe is a unity, and that it 
is impossible that it can have been the production of 
two opposing wills; for not only does it present a 
unity of plan, nor does its structure contain a trace 
of the presence of two opposing forces, but the same 
instrumentality which produces pleasure under 
altered conditions produces pain; and its destructive 
forces are inherent in its constitution, and are regu- 
lated by the same laws as those which produce the 
happiness and the comfort of sentient beings. It 
is, therefore, not too much to affirm that no well- 
informed person will now take refuge from the 
difficulties in question in the theory that the physical 


218 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 


and moral evil in the world have originated in the 
action of two opposing wills, as affording a rational 
account of the origin of evil, however plausible 
such a theory may have seemed when the great 
truths brought to light by modern science were 
unknown. 

But the extent in which evil exists in the world 
has formed a great stumbling-block in the way of 
thoughtful men in every age, especially among 
Orientals, and, to speak generally, among that order 
of mind which seeks a solution of difficulties in 
theorizing rather than in a careful study of the facts 
of Nature. Pressed by the difficulties in question, 
some of the greatest thinkers of the Oriental world 
have sought an escape from them by taking refuge 
in some one of the various forms of Pantheism. 
As its nominal adherents are more numerous 
than those of any single religion in the world, it 
will be necessary to offer a few observations on it, 
for the purpose of showing that pantheistic sys- 
tems of thought utterly fail to solve the difficul- 
ties in question. My observations on them must 
be brief. 

Pantheism assumes two aspects— 

First : One which identifies the universe with God, 
and God with the universe. This may be designated 
Pantheism pure and simple; and is really, except in 
name, indistinguishable from Atheism. 

Second: One which lays down that this imperfect 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 219 


world is not a direct emanation from the Supreme 
God, but that it is the work of a being who is a very 
distant emanation from Him; who, owing to the 
remoteness of his emanation from the Supreme God 
had become the subject of numerous imperfections. 
By this means it has been sought to free the Supreme 
God from the responsibility of being the author of 
evil. The utter inadequacy of such a system of 
thought to grapple with the difficulties in question 
I have already pointed out, and therefore I need not 
further discuss it. 

But with respect to Pantheism generally, the being 
which the Pantheist designates God is impersonal, 
destitute of volition, free agency, the power of choice, 
or a single attribute which we designate moral. He 
is aS much a necessary agent as blind matter, and 
unintelligent force. He is, therefore, incapable of 
inspiring a feeling of adoration, love, or duty due to 
him. In a word, Pantheism, as affording a rational 
account of the origin of things, is involved in all the 
difficulties which we have been considering in 
the previous chapters, and affords not the smallest 
solution of them. The universe being God, it fails 
to offer any explanation of how physical and moral 
evil have got into it, except on the assumption that, 
in some form or other, it was originally inherent in 
it, or that it has originated in separate conscious 
existence; and the only relief which it offers from 
its burden is ultimate absorption into the all of 


220 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


things, in which personal consciousness will cease, 
and from which it was a calamity that it ever became 
separated. ‘lo obtain this re-absorption is the great 
end of human life. Surely, a system which teaches 
that the only mode of complete escape from the evil 
with which the world abounds is the cessation of.our 
separate conscious existence ; and which at the same 
time teaches that the all of things, of which man 
forms a portion, is God, wholly fails to give an account 
of the origin of either physical or moral evil which 
will satisfy our reason. 

I will now pass on to the consideration of the 
objection that the mass of evil, with which the world 
abounds, proves that its Creator, if there be one, 
is not almighty, but imperfect either in power, 
wisdom, or goodness; and, therefore, that he was 
unable to create a better world than that in which 
we live; and with respect to which a class of 
unbelievers, known by the name of Pessimists, have 
gone the length of affirming that a worse one 
could not have been brought into existence; and 
that it would have been good for mankind, taken 
as a whole, if they had never been born. 

It has been urged by an eminent writer whose 
works have attained a wide circulation in the higher 
regions of thought, that all that can be inferred from 
the existence of the universe is, that it is the work 
of a being who possessed a power adequate to its 
formation, but that this is far from proving that 


HOLOULAW-OBJEGTIONS, 221 


his power is almighty. Into any abstract discus- 
sion of what infinite power is capable of effecting, 
I shall not enter, because I think that my readers 
will be of opinion that the being who could create 
the systems of suns which astronomers tell us 
are scattered throughout space in numbers passing 
human comprehension; our sun with its attendant 
planets, with everything which they contain, uphold 
them in being, and carry on their operations, is for 
all practical purposes justly designated almighty ; 
and that the power that could effect all these won- 
ders transcends all our ideas of limitations. Whether 


such a power could have created a better world than | 


that in which we live is, in our ignorance of world- 
building, an idle speculation. It is related of a 


Spanish king, who knew only the Ptolemaic system | 


of astronomy, that he said if he had been of the 
Creator’s counsel, he would have advised Him how 
to have constructed the solar system better ; but sub- 
sequent discoveries have shown that the objection 
was due to the objector’s ignorance, and not to 
imperfections in its actual structure. On similar 
principles, we are entitled to argue that supposed 
imperfections in the Creator's work will hereafter 
be found to be due, not to imperfections in the 
work itself, but to our ignorance of what that work 
actually is, and our inability to contemplate it taken 
as a whole. It ought never to be forgotten in this 
controversy that all things which are conceivable 


222 CHRISTIAN *THEISM, 


are not possible; for we freely concede to the 
objector that Almighty power cannot work contra- 
dictions; and that when He has conditioned the 
limits of His own working, as He must have done 
when He determined to create finite beings, that 
He cannot transcend the limits which He Himself 
has assigned to it without contradicting His own 
purposes. Moral and physical evil, pain and suf- 
fering, therefore, exist in the world, not because its 
Creator is deficient in power, but because their 
permitted existence formed a portion of His crea- 
tive plan, which embraced the past, the present, 
and the future, boundless space, and boundless 
duration. The inconceivable vastness of the uni- 
verse may full well make anti-theistic speculators 
on the best mode of world-building doubtful, 
whether if their advice had been taken in its 
construction they would have produced one more 
perfect. Whether a world would have been a 
better one in which the existence of suffering and 
moral evil had been rendered impossible, I shall 
have more to say in the next chapter. 

The following objections, which are indepen- 
dent of moral considerations, now require our 
attention : 

1. That the fact that diseases should be capable 
of transmission from ancestors to their descendants, 
and the imperfections which exist in the structure 


of organized beings as, for example, in persons 


FORGLAR OBJECTIONS. 223 


born blind, deaf, dumb, lame, destitute of intellect, 
with tendencies to insanity, and various forms of 
disease, prove that beings in which such things 
exist cannot have been the work of one whose 
power is devoid of limitations, and whose wisdom 
and benevolence are perfect. 

2. That the action of the forces of Nature, 
remorselessly crushing, as they do, everything which 
comes across their path, are inconsistent with the 
idea that their Author is one who possesses the 
attributes which Christian Theism attributes to 
Him. 

3. That the existence in animals of rudimentary 
organs, and of organs which have no present use, 
deprives the argument from adaptation of any 
argumentative value as affording proof of the 
existence of an intelligent Creator, it being incon- 
celvable, as it is alleged, that rudimentary or 
useless organs can have been the work of one 
whose wisdom is devoid of limitations, whereas 
their existence is fully accounted for by the anti- 
theistic theory of evolution. 

4. That if the author of Nature had been all- 
powerful, wise, and perfectly benevolent, he would 
have so constituted the world as to have prevented 
sentient beings from being subject to pain and 
suffering; or if their existence is in any sense 
necessary, that he would have greatly diminished 
their amount. 


224 CHRISTIAN THEION. 


5. That the miseries of existence are so great 
as to render it doubtful whether it would not 
have been better if sentient beings, above all man, 
whose high organization renders him especially 
obnoxious to suffering, had never been brought 
into being; and afford proof that the Creator 
is either deficient in power to have made things 
otherwise than they are, or in benevolence; or 
that he is indifferent to the happiness of his 
creatures. 

I fully admit that the first of these objections is 
founded on difficulties which are real. Why the 
Creator has made mental and bodily qualities trans- 
missible from ancestors to their descendants; why 
men are born with the various defects above enu- 
merated, and with inherited tendencies for which 
they are not responsible ; I may add, why the vast 
inequalities in the condition of things into which 
men are born exist; why one man is endowed 
with a lofty intellect, and another with a mean 
capacity ; why one is born rich, and another poor ; 
and numerous other questions of a similar cha- 
racter,—are problems of which our finite intellects 
are unable to give the solution. Before that will 
be possible, we must be capable of entering the 
council chamber of the Most High, and scan from 
end to end His creative and providential plan, which 
embraces alike the ages of the past, the present, and 
the future, and those worlds which, in numbers 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS, 225 


inconceivable by man, are scattered throughout the 
infinitude of space. Is it not credible, I ask, rather, 
is it not highly rational, that there should be diffi- 
culties into, which the intellect of man cannot pene- 
trate, in the creative plan and in the providential 
government of a universe, compared with the vast- 
ness of which the world in which we live, and all 
that it contains, is less than a grain of sand on 
the ocean’s shore ; and in which there must be things 
for the existence of which it is unable to assign 
the reason, but which may be readily soluble to 
higher powers of intellect and a larger grasp of the 
plan of the Creator? One thing is certain, no effort 
of the intellect of man has succeeded in penetrating 
the reason why such things exist, nor has it pleased 
God to tell us by a revelation. All that our Lord 
did, when He was asked if a beggar was born blind 

on account of a sin committed by his parents or — 
himself, was to deny that either was the reason, 
and to add that he was so born “that the works of 
God should be made manifest in him.” This being 
so, I shall not attempt to unravel that which He, 
when questioned on, declined to explain; and I shall 
only observe that the existence of difficulties, com- 
paratively few in number, in the creative plan and 
in the providential government of a universe so 
inconceivably vast, is unable to nullify the over- 
whelming evidence which it furnishes of the exist- 
ence of a God possessed of the attributes which 


t) 


226 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Christian Theism attributes to Him, as set forth in 
the previous chapters. 

2. The second objection, which has been founded 
on the fact that the forces of Nature remorselessly 
crush everything which comes across their path, 
can be disposed of without difficulty. The objection 
has been strongly put by the late Mr. J. S. Mill. 
He tells us that Nature (7e. its necessary forces) 
perpetrates acts every day which, if committed by 
man, human justice would punish as atrocious 
crimes; and, therefore, that it affords no proof of 
the existence of an author whose justice and benevo- 
lence are perfect. The fact that the forces of the 
universe act in conformity with a law from which 
they never vary, and, therefore, that they re- 
morselessly crush whatever comes in their way, is 
undoubted. Equally certain is it, according to the 
principles of Christian Theism, or of any Theism, 
which does not assume their existence independent 
of a Creator, that they are expressions of his will. 
Why, then, has he so constituted them as to produce 
results like these? The answer is an obvious one. 
Unless they thus acted, the entire course of human 
life would become a scene of hopeless confusion. 
What, then, is the demand which the objection before 
us makes on the Creator? Either that He should 
have so constituted them as to have made them 
capable of exercising discrimination, and thus have 
rendered their action variable and uncertain ; or that 


LOPULAR OBJECTIONS. 227 


He should directly interfere with their activity 
by interpositions whenever their action is likely to 
prove injurious. I need hardly observe that such 
interpositions, in order that they may be effectual 
for the end proposed, must be of such frequent 
occurrence as to deprive their action of all certainty, 
and thereby render the future incapable of calcula- 
tion ; a condition of things, be it observed, which is 
one of the chief objections which unbelievers urge 
against the belief in the miracles which are recorded 
in the Bible. Whether the rendering the forces of 
Nature uncertain in the mode of their action, and 
thereby throwing the whole course of human life into 
confusion, would be an improvement on the present 
order of things, let the reader judge. For example; 
Would it, I ask, be wise to suspend the force of 
gravitation every tinte when its action is in danger 
of causing suffering, or the destruction of human 
life? If the forces of Nature were rendered 
variable in their action, would human life be 
possible ? 

3. The next objection which we have to consider 
is that derived from the existence in animals of 
rudimentary, worn-out, and what are supposed to be 
useless, organs. It is urged that their presence is 
Inconsistent with the belief that they can have 
originated in the action of a being possessed of a 
high order of intelligence, because we should un- 
hesitatingly affirm that one who possessed no higher 


228 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


degree of intelligence than an ordinary man, who 
introduced things into his constructions which are 
devoid of use, was little better than a blunderer ; 
whereas, if in accordance with the anti-theistic 
theory of evolution the progress of things has been 
from imperfect to more perfect types of being with- 
out the intervention of intelligence, the presence 
of rudimentary, aborted, and even useless organs 
is readily accounted for, for blind matter and 
law may be readily excused for making a few 
blunders. 

To this last explanation I reply, Undoubtedly. But 
I would ask the reader to consider whether it is 
reasonable to believe that, during the course of their 
blind activity during the ages of the past, they must 
not have made infinitely more, or whether it is 
believable that they have produced a single compli- 
- cated orderly arrangement, not to speak of the 
innumerable adjustments, adaptations, and correla- 
tions, with which the universe everywhere abounds ? 
Further: It remains yet to be proved that certain 
supposed useless organs are really devoid of use. 
Mistakes have been made on this subject in former 
times. All that can be truly said is that their uses 
have not yet been discovered. Several eminent 
scientists have recently expressed strong doubts 
whether any organ exists which is really destitute 
of use. 


But with respect to the main point of the 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 229 


objection, the existence in animals of rudimentary 
and aborted organs, I must once more ask the reader 
to bear in mind that Christian Theism is not com- 
mitted to any theory as to the mode in which the 
Creator has operated in the production of His works. 
Respecting the mode of His operation, by which 
He brought into existence the constituents of the 
universe in their primeval form, we know, or can 
know, nothing. The determination of the order in 
which it has been produced is one which pertains, 
not to theology, but to science; but as to the modus 
operandi by which He has produced the various 
orders of beings—or to use language to which 
anti-Theists can take no’‘just exception, ‘they have 
been produced ”—neither theology nor science can 
determine anything for certain. All that science can 
effect is to render one mode of His action more pro- 
bable than another; but as to the actual mode in 
which He has energized in bringing finite beings into 
existence, both must confess their ignorance. There 
is nothing inconsistent, therefore, in a theory of evo- 
lution which affirms that God, acting from within, 
through the agency of what we designate growth, 
and from without, by which at the right time and 
place He provides the materials necessary for growth, 
with a cordial acceptance of Christian Theism. All 
that it demands is, that behind the forces (be they 
what they may) by which the various orders of 
beings have been brought into existence, there should 


230 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


be a God, all-powerful, and all-wise, who, whether 
He acts within these forces or without, is energizing 
through them, directing and controlling them, and 
working out through them the purposes of His 
creative and providential will. 

As far then as the belief in Christian Theism is 
concerned, what does the objection which we are 
considering actually amount to? I answer, Nothing. 
Every rational Theist is firmly persuaded that 
the Creator has acted on a definite plan in His 
creative work. This being so, it follows that He 
has acted on a definite plan in the formation of 
animal structures. It has also, I think, been 
fully proved that He has begun with bringing into 
existence the lower forms of life; and by the 
energy of His power, exerted from within or 
without, or in both ways (it matters not which), 
He has evolved a succession of higher and higher 
ones. Assuming, then, that He has acted on a 
definite plan, is it any proof of lack of wisdom, 
that He should have created in embryo in the 
lower animal structures everything which now 
exists in a completed form in the highest orders 
of animal life? 

Let me illustrate my position by an example. 
The fore feet of numerous animals contain in 
embryo and in type the various bones which in 
their perfected form constitute those of the human 


hand. In many other respects the structure of the 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 231 


lower forms of animal life may be said to be pro- 
phetic of the higher, until they receive their fulfil- 
ment (¢.¢. the complete realization of the idea which 
underlies them) in the highest. 

What objection, I ask, can be justly urged against 
either the power or the wisdom of the Creator, if He 
has begun by forming animal structures on a definite 
plan, in embryo and in type, and has gradually 
improved them through a course of working carried 
on through a succession of ages, until they have 
realized the idea involved in their original concep- 
tion ? Why, I ask, may not the Creative Power 
energize both from within and from without: from 
within, in the form which we designate growth ; and 
from without, in providing the materials necessary 
for growth, and causing them to meet at the time 
and place where they are required? Is such a 
mode of action any objection against His power or 
His wisdom ? The objection would only be valid 
on the assumption that each order of beings was a 
separate creative act, perfect from the first in all its 
parts. On the contrary, the formation of a definite 
plan embracing within its wide compass every order 
of beings possessed of life, proves that the being 
who conceived it, and who has ultimately realized 
the idea which underlay it in the formation of the 
human body, must have been possessed of a power 
and intelligence to which we can assign no limits ; 
and His continuing to carry it out through long 


232 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


ages that He must have possessed not intelligence 
only, but purpose and volition. With respect to 
organs, which were useful once, but are no longer 
useful now, I ask, is it a proof of lack of wisdom, 
if, instead of removing every trace of their former 
existence from the higher forms of life by some 
special intervention,—a course of action especially 
objectionable to anti-Theists,—He has allowed them 
to remain in their present condition as memorials 
of the past? 

4. Let us now consider the next objection, which 
is founded on the vast amount of pain and suffering. 
with which the world abounds. From its existence 
it is urged that if there is a Creator, all-powerful, 
wise, and perfectly benevolent, He would have pre- 
vented its existence altogether, or have greatly 
limited its amount. 

My observations on this point will be brief, 
because as a large portion of the pain and suffering 
which exists originates in moral causes, the subject 
will more suitably come under notice in the next 
chapter. In this place it will be sufficient to observe 
that it is in the highest degree probable, if not 
absolutely certain, that it is a necessary condition of 
the creation of beings who are capable of receiving 
pleasure through a bodily organization, such as a 
nervous system, that it must involve the necessity 
of their being capable of suffering pain; or, in other 
words, what the objection affirms, that which the 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 233 


Creator ought to have done involves a contradiction. 
Further: It is an undoubted fact that pain has its 
uses—uses so important that its existence is con- 
sistent with the most benevolent purpose on the 
part of the Creator—among which I may notice 
here that it acts as a warning against consequences 
which might otherwise be attended with the most 
dangerous results to the well-being of mankind. 
How far its amount admits of diminution is a 
question on which our finite intellects are incapable 
of forming a judgment. 

5. We now come to the objection which is urged 
against the benevolence of the Creator ; or, at least, 
that he is indifferent to the happiness of his crea- 
tures on the ground that the present condition of 
animal and human life is attended with results 
which prove that the Creator, if there be one— for it 
is the effect of these objections as they are urged 
by anti-theistic writers and lecturers to convey the 
impression that there is none-—is either deficient in 
power to have made things otherwise than they are, 
or of benevolent purpose in his creative acts. The 
objection really raises the question, whether from 
the phenomena of animal and human life we are 
justified in inferring that its author is perfectly, or 
only partially benevolent, or indifferent to the happi- 
ness of sentient beings, or whether their author 
is blind matter and neceSsary force, both destitute 
of a single element which can be designated moral. 


234 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Not a few of those who have embraced the gloomy 
view of things which the last alternative suggests 
have adopted the doctrine known by the name of 
Pessimism, the meaning of which is that, as things 
are at present constituted, life is not worth having, 
and that the present order of things ought to be sub- 
verted as unbearable, cost what its subversion may. 
I will offer a few remarks on this last position first, 
but in doing so I shall avoid referring to it in its 
political aspect. 

There can be little doubt, if the question were 
put to every hundred thousand of mankind: Do 
you think that life, taken as a whole, is a scene of 
enjoyment, and therefore desirable? that ninety- 
nine thousand out of each hundred thousand would 
certainly answer the question in the affirmative. 
This surely is a sufficient reply to those who adopt 
the theory in question. They arrive at this con- 
clusion by contemplating one aspect of it, and by 
shutting their eyes to every other. I fully admit 
that human existence, especially towards its close, 
is not unfrequently clouded with no inconsiderable 
amount of sorrow and suffering; but it is a fact to 
the truth of which the testimony is overwhelming, 
that the happiness of life, taken as a whole, stands 
- in an overwhelming ratio greater than its sufferings. 
I say taken as a whole, and I would add, irre- 
spective of the moral causes by which suffering is 
produced, because we have no right to fix our 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 235 


exclusive attention on some of its darker aspects, 
and thereon to erect a theory of human life, and 
affirm that it is inconsistent with the existence 
of a benevolent author. I by no means wish: to 
deny that there are individual cases of protracted, 
I may say lifelong, suffering, in which the sufferer, 
if he confines his view to this life only, may be 
justified in invoking death as a release; but such 
cases are comparatively rare. It will be only 
necessary to observe that if it is true that human 
existence is a scene of misery, such as this theory 
presupposes, and that man perishes with his body, 
suicide would be its logical conclusion; and the 
best thing which could happen would be the pain- 
less passing of the human race into non-existence. 
But the Pessimist does not act on his theory; he 
only grumbles, or commits some crime attended 
with danger, from the consequences of which he 
does his utmost to escape. It is true that certain 
philosophers of two widely different schools sought 
refuge in suicide from the tyranny of the early 
Roman imperial government; that others in obe- 
dience to imperial orders, did the same that they 
might escape from a more terrible fate; and that 
during this period suicides were frequent in the less 
cultivated ranks of life, as a means of escape from 
a state of things which was deemed intolerable ; 
and that even the luxurious spendthrift, who had 


squandered his means of subsistence, and who, 


236 GH S PLAN Atle S iM, 


therefore, could no longer indulge in his former 
courses, adopted this as his last refuge. But all 
this arose, not from evils which are inherent in 
the constitution of things, but from those which 
are of man’s creating, and within his power to 
remedy. Suicides at this period, like many other 
abnormal things in human nature, were a kind of 
temporary rage, the reasons for which subsequent 
experience has refused to endorse. It is also true 
that the fundamental principle of Buddhism (a 
system—it can hardly be called a religion in the 
original form in which it was propounded by its 
author) is, that life is so bad and miserable that 
the sooner our separate conscious existence is 
absorbed in the mighty “All,” the better. This, 
like many other theories that have been propounded, 
by concentrating attention on one aspect of the 
question, namely, the suffering with which the 
theorizer has come in contact, and excluding from 
his view the other, namely, the far greater amount of 
the indications of happiness and enjoyment, which 
is presented by the phenomena of conscious exist- 
ence; contradicts the general experience of mankind, 
which, on such a subject as whether life is desirable 
or the reverse, is the only adequate test of truth. 
But the practice of the overwhelming majority of its 
adherents, as well as that of the professed followers 
of every system founded on similar principles, 
proves that they are of opinion that conscious 


POPULAR®* OBJECTIONS. 237 


existence is a thing to be desired. I shall, there- 
fore, only observe that theories which are prac- 
tically false must be theoretically untrue; and 
therefore that all theories which affirm that the 
miseries of life are so great that it would have been 
better if man had never been brought into existence 
are untenable. 

Let us now consider the question whether the 
phenomena of sentient life, taken as a whole, and 
our own individual experience of it, indicate a 
benevolent purpose in the Creator, or that He is 
indifferent to the happiness of His creatures. I say 
“taken as a whole,” because no theory can be true 
which is based on partial views of it, or if we fix 
our exclusive attention on particular aspects of it. 
What, then, is the inference which the phenomena 
of life suggest ? It is necessary to consider this 
subject carefully, because so thoughtful a writer as 
Professor Huxley speaks in a recent article on “ The 
Struggle for Existence,” of the myriads of genera- 
tions of herbivorous animals which have been tor- 
mented and devoured by carnivorous ones; of both 
alike being subject to all the miseries incidental to 
old age, disease, and over-multiplication, and of the 
more or less suffering which is the meed both of the 
vanquished and victor ; and he concludes that ‘some 
thousands of times a minute, weve our cars sharp 
enough” [the italics are mine] ‘‘ we should hear sighs 
and groans of pain like those heard by Dante at 


238 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


the gate of hell, that the world cannot be governed 
by what we call benevolence.” Few, I think, will 
consider this a correct statement of the phenomena 
presented by animal life. The following is my 
reply to it— 

As all direct knowledge respecting the happiness 
or the misery of existence must be confined to our- 
selves, we can only judge whether beings, other 
than ourselves, are in a state of enjoyment or of 
suffering by comparing their actions with our own 
under similar circumstances. But although our 
judgments are founded on analogy, few will be 
found who will doubt their correctness. What, then, 
are we entitled to infer respecting the animal 
creation? Are their happiness and enjoyment out 
of all proportion greater than their sufferings; are 
they equally balanced; or do their sufferings pre- 
ponderate ? On this point no careful observer can 
entertain a doubt. Do not the phenomena of insect 
life, when we see its innumerable hosts on the wing 
during the summer evenings prove that they are 
experiencing sensations of pleasure? Is not the 
same true of the feathered races, and of the innu- 
merable shoals of fish which gambol in the ocean, 
and of the different land animals when they are 
partaking of their food? Who can doubt that the 
domestic cat, when we hear it purring, or see it 
stretching itself in the heat; or that the dog, when 
following its natural instincts, such as hunting, or 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 239 


when he is engaged in the service of his master, 
is happy? The same is true of every animal in 
its various gambols, when acting on its instincts, 
or reclining at its ease. I think that few who 
have contemplated the innumerable forms of sentient 
life, will entertain a doubt, that the life of animals 
is one which, with few excepilons, 1S .aslife: of 
pleasure. In many cases it may be short, but 
as long as_ it lasts, every indication by which we 
are able to form a judgment, proves that it is 
pleasurable. The chief exceptions are the suffer- 
ings which man inflicts on those which are subject 
to his rule. The diseases to which they are ex- 
posed are few; and for the most part, as far as we 
can judge, are not attended with acute pain. From 
two things which intensify human suffering they 
are certainly exempt. Animals are incapable of 
reflex action. Man possesses that power, and by 
concentrating his attention on a pain, intensifies 
it. The sufferings of man are multiplied by the 
power which he possesses of anticipating the future. 
This power animals have not. Whatever pains they 
feel, even death, come upon them suddenly, without 
the suffering which arises from anticipation. If they 
are subject to death, this is the means by which a 
far greater number than would otherwise be pos- 
sible, are rendered capable of the enjoyments of 
life ; for, if there was no death the world would be 
speedily over-peopled, 


240 CHRISTIAN THEITSM, 


It will doubtless be objected that a large majority 
of animals live by preying on one another, and that 
it was the intention of the author of Nature that 
they should do so; for he has provided not a few 
of them with a highly complicated machinery for the 
purpose of enabling them to catch their prey, and 
with an intelligence adequate to contrive the means 
of alluring it into their power. It is impossible for 
us to estimate the exact amount of suffering which 
this may occasion. All that we know for certain is, 
that it comes suddenly and without fearful anticipa- 
tion; but of the precise amount of pain with which 
the extinction of life in this manner is attended we 
have no means of judging, for scarcely has a human 
being escaped from the deadly grasp of the more 
powerful predaceous animals to tell the tale. But 
if Livingstone’s experience be not a singular one, he 
tells us that when he was seized by a lion his sense 
of feeling and of fear was all but paralyzed. If this 
be true in all similar cases, it is certainly a merciful 
provision of the Creator. These inferences are 
further strengthened by the fact that no organism 
with which we are acquainted has been framed for 
the infliction of pain as its immediate object. Many 
members of the animal creation, it is true, are pro- 
vided with organisms of a destructive character, 
and frequently with very elaborate ones; but their 
use, and, if it may be permitted to use the word 
their intention, is not to inflict pain, but to procure 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 241 


for their possessors the needful supply of food, 
or with the means of self-defence. 

If, then, we take a general view of animal life, and 
at the same time take into account that the number 
of living beings which exist is past all human com- 
prehension; and that each of them in its respective 
sphere shows unquestionable signs of enjoyment ; 
the conclusion is inevitable that the amount of 
happiness which they experience is not only in- 
conceivably vast in quantity, but that it indefinitely 
transcends the pains which they suffer. If Professor 
Huxley’s ears were sharpened up to the point which 
he postulates, it is certain that he would find that 
the sounds emitted by animals which are indica- 
tive of enjoyment would be so loud as to drown 
those which are indicative of pain; and that the 
groans and sighs of pain which are emitted by 
animals, like those which Dante supposed that he 
heard at the gate of hell, are as much the creation 
of his own imagination as the latter were of the 
imagination of the poet. Such being the indica- 
tions of almost uninterrupted enjoyment which are 
afforded by the phenomena of animal life, they prove 
that the purpose of the Creator in bringing them 
into existence was benevolent; and, consequently, 
that those cases which seem to point to the conclu- 
sion that He is indifferent to the happiness of His 
creatures must admit of some other explanation. 

Let us now take a brief survey of human life, 

16 


242 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


—- 


Does it indicate the presence of benevolent purpose, 
or would it have been better, as some have ventured 
to affirm, if man had never been brought into exist- 
ence? In considering this subject, | must for the 
present omit a consideration which, if taken into 
account, would alter the complexion of the entire 
question, namely: Does a future state of existence 
await man, the enjoyments of which may fully com- 
pensate for the sufferings of the present life? On 
this question—one of great importance in relation to 
the present controversy—I will offer a few observa- 
tions in the concluding chapter of this work. . I must 
also ask the reader to exclude from his view the 
popular and widespread doctrine of everlasting 
damnation. This, if it is true, certainly involves the 
consequence that it would have been good for the 
overwhelming majority of mankind if they had never 
been born. In this place I must confine myself to 
the question whether human life, as we behold it, 
taken as a whole, does or does not testify to the 
benevolence of its author. Let it also be remembered 
that that vast mass of suffering which originates in 
moral causes is excluded from our present inquiry. 
When we contemplate human life, its phenomena 
prove beyond a doubt that, in its earlier stages, its 
pleasures greatly exceed its pains. This we know, not 
only from observation, but from our own recollection. 
This period of life knows little or nothing of care 
about the future. Its wants are supplied, not by 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 243 
its own exertions, but by those of others. The 
restraints which it is necessary to impose on its 
desires with a view to its future good may be 
irksome, but are certainly not painful. Its volun- 
tary activities—and they are many—are attended 
with pleasurable sensations. The period of child- 
hood, with a few rare exceptions, is universally 
acknowledged to be one of enjoyment. This is not 
only the case with those born in comfortable 
circumstances ; it is true of the great majority of 
mankind. Look, for example, at the ill-clad children 
in our streets. Observe them when at play ; when 
they dance at the music of the organ-grinder ; even 
when they struggle with one another, when contest- 
ing the palm of superior strength, and in other 
circumstances too numerous to particularize. One 
often wonders at witnessing the indications of 
happiness which they display. They doubtless 
have their discomforts; but who can doubt that 
their pleasures out of all proportion greatly pre- 
ponderate over their pains? The same observations 
are true of early youth. If the question were 
put to everyone under twenty years of age: “Do 
you consider life a blessing ?” I feel assured that 
the all but unanimous answer would Dene dOge 
the only exceptions being those who from their 
earliest consciousness have suffered from painful 
congenital disease ; .and these are comparatively few. 
What, then, is the inference which these considerations 


244 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


suggest ? I answer whatever clouds and darkness 
may be round about Him, that the purpose of the 
Creator was a benevolent one, and that the experi- 
ence of early life, taken as a whole, proves that life, 
with all its drawbacks, is a blessing. 

Let us now direct our attention to mature life. 
What does our own experience of it, and that of 
others, testify as to the purpose of the Creator in His 
creative work ? The anti-Theist urges us to contem- 
plate its struggles, its disappointments, and its suffer- 
ings ; and say whether such things are consistent 
with benevolent purpose. The Theist, on the other 
hand, justly calls on us not to fix our attention on one 
portion of the picture only, but to take into account 
the pleasures and the joys with which life abounds, 
and ask ourselves, as a matter of our own experience, 
whether they do not greatly preponderate over its 
pains. When, for example, a man has had expe- 
rience of sixty years of life, does he wish that 
he had passed painlessly out of existence at an 
earlier period? or, after contemplating the past, is 
it his deliberate opinion that it would have been 
good for him if he had never been born? I fully 
believe, and know from experience, that life has its 
many trials and its sufferings; but what I ask the 
reader's particular attention to is, that the over- 
whelming majority of these owe their origin to moral 
causes. Such evils are either self-caused, or are 
caused by the action of other moral agents, and are 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 245 


therefore remediable. In fact, if the Gospel of Christ 
were practically obeyed; if the golden rule, ‘‘ Thou 
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” were carried out 
in religion, in politics, and in every department of 
social and private life; if ambition, love of power, 
self-love to the injury of others, envy, hatred, malice, 
and the innumerable petty trifles which disturb the 
happiness of life, were made to cease, the pain and 
misery occasioned by them would disappear. 

If, then, we withdraw from our view that vast 
amount of suffering which originates in moral causes, 
is there anything in the phenomena of mature life 
which would lead us to question the general 
benevolence of the Creator? I say His “general 
benevolence,” because I fully admit that there are 
numerous cases of pain and suffering arising from 
causes over which we can exert no control, of which 
it is impossible, with our limited knowledge, to assign 
a reason why they are permitted. The faculties with 
which we are endowed prove that a life of energetic 
action was destined to be the lot of man. Accord- 
ingly the Creator has attached pleasurable enjoyment 
to the active energy of every faculty which we pos- 
sess, and that enjoyment only ceases when the 
energetic action is pressed beyond due limits, a 
pressure which often takes place, but which origin- 
ates in causes over which we can exert control. Let 
each of us examine our experience of the past, and 
say whether our every exertion of mind and body— 


246 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


and active life is full of exertion—when confined 
within due limits, has not been pleasurable. Does 
not a life of energy banish a whole array of evils 
to which a life of idleness is a prey? Will not the 
overwhelming majority of mankind testify that this 
has been their experience also? Let anyone who 
has attained to mature years calmly survey his past 
life, and ask himself whether, when he excludes from 
his estimate those sufferings over which he and 
others can exert control; and the various trifles, not 
worth a moment’s consideration, which embitter the 
lives of thousands ; the pleasures which have lain 
within his reach have not been out of all proportion 
greater than the pains which he has suffered? If 
so, this period of human life is desirable, and it 
is impossible that a limited number of apparent 
exceptions can outweigh the overwhelming evidence 
of benevolent purpose which it affords; but they 
must admit of an explanation which, if we could 
take a larger view of the Divine government than 
is at present open to our observation, would be 
found to be consistent with it. 

We have now arrived at the concluding period of 
life, which we designate old age, with respect to 
which the saying of the Psalmist, if not universally, 
is for the most part, true: “The days of our years 
are threescore years and ten, or even by reason 
of strength fourscore years, yet is their pride but 
labour and sorrow; for it is soon gone, and we fly 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 247 


away.” Far be it from me to say that this period 
of life is not attended with a considerable amount of 
happiness, especially when it is supported by bright 
prospects of a world beyond the grave in which sin 
and suffering will cease for evermore; but it is an 
unquestionable fact that those energies, which once 
were pleasurable, have with few exceptions become 
laborious. Not only is this so, but our bodies are so 
framed that, however long they may last under 
favourable conditions, they are destined ultimately 
to wear out; and death is the final result. Whether 
the act of dying, apart from the presence of disease, is 
painful it is impossible to say—probably it is not ; 
but the decay of our bodies for the most part 
weakens our mental powers, and greatly diminishes, 
if not destroys, the enjoyment which in the days of 
our strength resulted from their exercise. Peaceful 
extinction is, I own, under ordinary circumstances, 
the favourable side of the picture. Death is fre- 
quently preceded by long, painful, and wasting 
disease ; and in not a few cases with sufferings so 
acute that even the holiest of men have offered 
earnest prayer to God that He would grant them 
relief from their sufferings by death. Death also, 
at whatever period of life it may come, is usually 
preceded by painful disease. Such are the facts. 
From these the anti-Theist argues that it is incre- 
dible that such a condition of things can be the work 
of a God who is all-powerful, wise, and good. Could 


248 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


not such a being, if he exists, have so formed the 
human body, even if death were a necessary condition 
of his creative work, that it should be brought about 
with little or no suffering—at any rate, only with — 
suffering which has been self-caused ? How is it 
consistent with unlimited power and perfect goodness 
on the part of the Creator that the declining years 
of life should be, with such few exceptions, years of 
labour and sorrow? Is it not far more rational to 
believe that the state of things which actually exists 
has been brought about by the action of forces des- 
titute of any attribute which we designate moral, 
than that it is the work of an all-powerful, wise, and 
benevolent Creator ? 

Such objections may appear plausible to those 
who contemplate only one side of human life, namely, 
its sorrows and its sufferings; but it is impossible 
that they can outweigh the overwhelming evidence 
which every form of sentient life affords, of the 
existence of a God who is all-powerful, wise, and 
good. Unless, then, our reasoning powers are un- 
reliable, there must be some mode in which the 
existence of those things which appear to us to be 
evils, must be consistent with these attributes in the 
Creator. Surely, it is rational to believe that man 
with his limited faculties is unable to penetrate to 
the height, depth, and breadth of the plan of the 
Creator’s working ; but that this inability does not 
hinder us from forming a correct estimate of those 


POPULAR OBJECTIONS. 249 


parts of it which are evident and clear. That work 
extends from the eternity of the past to the endless 
ages of the future; its sphere is boundless space. 
Who, then, can embrace it in all its bearings ? That 
the existence of suffering which originates in other 
than moral causes has a purpose, we cannot doubt, 
though we cannot penetrate it here. I fully admit 
that if man perishes in the grave, the purpose which 
these sufferings subserve is inexplicable. It is only 
explicable in the light of a future state, when with 
an enlargement of our faculties and of our sphere of 
vision, that which is dark now may become clear 
hereafter. Until that day dawns, all that we can 
do is to exercise faith in that God who has filled 
the world with such innumerable proofs of His 
power, wisdom, and goodness, that He will do 
all things right; and when we contemplate what 
to us is inexplicable in the Divine government of 
the world, say with the Apostle: “O the depth of the 
riches both of the wisdom and the knowledge of 
God! how unsearchable are His judgements, and 
His ways past tracing out! For who hath known 
the mind of the Lord? or who hath been His 
counsellor ? or who hath first given to Him, and it 
shall be recompensed unto him again? For of Him, 
and through Him, and unto Him, are all things. To 
Him be the glory” unto theages of ages! Yes, truly, 
He has the ages of ages in which to work; and in 
them He can bring good out of apparent evil. Surely, 


250 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


then, it isin the highest degree rational to have faith 
in Him who has filled the world with such innumer- 
able manifestations of His power, His wisdom, and 
His goodness, that what at present seem to be 
blemishes in His creative and providential work 
will ultimately work out the purposes of His holy 
will 


Cla bad rea DIR © De 


THE OBJECTIONS WHICH ARE URGED AGAINST 
CHRISTIAN THEISM OWING TO THE EXISTENCE 
OF MORAL EVIL AND THE RESULTS WITH 
WHICH TeISSATTENDED. 


Bese can be no doubt that one of the greatest 

stumbling-blocks to ordinary people in the 
way of their accepting the teaching of Christianity 
respecting the character of God is the vast amount of 
moral evil which exists in the world, and the terrible 
consequences which, as far as we can at present 
discern, have resulted from it. I say “as far as we 
can at present discern,” because it is obvious that 
we have no right to assume that these will be the 
ultimate ones which will be realized by its permitted 
existence under the moral government of God, 
which with a view to my present argument I am 
entitled to take for granted will not be limited to the 
brief space of man’s continuance here. I fully admit 
that the difficulties are real, and that they have 
the appearance of considerable plausibility to those 
who have not given to this subject a careful 


252 CHRISTIAN THEISM., 


consideration. I propose, therefore, in the present 
chapter to consider the subject of moral evil, and 
the reasons why its existence is permitted, notwith- 
standing the results with which it has been attended. 
In doing so, it will be impossible to keep the subject 
of physical and moral evil entirely separate from one 
another, because it is unquestionable that by far the 
larger proportion of physical suffering owes its origin 
to moral causes, that is, to causes over which we 
ourselves can exert control, or which originate in 
the conduct of others, or in tendencies to evil trans- 
mitted from ancestors more or less remote. Few 
will question that the overwhelming mass of the 
misery from which man suffers is of his own creation, 
though we, as individuals, may not be responsible for 
its origination; and that not a little of it is the 
penalty which follows on the gratification of his evil 
appetites and passions, and suited to make him 
sensible of the evil of those unhallowed gratifications 
—one, therefore, which is deterrent and calculated 
to be remediable. There can be no doubt, if moral 
evil could be removed out of the world, the amount 
of suffering which originates in causes purely 
physical, would be reduced to dimensions which are 
comparatively small—at any rate small compared 
with the vast amount of enjoyment which, as I have 
proved in the last chapter, the phenomena of 
sentient life present. 


I will now state succinctly the chief objections, 


MORAL EVIEVAND ITS RESULTS. 253 


founded on the existence of moral evil and the 
amount of suffering which has resulted from it, 
which are urged by anti-Theists against the belief in 
the existence of a God who possesses the attributes 
which Christian Theism attributes to Him. 

It is objected— 

Peeilateitgiomineredipies tial asGodswho.is: all- 
powerful and all-good can have been the Creator of 
a world in which such amass of moral evil and 
suffering contingent on it exists. Could he not, if 
he is almighty, have prevented it ? and if he could, 
but has not, does it not prove, if a Creator exists, 
which is rendered more than doubtful, that he must 
be indifferent to the happiness of his creatures ? 

2. lhat even if ‘the existence jof ‘moral evil is a 
necessary condition of the creation of a free agent, 
might he not have caused that the amount of sin 
and suffering should have been far less than it is ? 
Is it not inconsistent with his holiness to allow 
moral evil to flourish as-it does, without adopting 
some more effectual means of openly showing His 
disapprobation of it? 

3. That inasmuch as every existing thing, whether 
it be the evil, or the good, is maintained in being 
by the energy of the Creator’s will; his holiness and 
his goodness require, even if the possible existence 
of moral evil is a necessity, that he should withdraw 
from those beings in whom it has taken root that 
energy by which he upholds in existence all created 


254 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


things, and thus cause everything which is evil to 
cease to be, and by this means prevent its indefinite 
multiplication. In a word, is not the suffering in 
the world which results from the existence of 
moral evil so vast, and its moral government so 
imperfect, as to prove, if a moral government 
exist at all, that it cannot be that of a being who 
is at the same time all-powerful, all-wise, all-holy, 
and _ all-good. 

Such are the chief objections which are urged by 
anti-Theists on moral grounds, in a great variety of 
forms, against the existence of a Creator who 
possesses the attributes which Christian Theism 
attributes to Him, and which severely try the faith 
of not a few sincere believers. Before I proceed to 
consider them in greater detail, it will be desir- 
able that I should offer a few general observations 
on them. 

(i) The creation of a finite being must necessarily 
lie open to a considerable number of objections, be- 
cause imperfection is inherent in the conception of 
the finite. Thus it is always possible that the most 
exalted finite being may think that it would have 
been better if it had been created higher and better 
still, and so on for evermore; for nothing can be 
perfect until the infinite is reached, which for a finite 
being is impossible. Consequently, if objections are 
urged against the existence of a God who possesses 
the attributes which Christian Theism attributes to 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 256 


Him on account of supposed imperfections which we 
think that we can discern in finite beings, it really 
means that they ought never to have been created. 
For the same reason, it would have been impossible 
for the Creator to have created beings of different 
orders, some of which are possessed of higher and 
others of lower endowments, because each inferior 
one might object that His work was imperfect 
in that He has made it what it is, and not invested 
it with the attributes of one of a higher order. The 
only question open for consideration is: Has the 
Creator provided each order of beings which He has 
created, with the means of happiness and enjoyment 
within the sphere of the faculties with which He has 
been pleased to endow them? To this question | 
think that I have returned a sufficient answer in the 
last chapter. 

(ii) It is important, in considering questions like 
the present, that it should be kept steadily in mind 
that the work of world-building, and the possibilities 
involved in it, is one which transcends the powers 
of human reason to determine what is possible, or 
Siescontiany aan Lhiseis obvious, for it is one which 
lies outside the range of human experience; and 
whatever the theorizer may imagine, it is impossible 
to apply a priori principles to the work in question: 
for these uniformly fail in matters which come 
within our experience to conduct us to the realities 
of things; and if they are thus unreliable in the 


256 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


case of things which come within our experience, 
how can they be reliable in things which transcend 
it? The discoveries of astronomy, to speak of no 
other science, have so disclosed the vastness of the 
universe as to make it evident that man’s finite 
intellect is incapable of fathoming the height and 
depth, the length and breadth, of the Creator’s 
plan, or to form a judgment, from the small portion 
of it which we behold, what will be its ultimate 
results. Surely, in view of its vastness, a less con- 
fident affirmation on the part of speculators as to 
how the creative plan might have been improved 
would not be unreasonable. A plan thus vast may 
be fully consistent with the temporary presence of 
evil which will be ultimately curable, or which will 
pass into non-existence when it has accomplished 
the work for which it has been permitted to exist, or 
with suffering which will hereafter be productive of 
greater good to the sufferer which could not be 
realized without it. 

(iii) When the Creator formed the purpose of 
creating the finite, He must have assigned limits 
to the exertion of His own omnipotence, for it is 
evident that the exercise of His power must: have 
been confined within the limits of His creative 
purpose, that purpose being the bringing into exist- 
ence of that which, from the conditions of the case, 
involved the production of beings in whom various 
degrees of imperfection must have been inherent. 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESOLLS, 257 


In other words, when He determined to create 
finite beings He entered into self-imposed con- 
ditions, and having judged these conditions to 
be wise and good, it is absurd to demand that 
He should violate them to meet our a priori 
speculations, 

(iv) It has often been assumed, as though it were 
an axiom, that the work of a perfect Creator must be 
perfect, that is, have no conceivable imperfection in it. 
Perfect I allow it must be, as far as the creative 
purpose is concerned, and that that purpose is holy, 
just, and good ; yet it by no means follows that this 
must be true of each creative act taken by itself, 
and without reference to the plan of which it forms 
a part. But of the nature of the instrumentality 
by which His purpose is capable of being realized 
we have no means of judging. But if we mean 
by perfect that every creative act, taken by itself, 
must realize our conception of absolute perfec- 
tion, then it would have been impossible that the 
creative and providential plan could have been a 
work extending throughout the ages, gradually 
advancing from lower to higher forms of being, and 
that beings, some of which were gifted with higher, 
and others with lower endowments could have 
been brought into existence. 

Who then, I ask, will venture to affirm that it 
would have been better if all rational beings had 
been made incapable of progress; or that the 


17 


258 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


present plan of creation, so vast as to exceed the 
powers of man to embrace it in its length, breadth, 
and depth, will not ultimately realize the highest 
purposes of holiness and benevolence ? We, in our 
impatience, are apt to forget that the Creator has 
ages of ages in which to work, and that we may 
have ages of ages in which to exist, during which 
He can bring good out of apparent evil. That He 
can do so is certain, for I shall show presently that 
the existence of moral evil is a necessary condition 
of the existence of moral agents, and that their 
existence is a necessary condition of the production 
of the highest form of good. If beings possessed of 
freedom had not been brought into existence because 
their creation involved the possibility of the intro- 
duction of moral evil into the world—then, nothing 
but beings who could only act as they were com- 
pelled to act; nothing which could choose good 
because it is good, nothing which could render a 
voluntary service ; nothing noble, nothing worthy of 
commendation, nothing pure, nothing lovely, no 
virtue, no self-sacrifice,—could have been brought 
into existence; but all agents would have been of 
the same dead level, incapable of a single elevated 
aspiration, or of a single affection which is spiritual 
or moral. 

(v) One further consideration requires notice. If 
free agency did not exist (and without it the exer- 
cise of intellectual power would be impossible), man 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS Ie Oy ONLY BS: 259 
would be incapable of exercising any command over 
the physical laws of Nature. Their action, when 
undirected by intelligent volition, as we see in the 
case of volcanoes, earthquakes, and other similar 
phenomena, is ofa very destructive character, But as 
the blind forces of Nature can only act in conformity 
with invariable law, when the law of their activity 
is discovered, the mode in which most of them act 
at any particular time and place is capable of being 
made a subject of certain calculation. This being 
so, when our intellect informs us that their action 
will be either dangerous or destructive, our posses- 
sion of the power of self-determination enables us 
to avoid crossing their path, or, by playing off one 
force against another, to avoid the danger which 
would result if their blind action was not interfered 
with by human agency. Man therefore, by the 
possession of this power, is able, within certain 
limits, to avert no small amount of the evil which 
would otherwise result from their uncontrolled 
activity. Further: It is the power of choosing 
between alternatives, united with the ability of 
concentrating our intellects on some particular 
subjects, and of withdrawing them from others, 
which enables man to compel the blind forces of 
Nature to execute the purposes of his will, and thus, 
instead of being his masters, to become his servants, 
All this would be impossible unless we were free, 
and not necessary agents; and, as I shall prove 


260 CHRISTIAN THEISM, 


presently, the possibility of the existence of moral 
evil, with all the consequences with which it is 
attended, is the necessary condition of the creation 
of a being who is a free, and not a necessary, agent. 
Will any rational being, I ask, when he considers 
the consequences which would be the result of 
filling the world with nothing but necessary agents, 
affirm that it would have been desirable that the 
Creator should have abstained from creating free 
agents, because His doing so involved the possibility 
of the introduction of moral evil into the world, 
with the consequences with which it has been 
attended ? 

The above considerations are amply sufficient to 
make a thoughtful man pause, before he ventures to 
affirm that the amount of suffering which exists is 
sufficient to invalidate the overwhelming mass of 
evidence, with which the universe is everywhere 
loaded, that it is the work of an all-powerful, wise, 
and benevolent Creator. I will now proceed to 
consider the fundamental principle on which the 
anti-theistic objections rest, the question of moral 
evil generally, and inquire whether its permitted 
existence is not the necessary condition of the 
existence of everything above the dead level of 
necessary agency; or, in plain words, whether it is 
not the necessary condition of everything which 
is elevated, noble, just, pure, deserving of praise, 
and of everything which we understand by the 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 261 


words, virtue, holiness, and benevolence. If this is 
so, and I think that the proof that it is so is over- 
whelming, then its permitted existence is a good— 
and if a good it is a proof of benevolent purpose in 
the Creator. 

In considering this subject, I shall assume that | 
have proved, in chapter viii. of this work, that free 
agency, in the sense in which we commonly use 
that term, is not a mere disguised form of necessary 
agency, as anti-Theists would endeavour to per- 
suade us; but a thing which actually exists, account 
for its origin as we may ; and that all their attempts 
to disprove its existence, or to explain it away, con- 
tradict the most certain intuitions of our conscious- 
ness. I shall, therefore, enter into no abstract 
questions about its origin, but I shall base my 
reasonings on 7s existence as a fact, the existence of 
which is not only testified to by our consciousness 
as individuals, but by the universal experience of 
mankind. The question, therefore, which we have 
to consider is, whether it is consistent with holiness 
and benevolent purpose in the Creator, to have 
created beings who are endowed with the power 
of choosing among different incentives to action 
which of them they will follow, subject to the con- 
dition of rendering the existence of moral evil 
possible. In investigating this subject let me 
remind the reader that although the objections of 
anti-Theists assume a variety of forms, all that is 


262 . CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


really salient in them may be expressed in two 
simple sentences-- 

1. If God is almighty, all-holy, and benevolent, 
and if sin and moral evil are hateful to Him, why has 
He not so constructed the world as to have rendered 
the intrusion of moral evil into it, with all its terrible 
consequences, impossible ? 

2. Inasmuch as -nothing is too hard for omnipo- 
tence to effect, it is inconceivable that a God exists, 
who permits the continued existence of wills which 
are antagonistic to His own. 

To these objections, at first sight so plausible, I 
answer, that it is possible for beings, even with our 
finite intellects, to conceive of things which it is 
impossible even for omnipotence to effect. As this 
is a point of the utmost importance in relation to our 
present argument, I must adduce a few obvious 
examples of such limitations. Thus, things being 
conditioned as they are, it is impossible even for 
omnipotence to make two straight lines which shall 
enclose a space; or a triangle, whose three angles 
shall not be equal to two right angles; or one, the 
two sides of which shall not be greater than its third 
side; or to cause that things which are equal to the 
same thing, should not be equal to one another; or 
that two and two should make five and not four, or 
that an event which is past should never have 
existed. 


In a word, it is no limitation to almighty power 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 263 


to affirm that it cannot work contradictions, and 
such things, and numerous others, involve contra- 
dictions. All that we mean when we attribute 
almighty power to God is, that He can do all things 
which are possible. Now the suggestion that it is 
possible to create a being who is free to choose 
the good, and who is not at the same time free to 
choose the evil, involves a direct contradiction ; for 
the conception of free agency involves the possession 
of a power of choosing between a number of alterna- 
tives ; but where a being can only act under compul- 
sion, or because it cannot act otherwise, there can be 
no choice, and a being who is impelled to choose the 
good only, and who cannot choose evil, that is, who 
can only act in conformity with what has been incor- 
rectly called the strongest motive, is no more a free 
agent than the force of gravitation. There can be 
no doubt that it was within the power of the Creator 
to have rendered the existence of moral evil impos- 
sible ; but this could only have been effected by His 
declining to create a moral being, that is, by His 
being satisfied with the services of beings which 
could not do otherwise than serve Him; who could 
not do His will because it is right to do it; who 
were incapable of feeling an affection towards Him 
who made them, of progress, or of obedience to a 
moral law. 

Let us consider, then, what would have been the 
consequence, if the existence of moral evil had 


264 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


been rendered impossible. |The world would have 
contained nothing but necessary agents, or, at 
best, of agents possessing no greater amount of 
intelligence, or freedom, than that of the most 
intelligent of animals, whose intellect and freedom of 
choice is evidently confined within limits so narrow 
that, if left to themselves, and not interfered with by 
a higher order of being, they would be utterly un- 
progressive, and continue precisely the same as they 
were when they were first brought into existence ; 
and if, as it is said, some of them possess the 
rudiments of a moral nature, it would continue 
undeveloped. Everything, therefore, in man which 
places him at the elevation which he occupies above 
the most intelligent of animals—an elevation so great 
that it is impossible to assign its limits—would have 
been non-existent. To put the distinction briefly: 
Man is capable of indefinite progress, both intellec- 
tually and morally; the noblest animals if left to 
themselves would continue for ever ‘stagnant ; and 
even that progress which some of them are capable 
of making, under the hand of man, is confined within 
limits so narrow, that they still continue, irrespon- 
sible for their actions ; or, in other words, no amount 
of education or training will convert the most intel- 
ligent of animals into a moral being. 

As this is a point of considerable importance in 
relation to our argument, let me illustrate it by two 
familiar examples—one which is capable of making 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 265 


a very limited progress when brought under the 
teaching of man, of whom he is the constant 
companion; and the other which is capable of 
performing operations which, if the result of an 
intelligence possessed by itself, would involve in- 
telligence of a high order, but which remains utterly 
unprogressive, 

The intelligence displayed by the dog within 
certain limits is great, but within these limits it is 
strictly confined. He may even be said to possess 
some rudiments of a moral nature; but these again 
are confined within such narrow boundaries that we 
never think of holding him responsible for his actions. 
He is capable of learning things under man’s teaching 
which he never could have learned by his own un- 
aided powers. That he possesses reasoning powers, 
not of universal application, but confined within 
certain narrow limits which he is unable to transcend, 
seems unquestionable. His devotion to his master 
is striking. Even when he beats him, he fawns 
submissively at his feet. He is capable of sacrificing 
himself for him, and even of pining away at his death. 
But he will serve with equal faithfulness the greatest 
saint and the greatest monster of iniquity. He is 
governed by his impulses ; he is unable to discrimi- 
nate between right and wrong. Notwithstanding all 
his devotion to his master, he cannot offer himself as 
a sacrifice either to him or to any other being 
because it is holy, just, and right that he should do 


266 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


so. His acts of this kind are not the result of 
choice, but of impulse. With all his intelligence he 
has never given an intelligent glance at the mighty 
heavens, though he bays at the moon. Surely no 
rational being would sacrifice the powers with which 
his free agency invests him at the cost of being 
reduced to a level of those of the dog, the horse, or 
the elephant. 

Let us now take another example from the working 
bee. Wonderful are its operations. In the formation 
of its cells, it has solved a difficult mathematical 
problem thousands of years before it was solved by 
man. In the construction of its combs, it is capable 
of deviating from their usual form, so as to meet 
certain emergencies arising from the nature of its 
abode. By its incessant labours it provides a 
store of provisions against a season when it can 
procure none. When by some untimely accident 
the hive has been deprived of its queen, it is capable 
of manufacturing a new one out of a grub which in 
ordinary course would produce a worker. If these 
and other operations involved on its part intellect 
or choice similar to that possessed by man, it is 
certain that its intellect must be of a very high order ; 
but yet so stupid is the insect that if it enters a 
room by an open window, and gets into another 
which is shut, it will continue vainly to buzz against 
the glass; for its intellect does not enable it to 
retrace its steps and escape by the one which is open. 


MORALZEVIE ANDATS RESULTS. 267 


Its devotion to its queen is admirable, its self- 
sacrifice for her is great; the hive bears the 
appearance of a well-ordered commonwealth, but all 
this involves no element which can be designated 
moral. Its stupidity on numerous points makes it 
certain that the intellect which it possesses is not its 
own, but that of another. Bees are precisely the 
same morally as they were three thousand years 
ago. Such, then, is the condition to which the world 
would have been reduced, if for the purpose of 
rendering the existence of moral evil impossible, 
the Creator had declined to create a free agent, or in 
other words a moral being. 

The demand, therefore, that the Creator should 
have rendered the existence of moral evil and the 
consequences which have resulted from it impossible, 
means that no being should have existed which 
could bow in lowly reverence before that power 
which built the universe, who could adore God 
because He is worthy of adoration, or love Him be- 
cause He is the embodiment of loveliness ; or who 
could choose the right in opposition to the strong, 
because it is right that that which is right should 
vanquish that which is strong. Where would have 
been the noble ? Where would have been the morally 
beautiful? Where would have been the sense of 
duty ? Where would have been the army of martyrs 
who, sooner than violate their conscience, have yielded 
up their lives to a torturing death ? Where would 


268 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


have been those who have striven (imperfectly I 
admit) to form in themselves something of the char- 
acter of Jesus Christ? Where, with all reverence 
be it spoken, would have been that glorious character 
itself, the contemplation of which has acted on the 
spiritual and moral world with a force similar to that 
exerted by the sun on the natural world, breathing 
into it life and energy, recovering the degraded from 
their degradation, and elevating the holy to higher 
degrees of holiness? If, for the purpose of rendering 
moral evil impossible, free agents had never been 
created, there would have been none to cry, “ Holy, 
Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty ;” none to exclaim, 
“Worthy is the Lamb;” none to acquiesce in the 
great declarations, ‘‘ Blessed are the meek; Blessed 
are the pure in heart ; Blessed are they who hunger 
and thirst after righteousness; Blessed are the 
merciful; Blessed are the peacemakers ; Blessed are 
they who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for 
theirs is the kingdom of heaven.” Nay, modern 
anti-theistic Altruism would have been impossible ; 
for not one of the qualities which it desiderates 
could have come into being. Who, I ask, can feel 
love for that which is not lovely, or for an agent who 
is incapable of acting otherwise than it does ? Many 
such agents exist who benefit us; the food which we 
eat is absolutely necessary for the support of our 
lives ; but who ever felt a feeling of gratitude, or 
thought of returning thanks either to it or them? If 


MOnAT EMIT NO TT SeRESULTLS, 269 


only necessary agents, or animals had existed, the 
existence of a moral world would have been im- 
possible ; and that the latter should exist without 
rendering the existence of moral evil possible involves 
a contradiction. 

The question at issue may be briefly stated thus: 
Was it desirable that free (that is, moral) agents 
should have been created with all the possibilities of 
moral evil which their creation involved, or that the 
world should have contained no higher order of 
beings than the highest animals? Few, I think, 
will affirm that this last alternative would have been 
the preferable one. I fully admit the terrible char- 
acter of moral evil, and the fearful results which it 
has wrought ; but the Creator, when He determined 
to create a finite moral agent, must have foreseen all 
the consequences which would result from His 
creating a being endowed with the power of choosing 
the evil, as well as the good. He must, therefore, 
have determined that it was right to do so, notwith- 
standing the consequences which He foreknew would 
follow. Who will venture to affirm that He was in 
error ? He must also have foreseen the remotest con- 
sequences of His creative acts, which we cannot; and 
known that He could work out from them results 
consistent with His holiness and benevolence. This 
Christianity affirms that He has provided the means 
of doing, and that this formed a part of that purpose 
which He purposed in Himself before the ages began. 


270 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


Into this subject space forbids that I should enter, but 
this is the proper place to ask the reader’s attention 
to it. It is true that an attempt has been made to 
explain these difficulties by throwing the blame of the 
apparent imperfections, the sin and suffering, with 
which the world abounds, on the imperfect action of 
the machinery by which it was brought into existence 
in its present form. But all that it succeeds in doing 
is to remove it a little from our view. Who, I ask, 
was the constructor of this machine? Did He not 
foresee all the consequences which would result from 
its working ? Must He not have stood by, without 
interfering, while these consequences were being 
ground out? View the subject as we may, the 
permitted existence of moral evil, and of the con- 
Sequences which have resulted from it, must have 
formed a portion of His creative plan, for every 
being, the holy, and the unholy, is upheld in exist- 
ence “every moment. by the energy of His’ ‘wills 
and if He were to withdraw that energy, both the 
one and the other would immediately pass into 
non-existence. 

The existence of moral evil, therefore, must be 
intended to realize some purpose for good which 
would be incapable of realization apart from its 
permitted existence. The most important of these, 
namely, the existence of a free agent, is one which lies 
clearly within our mental vision to see that it is pro- 
ductive of the highest good; and I have been careful 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 271 


to dwell on it in considerable detail, because, to those 
who have not carefully considered the subject, it forms 
the most plausible objection which the anti-Theist 
adduces against the existence of a holy and bene- 
volent Creator. Other reasons for its permitted 
existence [ shall point out presently. But I readily 
admit that the whole can only be fully known and 
rightly estimated when we can take a larger view of 
the Creator’s work, 

Here, then, is the legitimate place for faith, for 
surely it is not only religious, but in the highest 
degree rational, to trust that He who is doing innu- 
merable things on which our reason is fully com- 
petent to sit in judgment, is doing all things right, 
although there may be not a few things into 
the purpose of which our finite intellects cannot 
penetrate. Scientists ask us to have faith in the 
ultimate discoveries of science on points on which 
their present knowledge is imperfect. Is it, then, 
not rational, I ask, that we should have faith 
in God when some parts of His working, both 
in creation and providence, are inexplicable by 
our finite understandings? Let no one, however, 
draw the conclusion because the permitted exist- 
ence of moral evil forms a portion of the Creator's 
plan, that it is destined to exist for evermore in the 
universe which He has made. It has been, and still 
is, a popular belief that it will be so; but that belief 
has no foundation in reason and is nowhere affirmed 


272 CHRISTIAN THETSM. 


in revelation. On the contrary, there is much in 
the latter, unless language is used in a non-natural 
sense, which affirms the reverse. Moral evil, as I 
have shown, has a purpose for its permitted exist- 
ence, which it is fitted to realize. Who, then, will 
venture to affirm that when the end of its existence 
has been accomplished it will not cease to be, or 
that the Creator has not the means of winning 
back to Himself during the ages of the future 
the erring children who have revolted from Him 
heres, | 

_ Let us now consider the objections so often urged, 
that even if the creation of finite free agents involved 
the possible existence of moral evil, could not a 
Creator all-powerful, wise, holy, and benevolent have 
limited its amount and prevented it from casting such 
a blight on the world which He has made? Would 
it not have been better if He had removed out of 
existence every being which had become infected 
with evil, and thus prevented it from forming an 
environment of evil, by which this moral pestilence 
has been spread wider and wider? To many there 
can be no doubt that these objections seem plausible 
ones. 

To these objections I reply, that it is impossible to 
form a judgment as to the amount of moral evil of 
which it was consistent with the holiness and the 
goodness of the Creator to permit the existence, until 
we can comprehend His entire creative plan, and 


MORAL EVIL AND°ITS “RESULTS. o8 


know all the purposes which its permitted existence 
is intended to subserve. I have already proved that 
its existence has realized one of the highest purposes 
for good, namely, the rendering the existence of moral 
agents possible. But as to its amount, or the future 
purposes it is intended to subserve, our finite intel- 
lects are incapable of forming a judgment. With 
respect to the objection that it would have been 
better if He had caused it to pass out of existence as 
soon as it had become rooted in the world, I reply that 
its continued existence subserves valuable purposes 
in the formation of character, and that it would have 
been impossible for these to have been realized if it had 
been blotted out of existence as soon as it had become 
so. The, All-Holy will doubtless cause it to cease 
to exist when it has realized the purposes for which 
he has permitted it. Here, again, is rational ground 
for the exercise of faith, that He whose power and 
wisdom have built the universe, with all its wondrous 
adaptations, and whose goodness has provided sen- 
tient beings with such ample means of happiness and 
enjoyment—a happiness and enjoyment which would 
be all but complete if men would live in conformity 
with the principles of the moral law as enunciated 
by Jesus Christ,—has done, and will ultimately be 
proved to have done, all things in conformity with 
perfect holiness and benevolence, when we are 
capable of taking a more enlarged view of His 
creative and providential plan. Who i ask, when 


18 


274 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


we consider the limitation of our faculties, can justly 
venture to affirm that such faith is irrational? Surely 
not the scientist, who asks us to have faith that the 
discoveries of the future will fill up the gaps in his 
present knowledge. One thing we can see plainly, 
that as long as moral evil exists suffering is its just 
reward, and that the foreknowledge that suffering 
will be the certain result of sin is its chief deterrent. 
God, therefore, is holy and benevolent, who has 
bound the two together in inseparable union. 

I will now consider some of the other purposes 
which the existence of evil is fitted to subserve. 
In doing so I intend borrowing from a recently 
published work of Dr. Martineau, entitled A Study 
of Religion. The work in question is one of those 
which are addressed to a high class of thinkers. 
I shall, therefore, not quote from it verbatim, but 
endeavour to translate its leading thoughts into 
language more adapted to that class of readers 
for whom the present work is intended. Speaking 
of the additional sufferings which man undergoes, 
compared with those of the animal creation, the 
doctor observes— 


‘The additional dimensions which suffering gains 
in man beyond the limits of animal sensibility 
originate in our superior mental endowments. _ It is 
because we can see fore and aft from the point where 
we stand, because we have ever with us the possible 


MORATVEVIEVAND ITS RESULTS. 275 


as well as the actual, because the visible has no 
power to blot out the invisible from our thought, that 
with us no pang can be born or perish in a moment, 
It sends no notice of its approach, it leaves with us 
many a vestige of its departure ; far beyond the term 
of total eclipse it spreads a broad penumbra of 
mournful twilight. What, then, is the just inference 
from this? Would you renounce your reason that 
you might be saved your tears? Would you quit 
your many-chambered mind, and shut yourself up in 
a single cell, and draw down its blinds, and see no 
lightning, and know nothing until you are struck ? 
Further : Man’s power of self-consciousness enables 
him to concentrate his attention on a particular sub- 
ject in a manner which animals cannot. This power 
is the foundation of nearly all that is noble in him 
both in intellect and in character. We all know from 
experience that this power of concentrating our atten- 
tion on our pains greatly intensifies them. On the 
other hand, this act of concentration greatly intensi- 
fies our pleasures. [rom all these mighty endow- 
ments of man we must part if we would decline our 
heritage of pain. That heritage is the consequence of 
intellect, and cannot be resigned without forfeiting 
all that intellect brings. 

Suffering is the discipline through which our 
moral nature gains its true elevation. Not that 
the mere incidence of pain necessarily awakens the 
torpid conscience, or frees a man from the slavery 


276 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


of selfishness. No mere experience of sense can 
produce a moral result. Even in low types of 
mind, it is quite possible for it to dry up and 
harden the character. But although some charac- 
ters may do without it, and others may do nothing 
with it, it is true that you must seek for the 
greatest and best among those who have abounded 
in hardships, and who have passed through the 
discipline of struggling. Ease and prosperity may 
supply a sufficient school for respectable commoners, 
but without struggling and effort is no man ennobled, 
Every highest form of excellence rises from this 
dark ground, and emerges into its nobleness by 
the conquest of some severe necessity. In what 
Elysium would you find the patience and silent 
self-control of which every nurse can testify, or 
the fortitude in right, which even the rack cannot 
quench or the dungeon wear out, or the courage 
of the prophet to fling his Divine word before the 
wrath of princes or the mocking of the people ? 
It will doubtless be urged that these are superfluous 
virtues, their value being only relative against the 
evils which they lessen. But is this true? Is the 
man who has never been subdued to patience 
braced to fortitude, fired with heroic enthusiasm, 
as strong, as noble, as free, as he who has been 
schooled in self-sacrifice and self-denial? These 
qualities do more than conquer the besetting evil: 
they add a cubit to the moral Stature ; they clear 


MORAI MELE ANDAs RESULTS: 27 


“I 


the vision, they refine the thought, they animate 
the will. So that there is not a duty, however 
simple, which does not win from them a_ fresh 
grace; and if to our chastening we must thus 
acknowledge this personal debt, it is equally certain 
that the sufferings of others speak with an indis- 
putable appeal to our affections, and awaken in us 
a disinterestedness else impossible. Deeply sunken 
must be that moral nature in which they do not 
call into active energy something which is good. 
It is in the presence of sorrow and of suffering 
that we forget ourselves, and in many a home the 
crippled child or the disabled father has trained to 
sobriety and tenderness the habits which would 
otherwise have been self-seeking and _ frivolous. 
The noble army of benefactors to mankind consists 
of men and women whose hearts have been pene- 
trated by a deep feeling of compassion; and who 
have offered themselves up in self-sacrifice to relieve 
others from suffering and to rescue them from sin. 
Is there not something in this inherently noble? 
Could we well spare such characters in a world 
where there is neither physical nor moral evil? 
Are they mere instruments for getting rid of this 
or that evil from the world, and have they nothing 
morally beautiful, nothing glorious in themselves ? 
It is their depth of character which comes home 
to us with power. 

“But further still—apart from its sorrow, the 


CEN 


278 CHRISTIAN. THEISM., 


heart would seldom find its rest in God. Even 
the cynic feeds his cynicism in the fact that men 
betake themselves to religion when they have lost 
all besides. He sees aright, but he gives the 
meaning wrong. He thinks it some mean fear 
which brings forth the sufferer’s prayer, and takes 
it as a proof that religion is nothing but the lowest 
dregs of life, when the generous wine is all drained 
off, And so it would be if the sole reality lay in 
temporal well-being. But what does the experience 
of those whose lives have been a course of unbroken 
prosperity testify, and who have had no experience 
of struggles, disappointments, or of suffering ? For 
the most part they fondly imagine that, after having 
amply provided themselves with the means of en- 
joyment for many years, that they will have nothing 
to do during the remainder of their lives but ‘to 
eat, drink, and be merry,’ or, in other words, enjoy 
themselves according to their respective tastes. But 
does it not for the most part happen that such per- 
sons speedily become sated, unable to kill time, 
devoured by ewvmnuz, and, like the author of the 
Book of Ecclesiastes, after having tried the whole 
range of enjoyment within the reach of man, ex- 
claim in bitterness of spirit, ‘ Vanity of vanities ; 
all is vanity’? But when such an one has been 
awakened from this baseless dream by the advent 
of suffering, sorrow, and disappointment, the inner 
and the outer depths of the realities of things become 


MORATREVHETAN DD. TISVRESOLTS, 279 


open to his vision; and thus it becomes revealed to 
him that there is an infinite reality beyond the 
present and the visible, that is, God, in whom 
alone can be found rest and peace. ‘Thus, instead 
of passing away from actualities, the worldly pro- 
sperous man for the first time discovers them, and the 
foot which once blindly attempted to support itself 
on the shifting sandbank, as though it were solid 


ground, at last rests upon the rock.” 


The demand which has been made that the Creator, 
if He is all-powerful and benevolent, ought to have 
made sin and suffering impossible, I shall answer 
by quoting another passage from the profound 
thinker above referred to, with only a few omis- 
sions and alterations as are necessary for accom- 
modating it to my present purpose, which will leave 


the sense intact. 


“The Creator might have certainly effected this, 
but only by substituting mechanism for free agency: 
It is only by abstaining from predetermining neces- 
sity, and allowing room for preferential choice, that 
He renders the existence of character, and the test- 
ing of fidelity a possibility. In virtue of this 
eMnenceme ee isatic  calsc#oOumticaexistencemoOL 
character; but not the cause of what that character 
shall be. Thus a universe which no sin could 
invade, would be one in which no character could 


exist ; and in insisting that every access should be 


280 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


shut against moral evil, we ask that the holiness 
of God should cancel its own conditions. It is 
because He is holy, and cannot be content with an 
unmoral world, where all perfection is given and 
none is earned, that He refuses to render guilt 
impossible and inward harmony mechanical. If 
He were only benevolent, it might suffice to fill 
creation with the pleasures of sentient existence ; 
but, being holy too, He wills that beings should 
exist capable of determining themselves by a free 
preference to the life which He approves; and 
preference there cannot be unless the path is open 
to choose the evil as well as the good. To set up, 
therefore, an absolute barrier against the admission 
of wrong, would reduce human life to a kind of 
menagerie, instead of allowing it to culminate in a 
moral society. 

“Would, then, the objector prefer that vice and 
wrong should produce happiness, or would he have it, 
make no difference to the external condition of man- 
kind, whether greed and licentiousness prevail, or 
disinterestedness and purity ? Surely the entail of 
suffering on moral evil is the indispensable expression 
of a righteous administration of things. Sin being 
in the world, it would be monstrous that there should 
be no suffering : and would more than justify the com- 
plaint which is not unfrequently raised against the in- 
sufficiency of the punishment which overtakes human 
transgression, expressed in the words: ‘ Because 


MOTALS PVA IEANDAIT SSRES OLLS. 281 


sentence against an evil deed is not executed speedily, 
therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set 
in them to do evil.’ The incidence of such suffer- 
ing may doubtless at times be open to wonder and 
criticism ; it may fall on the innocent, and seem to miss 
its proper aim. But its existence and its amount are 
only what must be expected in a state of being in 
which the character is to bear its consequences. The 
question which presses on us is not, How does it 
consist with the benevolence of God to admit so much 
morally incurred pain ? but, How does it consist with 
the holiness of God to admit so much unholiness 
in human life ?” 


The fundamental principles involved in the answer 
to this last question have been already virtually met 
in the course of the previous arguments, I shall, 
therefore, only offer on them a few brief remarks. As 
I have already observed, the determination of the 
Creator to create finite free agents, involved the pos- 
sibility of the existence of moral evil, and of all the 
consequences which result from it—it involving a 
contradiction to create a being capable of freely 
choosing the right, without at the same time render- 
ing possible its choosing the wrong; just as it 
involves a contradiction to affirm that it is possible 
to form a surface which is convex, without at the 
same time involving the possible existence of a surface 
which is concave. When, then, it is asked, with so 


282 CHRISTIAN LHLISIiz: 


much apparent plausibilty, why did not the Creator, 
all-powerful and beneficent, so constitute the world 
as to have rendered the existence of moral evil 
impossible, attention cannot be too strongly drawn 
to the fact that if free agents are to exist, the demand 
that He should do so involves a demand that He should 
work contradictions, a thing which even omnipotence 
cannot effect. Who, then, I ask, will venture to 
affirm that the Creator has acted contrary to His 
holiness, or His benevolence in creating free agents ? 
Is not free agency the source of everything which is 
holy, of everything which is morally beautiful in 
the universe? Would any free agent be content to 
sacrifice his free agency at the price of being con- 
verted into an animal, or a machine? It has been 
shown, in the course of the previous reasonings, that 
the pain, the suffering, and the struggles, which 
result from the existence of moral evil, tend not only 
to the formation of character, but to the production 
of everything which is noble in it; and so far work 
out results which are in the highest degree desirable. 
What would each of us be, if we had been born and 
brought up ina state of things in which no effort 
was necessary ; in which there was nothing to con- 
tend against, and no difficulty to be surmounted ? 
Obviously we should have been beings destitute of 
character, and of every quality which is noble. 

The only open question, therefore, is: Ought a 
God who is holy to tolerate the mass of wickedness 


MORALSEVALEA NDTIS RESULTS. 283 


with which human life abounds ? or could He not 
have limited its amount? One limit he has assigned 
to it. A moral being in whom conscience has become 
extinct, the impulses supreme, and the will power- 
less, has really ceased to be a moral agent, and 
has sunk to the level of an animal. Beyond this 
he cannot go in his wickedness. But it may be 
urged, Ought not narrower limits to have been 
assigned to it? To this I answer that on this 
point we are incapable of judging, because with 
our limited faculties we cannot penetrate all the 
purposes which its permitted existence is intended 
to subserve, or to grasp with our finite intellects 
the creative and providential plan. One thing only 
can be affirmed for certain, that it is inconsistent 
with the character which Christian Theism attri- 
butes to God, that He should permit the endless 
existence of wills standing in direct opposition to 
His own. 

Similar is the teaching of Christianity respecting 
the uses, which the struggles, the temptations, and 
the sufferings to which we are exposed are intended 
to be subservient. To adopt the words of an Apostle 
who suffered far more than falls to the lot of ordi- 
nary Christians, “ Our light affliction, which is for the 
moment, worketh for us more and more exceedingly 
an eternal weight of glory.” What glory? Not the 
glory of a halo of brightness emitted from us, or 
shining around us; but the glory of a higher and 


284 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


higher spiritual and moral elevation, for the only 
things which are truly glorious are the moral per- 
fections which are exhibited in the character of 
Jesus Christ. That such is the end which these 
‘things are intended to subserve is the affirmation 
of every one of the sacred writers; and the only 
limit which they recognize is, the attainment to the 
measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. Nay, 
one of them has even gone further, and affirmed 
that Jesus Christ Himself, ‘‘ learned obedience by the 
things which He suffered ;” “that He was made 
perfect through suffering ;” and “‘in that He Him- 
self hath suffered being tempted, He is able to 
succour them that are tempted.” If this is true of 
Him who was perfect man, how much more true 
must it be of those who are not only imperfect men, 
but whose animal appetites tempt to the indulgence 
of that which is sinful and evil! 

The importance of the subject which we have 
been considering in this and the previous chapter 
will render it desirable that before concluding I 
should set before the reader the chief points 
which have been established in the course of the 
argument, which throw light on the difficulties with 
which the existence of physical and moral evil is 
alleged to be attended. 

1. When we consider the vastness of the universe, | 
the small portion of it which is accessible to our 
observation, and the limited nature of our faculties, 


MORALS EVIEVAND ITS*RESULTS. 285 


it is reasonable to expect that portions of the 
creative plan, and of its providential government, 
may contain difficulties, and that things may exist 
the uses of which we are unable to explain. But 
when we consider their limited number, compared 
with the numberless indications of power, wisdom, 
and goodness with which the universe is everywhere 
loaded, these entirely overbalance the weight of 
the objections against Christian Theism which are 
founded on the difficulties in question; and afford 
rational ground for believing, and even feeling 
assured, that what is inexplicable now, when we 
are capable of taking an enlarged view of God's 
creative and providential plan, which the Christian 
revelation promises that we shall be hereafter, will 
be found to be consistent with every attribute which 
Christian Theism attributes to Him. 

2. That the amount of suffering which originates 
in moral causes, that is, in causes over which man 
can exert control, is out of all proportion greater 
than that which originates in causes which are 
purely physical. 

3. That the sufferings which originate in causes 
which are purely physical, arise from the fact that 
the Creator has seen good to act in His work of 
creation and providence through the agency of forces, 
which can only energize'in conformity with a law 
from which they cannot deviate, and that this purpose 
is a wise one is evident, for if these forces were 


286 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


made to vary in their action so as to avert the 
consequences which result to man, whenever he 
happens to cross their path, these interferences would 
be so numerous as to render the mode of their 
action at any particular time and place incapable 
of calculation, and that this condition of things, if it 
did not render human life impossible, would throw 
it into a state of hopeless confusion. On the other 
hand the action of these forces being calculable, no 
small portion of the evils which arise from the 
present mode of their activity are capable of being 
avoided by prudent calculation. 

4. That pleasure and pain are so closely correlated 
together, that it is extremely doubtful whether the 
demand that a nervous system could be so con- 
structed, which was capable of producing pleasure, 
and not under altered conditions be capable of 
producing pain, would not involve a contradiction. 
Further : That pain in very numerous cases acts as a 
warning against danger; and when it does so, it is 
undeniable that its existence is attended with results 
which are highly beneficial, and therefore consistent 
with benevolent purpose. 

5. That the happiness and enjoyment of which 
the phenomena of sentient life prove the existence 
is out of all proportion greater than the amount 
of suffering which arises from physical and moral 
causes united ; and that this disposes of the objection 
which is urged against the benevolence of the 


MORAL Hie ANDVLLESURESULTS: 287 


Creator on the ground of the large amount. of 
suffering which unquestionably exists; and conse- 
quently that the existence of suffering in individual 
cases for which with our present knowledge we are 
incapable of assigning a reason, must be capable 
of explanation on grounds which are consistent with 
His benevolence, if.we were capable of taking a 
more extended view of His creative and providential 
plan, and of the ultimate results which it is calcu- 
lated to realize. 

The following points relate to the existence of 
moral evil, and to them I ask the reader’s careful 
consideration. 

1. That the idea that it is possible to create 
a being who is capable of choosing the good, but 
who is so constituted as to be incapable of choosing 
evil, is no less a contradiction than that it is 
possible to form a convex surface, and at the 
same time to render the formation of a concave one 
impossible. 

2. That the demand that the Creator should 
have rendered the existence of moral evil with 
all the consequences which have resulted from it 
impossible, and yet that He should have created 
beings capable of self-determination, free agency, 
and with an intelligence such as that possessed 
by man, is a demand that He should work con- 
tradictions, which, with all reverence be it spoken, is 
a thing which not even omnipotence can effect. 


288 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


3. That if the existence of moral evil had been 
rendered impossible, the world would have contained 
no higher order of being than necessary agents 
and the most intelligent of animals. In a word, no 
being possessed of a spiritual and moral nature 
could have been brought into existence. 

4. That this being so, it was calculated to effect 
the highest purposes of holiness and benevolence 
to create agents who possessed all those endowments 
which we include under the terms “ rational,” “ intel- 
lectual,” “ spiritual,” and “moral,” notwithstanding 
all the consequences with which the Creator must 
have foreseen that the creation of such beings might 
be attended. 

5. That the present constitution of things in 
which the evil is inexplicably mingled with the good, 
and the struggles and exertion rendered necessary 
by it, is one which tends to the development 
of everything in human nature which we include 
under the terms great, noble, elevated, to the form- 
ation of character, and even of those milder virtues 
which we designate saintly. 

6. That these things being so, the permitted 
existence of moral evil is consistent with perfect 
holiness and benevolence in the Creator, and that 
it by no means follows that its existence will be 
endless. 

I by no means affirm that these considerations 
solve all the difficulties of the problem; _ but 


MORAL EVIL AND ITS RESULTS. 289 


those which they do solve—and they are not few— 
afford ample ground for believing that those which 
with our limited knowledge we cannot solve are 
solvable; and that the thing necessary to render 
them so is an enlarged view of God’s creative and 
providential plan. 

Yet if it is true, as many not a little eminent in 
philosophy and science have ventured to affirm, that 
man is destined to perish with the dissolution of his 
body, I fully admit that it is impossible to vindicate 
the present moral government of the world ; for, in 
that case it is a mass of confusion which hopelessly 
confounds human reason, holding out no hope of 
its future rectification; the existence of suffering 
and sorrow would subserve no purpose which is 
beneficial, or tending to ultimate good; and the 
elevation of character, and the moral qualities which 
the discipline of life is calculated to generate by 
means of many a hard struggle with temptation, and 
with many a trial, would come into existence merely 
after a short interval to cease to be. This opens 
to us the question of man’s survival, and the 
possibilities involved in it, a point which I propose 
to consider in the following chapter. 


19 


CHAPTER XI. 


THE QUESTION WHETHER WE HAVE REASON FOR 
BELIEVING THAT WE SHALL SURVIVE Gee 
DISSOLUTION ..OF OUR (BODIES; \AND@Siis 
BEARING ON THE PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS, 


NEED hardly remind the reader how important 

is the bearing of this question on the subject 
we have been discussing in the previous chapters. 
If man perishes at death, it is impossible to deny 
that the present state of things, including the moral 
government of the world, is exceedingly imperfect. 
But if, on the other hand, this life is only the com- 
mencement of his existence, infinite possibilities would 
then lie open during the ages of the future, in the 
light of which we must form our estimate of his 
present condition. It will be necessary, therefore, 
before bringing this work to a conclusion, that I 
should point out the fallacies which underlie the 
anti-theistic position that man perishes with the 
dissolution of his body; and state the reasons on 
which we believe that our conscious personality will 
survive the stroke of death. 


MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 291 


If, then, the anti-theistic position is true that 
man perishes with his body, in what state would 
it place the proof given in the previous chapters 
of the existence of a God who possesses the 
attributes which Christian Theism attributes to 
Him? In them it has been proved from our 
intuition of causation, that the existence of a First 
Cause of the Universe is a necessity of thought ; 
from its adjustments, adaptations, and correlations, 
that its First Cause must be a being possessed 
of boundless power and intelligence; and from 
the moral nature of man, combined with the 
marks of regard for the happiness of His creatures, 
which are manifested in His creative works, that 
He must be a being possessed of the attributes 
which Christian Theism ascribes to God. These 
proofs, as I have already observed, stand on 
wholly independent grounds, and are not touched 
by the objections urged by anti-Theists on the 
ground of the existence of physical and moral evil. 
On the other hand, it is impossible to deny, if 
man’s existence is limited to the present life, that 
the difficulties in question are incapable of explana- 
tion; and the moral government of the world 
incapable of vindication as holy, just, and good. 
Our argument, then, would be placed in the following 
position: Between the reasons for believing in the 
existence of a God, who possesses the attributes 
which Christian Theism attributes to Him, and the 


292 CHRISTIAN. THEIS™, 


difficulties in question, our reason would be hope- 
lessly confounded. 

This being so, it will be necessary that I should 
set before the reader the chief reasons on which 
the anti-Theist founds his affirmation that man per- 
ishes at death, and endeavour to test their validity, 
before I set forth the grounds on which we believe 
that this life is only the commencement of his 
personal conscious existence, and that all that death. 
effects is to translate him into a state of existence 
under different conditions. 

The anti-theistic position, briefly stated, is as 
follows— 

The brain thinks—that is, that it is not only the 
organ of thought, but that it generates thought, to- 
gether with that which we designate consciousness ; 
our highest aspirations, our intellectual powers, and 
our moral nature; in fact, everything which we 
include under the words “ mind,” ‘‘soul,” and “spirit.” 
Consequently, all thought is the result of the arrange- 
ment and of the motions of the particles of matter 
which compose our brains. What, then, are the 
facts which are adduced as affording proof of this 
position ? 

1. That the phenomena which come under our 
observation prove that the power of thinking is the 
exclusive possession of beings who possess brains ; 
or, to put the position tersely, where there is no 
brain, there is no thought. 


MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 293 


2. That the power of thinking varies with the 
size of the brain and the nature and arrangement 
of the matter which composes it. 

3. That diseases and malformation of the brain 
affect our power of thinking, producing at the one 
extreme mania, and at the other idiotcy ; and that 
our mental powers are variously affected by certain 
forms of nervous and bodily disease. 

4. That every act of thinking is attended with a 
corresponding motion in the brain. 

5. That the loss of certain of its parts renders 
thought, and that of certain other parts sensation, 
impossible. 

6. That when the brain is completely at rest, 
in other words sound asleep, thought ceases. 

7, That a power of thinking, apart from the 
possession of a brain, and independent of its ac- 
tivity, has never come within the range of human 
experience. 

8. That several of the reasons which have been 
urged as affording proof that man will survive the 
dissolution of his body are equally valid to prove 
the survival of animals. 

These are the chief grounds which are adduced as 
affording proof that mind and brain are identical ; 
and it is justly urged that, if they are identical, it 
affords conclusive proof that our personal conscious 
existence must perish with the dissolution of our 
bodies. Others have been added, but it will 


204 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


be unnecessary to draw the reader’s attention to 
them ; because, if those mentioned above fail to prove 
it, it will scarcely be contended that the others are 
sufficient to support the weight of the argument. 
The general truth of the facts above enumerated I 
shall not dispute; but I deny that they justify the 
inference which is drawn from them, namely, that the 
brain generates thought, and that when the brain 
perishes our conscious personality, the existence of 
which constitutes the highest certitude of which we 
are capable, perishes likewise. 

I observe, therefore, that it by no means follows, 
because as far as our present experience goes, 
thought is the exclusive possession of beings who 
possess brains, that that within us which thinks, 
namely, our conscious personality, must cease with 
their dissolution. To affirm that the only condi- 
tion under which thinking is possible is that of an 
organized brain is to assert that which it is im- 
possible to prove. Before this can be proved, the 
reasons which I have given, in the course of the 
previous arguments, for believing that blind matter 
and force incapable of self-direction cannot by any 
amount of interaction produce an adaptation or a 
moral agent must first be answered. It is simply 
absurd to affirm that life can only exist under the same 
conditions as those under which it exists in this planet. 
This being so, there is nothing irrational in assuming 
that thought and personality may do so likewise. 


MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 295 


What, then, do the facts prove which I have enu- 
merated above ? I answer this, and nothing more, that 
as we are at present constituted, mind, brain, and 
the nervous system are most intimately correlated to 
one another in a manner analogous to the correla- 
tions which exist between the vocal organs, the ear, 
the atmosphere, the brain, and the mind; so that 
the one cannot act in the production of sound, lan- 
guage, or thought without the other; or as the 
sun, the ether, the eye, the brain, and the mind 
are correlated to one another, so that apart from 
‘their conjoint action, neither the one nor the other 
could produce what we designate “ vision.” All, then, 
that the facts adduced by the anti-Theist prove 1s, 
that the mind, the brain, and the nervous system are 
so adjusted to one another that the mind can only 
act through the instrumentality of the brain ; and 
that the nervous system cannot be set in action 
without producing motions in the brain, which mo- 
tions the mind translates into sensations, thoughts, 
and ideas. It follows, therefore, that the facts 
which are adduced by the anti-Theist as affording 
proof that the personal existence of which we are 
conscious during life perishes at death, prove 
nothing one way or the other, but leave the ques- 
tion whether it will survive- the dissolution of the 
body, untouched. 

Let us now consider the reasons on which our belief 
‘nits survival is founded. In doing so, I shall not 


296 CHRISTIANS IIEISE, 
trouble the reader with a number of metaphysical 
arguments which, in former times, have been adduced 
as affording proof of this position. My own opinion 
is that our knowledge of the ontology of mind is far 
too limited, even if such knowledge lies within man’s 
powers to attain, to enable us to found on it an 
argument which is really reliable ; certainly not one 
which will bring conviction to those who have never 
studied such questions. 

Two of the reasons for believing that the con- 
scious beings which we designate ourselves, will 
survive the dissolution of our bodies I have had 
occasion to refer to in the course of the previous 
arguments. J must, at the risk of repetition, 
point out their bearing on the subject we are now 
considering. 

(i) While it forms a certitude, than which we 
possess none stronger, that we have continued the 
same beings from the earliest dawn of our conscious 
existence, yet scientists assure us that it is an un- 
questionable fact that our entire bodies have not 
only been in a state of constant change, but that in 
the case of those who have attained mature life, that 
they have changed several times over. This being 
so, it follows that our conscious personality must be 
something distinct from the matter which composes 
our brains, for the one is the subject of continual 
change; the other changes not. If, then, our per- 
sonality, that is, we ourselves, have survived every 


MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 297 


change through which not only our brains but our 
bodies have passed; if it is true that there is not a 
single particle in our present bodies which was in 
those which we possessed, say, thirty years ago; 
there can be no reason for believing that their dis- 
solution will cause the dissolution of our conscious 
personality. On the contrary, its persistence during — 
this course of years, amidst all the changes through 
which our bodies (including our brains) have passed, 
affords the strongest reason for believing that it will 
continue to persist after their dissolution. It is 
probably owing to the strength of this argument that 
those who affirm that man perishes with the dissolu- 
tion of his body, have propounded the theory that 
that which we imagine to be our permanent existence, 
is nothing but a succession of states of conscious- 
ness. The untenableness of this theory | have 
already sufficiently exposed. 

(ii) I have observed in a previous chapter that the 
affirmations of our consciousness respecting the 
reality of our moral nature, such as it is there 
described, prove that there is something within us 
distinct, and wholly different in character, from the 
particles of matter which compose our bodies. If 
this distinction is real, there can be no reason why 
the dissolution of our bodies should involve the dis- 
solution of our personality. On the other hand, as 
it is one of our highest certitudes that our moral 
being has been persistent through the various 


298 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


changes of our bodies, there is every reason to 
believe that it will continue to persist after their 
dissolution. That our moral being does thus persist 
is proved not only by the direct testimony of our 
consciousness, but from the fact that we both feel 
responsible, and are held responsible by others, for 
actions done in the distant past. 

(iii) The next argument which I shall adduce is 
from the greatness of man’s powers, and from the 
imperfect sphere which this life affords for their 
exercise and development. It may be briefly stated 
thus— 

I have proved in the course of the preceding 
reasonings that the adjustments, adaptations, and 
correlations with which the universe everywhere 
abounds, that its Creator must possess an intelligence 
to which it is impossible to assign limitations ; and 
that He must have had a definite purpose in creating 
a being such as man. How, then, stand the facts? 
Man has been brought into existence, in possession of 
various faculties, some of which are of a very high 
order, and all capable of a higher development. But 
so short and uncertain is the duration of human life, 
that a large portion of mankind are cut off in infancy ; 
others in early youth; others when, after a painful 
training, they have become fitted to enter on the 
work of life; others in the midst of their highest 
usefulness ;—and even at best the period of man’s 
activity, compared with the powers with which he is 


MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 299 


endowed, is very brief. Has, then, the all-wise 
Creator endowed mankind, and especially that portion 
of them that I have just mentioned, with these various 
faculties and powers, in order that they may vanish 
like a dream ? Has He placed others in situations 
of the highest usefulness, and endowed them with 
powers fitted for their work, in order that they might 
vanish from the scene immediately on entering on 
the work for which they were pre-eminently fitted ? 
Has He endowed others with the highest aspirations 
of which our moral nature is capable in order that 
they might shine forth as a meteor and disappear 
for evermore? If, then, the Creator must have had a 
purpose in bringing man into existence ; and if that 
purpose has been directed by a wisdom to which it 
is impossible to assign limitations ; that purpose must 
fail of its accomplishment, if a large portion of man- 
kind come into existence, and perish before their 
faculties are matured; and another portion of them 
before they can effect anything, which the faculties 
with which they are endowed are pre-eminently 
fitted to accomplish. It may be urged that we 
cannot fathom the purposes of the Creator. This 
is undoubtedly true of the length and breadth of His 
creative work ; but we are fully competent to judge 
if man passes out of existence before he can exert 
those faculties with which he is endowed, that his 
creation involves a purposeless expenditure of power, 
or a lack of wisdom on the part of his Creator. But 


300 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 
this is impossible. Death, therefore, cannot be the 
termination of man’s existence, but a removal into a 
sphere of action, where he will find an opportunity 
for the exercise of those powers, which, for reasons 
into which we cannot penetrate, have been denied 
him here. 

(iv) The next argument which I shall adduce is 
founded on the fact that in no small number of 
cases man’s intellectual powers and moral affections 
continue in full vigour up to the time immediately 
preceding the dissolution of his body. I fully allow 
that in the great majority of cases the wear of ad-- 
vancing years, increasing weakness, disease, and 
suffering, are attended with a gradual decay of 
our intellectual powers, and with a weakening of 
the energies of our moral nature; and that it not 
unfrequently happens that during some interval 
before death, both fall into a state of stupor. If 
this were universally the case, I admit that the 
position that the death of the body involved the 
dissolution of our conscious existence would not 
be without plausibility. But the fact is far other- 
wise. Numerous cases unquestionably occur, in 
which the intellect has continued as bright, and 
the affections as strong, immediately before death 
as they have been at any period during life. 
Not only does death not unfrequently occur sud- 
denly in the midst of man’s activities; but even 
when it has been preceded by wasting disease, 


MAN'S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 301 


the intellect has continued as clear, and the affec- 
tions as strong, up to the moment of death, as they 
have been at any time during the days of bodily 
health and vigour. This being so, it follows that 
the diseases which have worn out the body, have 
failed to wear out the mental powers. It will doubt- 
less be objected that such cases are rare. Granted ; 
but though rare, they unquestionably exist, and the 
fact of their existence is all that is required for 
my present argument. Is it credible, I ask, that 
the powerful intellect, the warm affections, and, I 
will add, the ardent faith, which were in active 
energy up to the time of death, have passed into 
non-existence ? or that those forces which have 
gradually worn the body out, but in doing this 
have left the mental powers untouched, should be 
able to cause them to pass into non-existence in an 
instant ? 

What, then, do we know, and what do we not know, 
respecting death? This is a very important ques- 
tion, because, where knowledge founded on facts is 
wanting, imagination too frequently attempts to fill 
up deficiencies. Of the real nature of life we are 
profoundly ignorant. Many theories respecting it 
have been propounded, but they are theories only. 
Equally ignorant are we of the ultimate nature of 
mind. Both remain at the present day as profound 
mysteries as they were at the earliest dawnings of 
philosophic thought. ‘This being so, it is impossible 


302 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


to prove, though it is easy to affirm, that death is the 
destruction of our conscious personality. All that 
we know about it is its outward phenomena, namely, 
that it suspends the manifestation of every pre- 
viously existing power; and that it liberates the 
chemical forces which were previously held in check 
by the vital ones, so that they are able without 
hindrance to effect the dissolution of our bodies. 
But on our mental powers, the forces which destroy 
the body are powerless to act. Death, it is true, 
removes them from the sphere of our cognizance, 
When it takes place, those powers which a minute 
before death were in lively exercise have vanished 
in a moment; but that it has destroyed them there 
is not a tittle of evidence, except on the assumption 
that brain and mind are identical; and that the 
death of the one involves the destruction of the 
other. But this is the very thing which scientific in- 
vestigation has failed to prove. Still more, eminent 
unbelieving scientists have candidly admitted that, 
as far as scientific investigation has yet penetrated, 
it affords no means of explaining how motions—the 
only things of which we have a certain knowledge 
that the brain is capable—are translated into thoughts. 
In a word, motion is destitute of a single element of 
thought. 

(v) We now come to the most important of all the 
reasons on which our belief in man’s survival after 
death is founded—the moral argument. While I set 


O 


Oo 


MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 


| Y 2 


it before the reader, I must ask him steadily to keep 
in mind that the belief in the existence of a God, 
who possesses a power and wisdom to which it is 
impossible to assign limitations, and who is a Moral 
Being and the Moral Governor of the Universe, can 
now no longer be viewed as an open question, 
but must be assumed to have been proved by the 
arguments adduced in the previous chapters. I, 
therefore, take as the foundation of my argument 
that such a being exists as Christian Theism pre- 
supposes, and from this I shall argue if a Moral 
Governor of the world exists, who is holy, just, and 
righteous, when we take into consideration the 
evident imperfection of the present moral order of 
things, that the conclusion is inevitable that it 
is absolutely necessary for the vindication of a 
righteous government, that man should survive the 
dissolution of his body. | 

What, then, are the phenomena which the moral 
world presents on the assumption that man perishes 
at death ? 

1. That it is undeniable that virtuous men are not 
rewarded, nor evil men punished according to their 
deserts. 

2. That in numerous cases a career of successful 
villainy would be the more prudent course to pursue 
than one of self-sacrificing virtue; and that the only 
thing which a man of evil propensities would have 
to consider would be whether in gratifying them 


304 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


he has sufficient astuteness to avoid detection, and 
thereby escape the penalties which society inflicts on 
evildoers for its own protection. 

3. That such is the condition of the moral world 
as it presents itself to our view, that if man perishes 
at death, the old saying, “ Let us eat and drink for 
to-morrow we die,” would be the most rational guide 
of life. The principle involved in this saying admits 
of the following general application. It is best, if man 
perishes in the grave, that during life’s brief day 
each man should gratify his own particular tastes, 
be they what they may, and pursue the course of 
conduct which he thinks will be most conducive to 
his own happiness ; for life is not only short, but 
its duration is so uncertain, that it is impossible to 
say, whether anyone may live to realize a distant 
good. On the other hand, death is certain at no 
distant day, when the virtuous and the vicious, the 
greatest self-sacrificer for the good of others and he 
who has lived in the gratification of his most selfish 
appetites, will alike pass into a state of unconscious- 
ness, from which there will be no awakening; and if 
from some error in judgment, a course of conduct 
has been pursued which has made life a burden, it 
will not be difficult to find an exit from it which will 
be comparatively painless. It is evident that if this 
principle were acted upon it would convert the moral 
world into astate of hopeless confusion ; yet it is the 
legitimate conclusion from the principle in question. 


MAN'S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 305 


This position involves such serious consequences, 
that the anti-theistic Utilitarian will doubtless reply 
that a virtuous life will be far more conducive to 
a man’s own happiness than a vicious one; and 
that it is wise to sacrifice present pleasure, and to 
submit to present self-sacrifice, for the purpose of 
realizing future good. How, I ask, are the over- 
Whelming majority of mankind to be convinced of 
the truth of either of these positions? The second 
is easily disposed of, for so uncertain is life’s dura-- 
tion, that it is impossible to calculate whether it 
will be prolonged a sufficient time to enable the 
self-sacrificer to reap the fruit of his self-denial ; 
and if it is not thus prolonged, it is evident that 
the sacrifice of present happiness in pursuit of a 
future good, has been a folly. But the principle 
on which this system of morality is founded, affirms 
that what we call virtue is the pursuit of that line 
of conduct which will most conduce to the realiza- 
tion of our own happiness, and that of others, 
without regard to any other consideration. In 
other words, it makes virtue to be dependent on 
the power of rightly calculating the results of ac- 
tions ; and vice to be the result of the want of this 
power, or of the careless use of it. But the 
majority of mankind are not good calculators; and 
are, therefore, certain to arrive at opposite conclu- 
sions as to what that course of conduct is which 
will realize their own happiness, for respecting this, 

20 


306 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


tastes differ widely ; and what the line of conduct 
- which will do so is, each man must be the sole 
judge. Thus, a man in whom the desire for sensual 
gratification predominates will never arrive at the 
conclusion that a life of self-denial, in the hope of 
attaining some future good which he may. never 
live to attain, will be the best means of realizing 
his own greatest happiness. How, I ask, is it 
possible to prove that crime will not effect this, if 
the perpetrator can manage to escape detection ? 
At any rate, one whom unbelievers do not deny 
to have been one of the greatest self-sacrificers 
for what he believed to be the good of others, has 
recorded the following opinion: ‘If in this life 
only we have hoped in Christ, we are of all men 
most pitiable.’” The actual experiences of those 
who have spent long years in labours, self-denial, 
and suffering, in promoting the good of others, in 
doing what they were persuaded to have been their 
duty to do, are of more weight than the theories and 
the speculations of a multitude of philosophers. 

4. The following are the results which a careful 
survey of the moral world presents to the observer, 
whether he views it in the light of the history of 
the past, or of the facts of the present. Moral 
evil, social evil, and political evil, have been and 
still continue widespread. The self-sacrificer for 
the good of others receives no adequate return for 
his labours and sufferings, if his existence perishes 


MAN SISURVIVARSARIER DEATH: 307 


at death. The noble army of martyrs have yielded 
up their lives in torture, and no avenger has ap-- 
peared. The wicked have flourished, great crimes 
have been perpetrated, the righteous have suffered, 
and the heavens have not thundered. The astute 
villain frequently escapes human justice, and there is 
no visible Divine interference to punish him. Suffer- 
ing, not self-caused, frequently meets with neither 
alleviation nor compensation here. The history of 
the past testifies that strength and intellectual power, 
united with moral unscrupulousness, persistent self- 
seeking regardless of the consequences to others, 
ambition which sacrifices the lives of thousands for 
its gratification, and other similar qualities too 
numerous to mention, have been those which have 
obtained the victory in the struggle of life, while 
those mental qualities on which the Sermon on the 
Mount pronounces its most emphatic blessing, and 
which none will venture to pronounce to be mean 
and despicable, have gone to the wall ; and although 
this state of things is less prevalent in modern 
Christendom, it still far too frequently meets the 
eye. of the observer even-there. Init, it is true 
that holiness, disinterestedness, self-sacrifice, and 
even a conscientious adhesion to a sense of duty, 
not unfrequently forces vice to render a kind of 
homage to virtue; but the satire of the Roman 
satirist still continues far too true: “Virtue is 
praised and allowed to perish in the cold.” 


308 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


If, then, man perishes with his body, what, I ask, 
becomes of a righteous government of God? It is 
certain that if he does so, it must be confined to this 
life only; and that after death the righteous have 
nothing to hope, nor the wicked to fear. What, 
then, is the inevitable conclusion? I answer, that 
although some rudiments of a moral government 
may be discoverable, in the fact that certain penal- 
ties are attached to certain sins as their inevitable 
consequences, yet the government of the moral 
world, if viewed in the light of this life alone, is of 
a very imperfect character. Are we, then, to deny 
that a Righteous Moral Governor exists ? As I have 
already observed, the proof of His existence which 
has been given in the preceding pages leaves it no 
longer an open question. Unless, then, our reason 
is to be hopelessly confounded, there must be another 
alternative, namely, that this life is only the beginning 
of human existence, and that man is destined to- 
survive the stroke of death; or, to adopt the words 
of an Apostle, God “has appointed a day, in the 
which He will judge the world in righteousness by 
the Man whom He hath ordained; whereof He 
hath given assurance unto all men, in that He hath 
raised Him from the dead.” 

5. One further argument requires our attention, 
namely, that founded on the all but universal 
belief which has been entertained by mankind that 
there is something in man which survives the 


MAIN SS SORIIVALVARLER “DEATH. 309 
death of the body. I say the “ail but universal 
belief,” because doubts have been expressed whether 
some degraded savage races entertain this _ belief, 
or even whether they have any religious ideas 
whatever. Whether this be so or not rests on the 
reports of travellers, many of whose opinions on 
this subject have been proved on subsequent in- 
vestigation to have been inaccurate. However this 
may be, it will be unnecessary to discuss the ques- 
tion of their accuracy, because it is certain that 
the belief that there is something in man, which 
survives the stroke of death, is so widespread both 
among civilized and savage races, as to amount to 
a practical universality. Many of these beliefs are 
doubtless sufficiently grotesque; but making all 
allowance for this, the fact remains that the belief 
exists, and that it is all but, if not quite, as univer- 
salas man. The only point which concerns us in 
our present inquiry is, What has suggested this 
belief ? 

I.—It is impossible that it can have originated 
in a course of reasoning. The intellect of savage 
races is far too imperfectly developed to render such 
an account of its origin a possible one. 

II.—A belief in our survival after death is certainly 
not one of our primary intuitions. 

III.—As its origin cannot have been derived from 
either of these sources, it follows that there must 
be something in the primary constitution of man 


310 CHRISTIANVIT HEL SM: 


which has suggested it, and which even the state 
of degradation into which savage man has fallen 
has not been able to obliterate. This being so, a 
belief which is suggested by man’s primary con- 
stitution cannot be a delusion pure and simple, but 
must have a reality of some kind which corresponds 
to it. 

Opponents of this belief have thought it necessary 
to propound theories to account for its origin on 
anti-theistic principles. It will be sufficient to notice 
two of them. 

(i) That the intensity of the desire that men have 
to live, has suggested the idea of a survival after 
death. 

(ii) That the fact that some men have seen their 
departed friends in dreams, has suggested the idea 
that they have not only survived the dissolution of 
their bodies, but that they had actually appeared. 

With respect to the first of these theories, it will 
be sufficient to remark that men have numerous and 
very strong desires, which do not suggest the idea 
of their future realization. Why, then, should this 
particular desire suggest the belief that man will 
survive the stroke of death not only to a few in- 
dividuals, but produce an all but universal belief 
that he will do so; and that, too, in the face of the 
phenomena of death, which, at least in the case of 
savages, have all the appearance of a termination of 
existence ? 


MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 311 


To discuss the nature of dreams would fall 
outside the limits of this work. One thing, how- 
ever, respecting them is certain. The occasions 
on which we see our departed friends in dreams 
are comparatively rare. The thing to be accounted 
for is not what such ideal appearances may have 
suggested to a few individuals, but how is it 
possible that they can have suggested the idea 
of an existence after death to the uncivilized 
races of mankind in every part of the globe, 
however little intercourse they may have had with 
one another. It will scarcely be urged that the 
idea was likely to have occurred except to a few. 
Are we, then, to assume that these turned mission- 
aries, and proclaimed this truth to their brother 
savages, and that they succeeded in inducing them 
to embrace it? But other strange appearances 
present themselves in dreams with the utmost 
vividness, which, whatever effect they may produce 
for the moment, not even savages continue to 
believe in as objective reality. Why, I ask, should 
this one in particular obtain an all but universal 
acceptance ? 

I conclude, therefore, that these and_ similar 
theories are utterly unable to account for the all but 
universal belief both of civilized and savage men, 
that there is something in man which survives the 
dissolution of his body. How, then, can the belief 
have originated? I answer that inasmuch as it is 


312 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


impossible that savage man can have arrived at 
it by a process of reasoning it must have been 
suggested by something which is inherent in the 
constitution of human nature. 

I fully admit that neither of these five reasons, 
nor all five taken together, amount to what’ is 
designated a “scientific demonstration.” But, as I 
have shown in a previous chapter, that form of 
reasoning is not the only one which is calculated 
to produce the conviction of absolute certainty 
on the human mind. I submit that the conjoint 
force of the arguments as above stated prove 
that man’s personality will survive the dissolution — 
of his body. 

But that this belief is no phantom of the imagina- 
tion, but has a reality corresponding to it, rests 
not merely on a course of reasoning, but on the 
evidence of fact. There is no more strongly 
attested fact in human history—I may say that 
there is no fact in history which has an equal 
attestation—than that Jesus Christ rose from the 
dead. His renewed life not only rests on the 
testimony of His followers, who believed that they 
held intercourse with Him after He rose from the 
dead—a testimony which all the theories which have 
been propounded by modern unbelief as affording 
a rational account of its origin, have been unable 
to shake; but is borne witness to alike by the 
history of the past and the facts of the present. 


MAN’S SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 313 


Space does not allow me to place the evidence on 
which this great fact rests before the reader here. 
For it I must refer him to my Lampton Lectures: 
“The Jesus of the Evangelists ;” and, on a smaller 
scale, to my Handbook of Christian Evidences. | 
shall only observe in this place, that if the great 
character which is delineated in the Gospels be 
a creation of the imagination, the history of the 
past, and the facts of the present, are inexplicable. 
He Himself has affirmed of His own direct know- 
ledge, and those who were commissioned by Him 
have taught, that our personal existence will not 
cease with the dissolution of our bodies; or in 
other words, that an existence awaits man after 
death. 

The survival of our personal conscious existence 
after the dissolution of our bodies being thus 
established as a fact, consequences follow from it 
which have a most important bearing on the diffi- 
culties connected with Christian Theism. I do not 
say that it dissipates all of them, but it enables us to 
see our way to the solution of no inconsiderable 
number of them. . 

1. The first of the difficulties which have struck men 
in every age is the obvious inequality of the moral 
government of the world, if man perishes at death. 
If, however, this life is only the commencement of 
man’s existence, the world beyond the grave will 
afford an ample sphere for the correction of those 


apparent inequalities in the Divine government, the 
solution of which baffles our reason, if our existence 
is limited to the present life. 

2. The survival of our conscious personality will 
afford an ample sphere for the vindication of the 
Divine justice in the government of the world which 
is obviously imperfect under the present order of 
things, and for the exercise of the Divine mercy. 

3. It will also remove the difficulty caused by the 
want of opportunity for the exercise of those powers 
and faculties with which man is endowed, referred 
to in the previous argument, if human existence 
perishes at death. That opportunity which, for 
reasons into which we cannot penetrate, has been 
denied him here may be afforded him hereafter. 
This being so, the objection so often urged: Where- 
fore hast Thou made so large a portion of the human 
race in vain, falls to the ground. 

4. It is a certain fact that the characters of a vast 
majority, even of Christian people, when they die are 
so imperfect as to render them unfit, without 
further purification, to enter into the society and the 
employments and enjoyments of the holy. Many 
imagine that the necessary change will be effected by 
a special interposition of the Divine power, but for 
this belief there is no foundation either in reason or 
in Revelation. We are assured, however, that in 
our Father’s house there are many mansions; and 
there is nothing irrational in believing that some of 


MANS SURVIVAL AFTER DEATH. 315 


them may be adapted for completing the work of 
purification which was left imperfect here. 

5. It is an obvious fact that an overwhelming 
majority of mankind pass the period of their proba- 
tion here under very unfavourable conditions. ‘This 
is true of vast numbers even in Christian countries. 
The unhappy condition of those who are born, and 
pass that portion of their lives in which the founda- 
tions of character are laid, in an atmosphere replete 
with vice and crime is such that I need not describe 
it. But nearly three-quarters of the human race at 
present in existence, have not only not had the 
benefit of the Christian revelation, but have perhaps 
not even heard of it. A future state will afford 
ample scope for the correction of these apparent 
inequalities; and the character which Christian 
Theism ascribes to God affords the strongest reason 
for believing that He will afford them those oppor- 
tunities for the formation of a holy character which, 
for reasons into which we cannot penetrate, have 
been withheld from them here. 

6. As we are at present constituted our bodies are 
the instruments through which we perceive, feel, 
think, and act; and their imperfections produce no 
small influence on our intellects, our characters, and 
our conduct. I need not attempt to prove this, for 
every one of us is only too painfully conscious of it, 
I will only refer to one example of it, the effect which 
a disordered nervous system exerts on our tempers. 


316 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


But when death takes place our connection with our 
body will cease, and whatever influence for evil its 
imperfections exert upon us will cease with it, 
Our existence after our connection with our bodies 
ceases must be an existence under wholly different 
conditions from our present one, but what these 
conditions will be is known only to Him who knows 
all things. | 

The reader will observe that, throughout this work, 
I have avoided entering on the discussion of the 
question of man’s natural immortality. My reason 
for adopting this course is that it is needless to do 
so, for all that my argument requires is, that our 
conscious personality, z.e. ourselves, should continue 
to exist for a period sufficiently long to afford oppor- 
tunity for the vindication of the moral government 
of God—a vindication which our reason, conscience, 
and moral sense affirm to be impossible if our con- 
scious existence is confined to the short term of our 
continuance here. To have discussed what is called 
the question of man’s natural immortality would have 
involved the subject we have been considering in 
needless difficulties. One thing alone is certain—that 
the universe and everything in it is upheld in being 
by the energetic action of the Creator’s will. In the 
words of the author of the Apocalypse: He has 
created all things; and through fis wi// they are 
(that is, they exist) and were created. His energetic 
action upholds in existence both the evil and the 


is the will of the Creator to withdraw that energy, 
both alike must pass into non-existence. But .into 
what that purpose is, no faculty of man can pene- 
trate by any course of reasoning. It can only be 
known by a revelation. 

I have only to observe, in conclusion, that the 
difficulties above referred to, and the moral govern- 
ment of God, assume a wholly different aspect if we 
contemplate human life as confined to the brief space 
Olemans existence here or as extended over the 
indefinite periods of time called in the New Testa- 
ment “the age,” “the ages,” and “the ages of ages.” 
Equally different is the aspect which it will assume 
if we view His government as limited to this incon- 
siderable globe, and those regions which in the 
Bible are designated Hades and Heaven; or as 
embracing the rational inhabitants of the universe 
of worlds, the existence of which the discoveries of 
modern astronomy have rendered indubitable. I 
say ‘rational inhabitants,” because it is incredible, 
if these worlds exist in numbers which surpass the 
powers of human comprehension, that this world 
should be the only place where rational and moral 
beings exist. The whole universe of rational beings 
and moral agents, therefore, must form the subject 
of the government of God. If, then, it embraces 
all space, and extends to endless periods of time, 
who shall assign limits to the possibilities of the 


318 CHRISTIAN THEISM. 


future ? or affirm that boundless power and wisdom, 
united with perfect holiness, justice, and benevolence, 
will not ultimately work out the greatest possible 
good, notwithstanding the clouds and darkness 
by which some of His present dispensations are 
surrounded ? 


Printed by Hazell, Watson, & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury. 


Ve 


Ahab 
w ay egit 


i, 
te) We 
imi 


